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This dissertation studies the determinants and consequences of capital in-
flows and foreign currency (FX) debt in emerging markets. Chapter 1 summa-
rizes the topics, questions addressed, and findings. Chapter 2 studies the effects
of balance sheet shocks driven by FX debt using a unique dataset of firm FX ex-
posures matched with firm-bank lending data from listed firms in Mexico. I find
that smaller non-exporters with FX mismatch see a decrease in loan growth, re-
sulting in stagnant employment growth and decreased growth in physical capital
relative to firms with less FX mismatch. Larger non-exporters with FX mismatch
also have lower loan growth in FX following the shock, but are able to increase
borrowing in Peso, resulting in higher growth in employment and physical capi-
tal relative to firms with less FX mismatch. My results imply that net worth based
borrowing constraints are tighter for smaller firms and for loans in FX. I present
a stylized model that rationalizes these findings.
Chapter 3 examines how international capital flows into a country, that is
by which sector capital flows in and out, and what drives those flows. To do so,
we construct a new dataset of capital inflows and outflows split by sector. We
establish four new stylized facts highlighting the differences in responses by sec-
tor to local and global shocks. These new facts are inconsistent with the standard
models in which all foreign and domestic agents invest or disinvest in the same
countries as a response to domestic and global shocks.
Chapter 4 examines the link between the global financial cycle (proxied by
the VIX) and the currency composition of lending by emerging market banks.
I construct a country-panel dataset of lending shares in FX, and show that this
moves positively with the VIX. Countries that are more open to capital inflows or
have poorly capitalized banking systems, however, tend to lend more in FX when
VIX is low. Using matched firm-bank data from Mexico, I find that the positive
association of FX lending with global liquidity holds in the microdata, and that
this relationship is driven by well-capitalized banks.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Foreign currency (FX) credit is pervasive in emerging markets (EM). Of-
ten denominated in US Dollars, this credit enters the country via international
capital flows. With the large increase in financial integration and capital flows
over the last 30 years, emerging markets have become more exposed to swings
in international credit conditions. Global shifts in credit and portfolio allocation
can drastically affect the buildup of credit and the consequences when that credit
dries up. Understanding how capital flows and FX credit enter a country and
the implications for financial stability and risk are important questions in inter-
national finance and macro and particularly relevant given the current scale of
international capital integration. This dissertation addresses these questions.
In Chapter 2, I study the impact that foreign currency (FX) borrowing has
on firms following a large depreciation. More generally, I address how negative
shocks to firm net worth (balance sheet shocks) affect firm activity. I construct
a novel dataset of currency exposures and loan level borrowing and examine
both the financial and real consequences of negative balance sheet shocks due to
foreign currency mismatch.
Firms that have FX debt in excess of their FX assets have a currency mis-
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match on their balance sheets. In the event of a large local currency depreciation,
if these positions are unhedged, the firm experiences a drop in their net worth
(due to the inflated burden of their FX debt in local currency terms). This decline
in net worth matters if firms face binding borrowing constraints that depend on
their net worth. Thus, firms borrowing in foreign currency may find themselves
unable to obtain credit following a large depreciation, leading to a decline in real
economic activity. This mechanism is central to many macroeconomic models
and can serve to amplify shocks and help explain larger macroeconomic out-
comes.
The existing literature has been challenged to identify these effects. This is
for a few reasons. First, you need data to measure a shock to a firm’s balance
sheet. In this case, that means getting data on the firm’s FX exposure. FX liability
information is scarce, but FX asset and derivative information is scarcer still. Sec-
ond, you need to isolate firm balance sheet shocks from shocks to a firm’s credit
supply, which may be affected from the same shock. This is rarely addressed.
Third, you need data on both the financial and real side of the firm in order to
test the mechanism (loss of credit via borrowing constraints) and connect that to
real economic activity. Most studies just look at the end result on investment.
Lastly, exchange rate shocks are often driven by endogenous crises within the
country of study, which can affect firm outcomes through other channels.
I address these challenges by constructing a new dataset of firms in Mex-
ico. This dataset includes data on firm FX liabilities and assets, as well as export
revenues and on balance sheet derivatives positions. This gives me a more com-
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prehensive view of firm FX exposures, enabling me to measure a shock to the firm
balance sheet. An important and unique contribution of this dataset is that it in-
cludes loan level borrowing for each firm, matched up to their banks. This allows
me to control for shocks to bank credit supply by comparing firms of differing FX
exposures who borrow from the same bank at the same time. In addition to this
detailed financial data, the dataset also includes real outcomes like employment
and investment. Lastly, this dataset covers the period surround the collapse of
Lehman Brothers. This shock generated an appreciation of the US Dollar vis-a-
vis many other currencies in the world. Thus, this event generated a large and
very sharp depreciation of the Peso that was not driven by an underlying cur-
rency or banking crisis in Mexico.
I find that firm size and the currency denomination of debt are two impor-
tant characteristics that determine the impact of these constraints. Borrowing
constraints are more binding following adverse balance sheet shocks for smaller
firms, indicating a net worth or size based borrowing constraint, and for foreign
currency loans, suggesting an additional tighter constraint on a firm’s foreign
currency debt. The interaction of these two constraints leads large firms with a
negative shock to decrease their foreign currency borrowing, but allows them to
increase their local currency borrowing and thus remain unconstrained in their
real activity. Small firms who are constrained in their total borrowing contract
their real activity following a negative balance sheet shock. These results are ro-
bust to numerous specifications and controls. These differences by currency of
borrowing are new results in the literature and may help serve to harmonize the
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existing literature by explaining how large firms are sometimes found to do better
following these exchange rate shocks.
I develop a stylized 3 period model of corporate borrowing and investment
to rationalize these findings. The model features simultaneous borrowing in both
foreign and domestic currency, a constraint on total borrowing for the firm, and a
second borrowing constraint on FX debt specifically. The intuition for the model
is that failure of uncovered interest rate parity, common in emerging markets (and
exogenous to the model), makes foreign currency borrowing attractive despite
the risk. When a depreciation hits, small firms with FX mismatch experience a
negative shock to their net worth and are constrained in their borrowing, and so
must decrease their debt in response to the shock. Large firms with FX mismatch
are likewise constrained in their FX debt due to the shock, but not in their total
borrowing, so they increase their Peso debt in order to invest at the unconstrained
optimum.
Extending the model to allow for differences in firm productivity helps
explain why large firms with large balance sheet shocks actually increase their
employment and physical capital growth relative to less shocked firms. In the
model, firms that are more productive are willing to borrow more in foreign cur-
rency because the likelihood of future constraints binding is lower. This generates
a selection into foreign currency borrowing for firms with higher future produc-
tivity. When a depreciation hits, the smaller of these firms are constrained as
before, but larger firms are unconstrained and so are able to increase their invest-
ment via Peso borrowing to the new optimal level, despite the shock.
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This research has a number of important implications. When examining the
risk posed due to FX borrowing, it is important to analyze the FX exposure of
the universe of firms, and not just the listed firms (who are more likely to have
the data). As the larger firms appear not to be negatively affected, the negative
impacts observed in the aggregate may be driven by firms in the smaller half
of the distribution (who are more likely to be constrained if hit by a negative
balance sheet shock). Further, large firms may crowd out small firms from the
Peso market and may thus generate negative effects through capital misalloca-
tion. Another implication is that the liquidity of the domestic currency in the
banking system is relevant for risk assessment of FX borrowing as the domestic
currency market serves as a substitute for firms that lose access to FX credit.
Given the consequences of FX debt buildup on corporate balance sheets, it is
important to understand how internatinoal capital arrives in a country. In Chap-
ter 3, joint work with Stefan Avdjiev, Şebnem Kalemli-Özcan, and Luis Servén,
I explore the drivers of capital flows, specifically examining the sector of the
economy that is involved. That is, I seek to understand by which sector inter-
national capital flows, mostly consisting of foreign currency, enter and leave a
country. It is widely recognized that international capital flows have nontrivial
consequences for the transmission of real and financial shocks across borders and
for macroeconomic outcomes across countries. Likewise, the domestic macroeco-
nomic environment and global shocks affect the volume and direction of capital
flows. However, the sector composition of capital flows has received compara-
tively much less attention. Yet, it is apparent from the history of financial crises
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that the vulnerability to external shocks can vary greatly depending on which
economic sector(s) are on the receiving side of capital inflows.
An important contribution of Chapter 3 is to introduce a new comprehen-
sive dataset on gross capital inflows and outflows at the quarterly frequency for a
balanced panel of 85 countries for inflows and 31 countries for outflows. In ad-
dition to reporting total inflows and outflows, we also report the decomposition
by borrower and lender sectors. Our dataset has two distinct advantages over
existing datasets. First, the large number of developing countries and emerg-
ing markets is a big advantage of our capital inflows dataset relative to standard
sources. Second, our sectoral breakdown of debt inflows and outflows into 3 bor-
rowing groups, i) sovereigns (which we sometimes separate into government and
central bank sectors), ii) banks, and iii) corporates, is of utmost importance since
greater international financial integration increases the risk of crises through debt
linkages.
Using our dataset, we establish 4 new stylized facts for capital flows. First,
the well-known positive correlation between capital inflows and outflows is driven
by banking flows, mainly by global banks in advanced countries. Second, we
find that, during domestic economic downturns, inflows to domestic banks and
corporates decline in all countries. In terms of outflows, banks in advanced coun-
tries invest less abroad, whereas banks and corporates in emerging markets do
not respond to their own business cycles in terms of outflows. Third, in response
to a country-specific slowdown, private and public inflows respond in opposite
directions—a fact driven by emerging markets’ sovereigns. While inflows to the
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private sector decline in response to economic downturns in emerging markets,
sovereigns behave in a countercyclical manner by borrowing more from abroad
and drawing down reserves. Fourth, in response to adverse global credit supply
shocks, such as an increase in the VIX, inflows to banks and corporates decline,
while domestic banks and corporates invest less abroad, decreasing their out-
flows. Sovereigns do not respond to such supply shocks on average.
These four facts stand in contrast to standard international macroeconomic
models, which treat domestic and foreign investors symmetrically. In those mod-
els, all agents respond to an expansion in the domestic economy by investing
more in the domestically and vice versa during a downturn. Likewise, for global
shocks, since all countries are affected, the models predict no difference in the
way domestic and foreign agents respond. In contrast, our results imply that
foreign and domestic investors behave differently in response to domestic and
global shocks, where “investors” are sectors such as banks, corporates and the
public sector.
Global conditions can be important drivers of international capital flows as
they enter domestic economies, with the banking sector playing an important
role in intermediating those flows. In Chapter 4, I address how global liquidity
affects FX lending by banks in emerging markets. I analyze the role of the do-
mestic banking sector as a transmission point for global liquidity and how the
currency composition of bank lending is affected. With a new dataset of the for-
eign currency loan share of the banking sector, I explore the link between global
liquidity and foreign currency lending in emerging markets.
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To address this question, I construct a country-level panel dataset of the
foreign currency share of lending by the domestic banking sector of 43 emerg-
ing markets. Using this dataset, I document 2 new facts: First, I document that
tighter global liquidity conditions, as measured by the VIX, are associated with
a higher share of a country’s external debt attributable to the domestic banking
sector. It is not obvious why this should be the case, as easier credit conditions in
international markets (associated with periods of low VIX) should be associated
with a relative increase in foreign currency lending. Second, I find that tighter
global monetary conditions lead to a larger share of bank loans in FX. This re-
sult goes against the conventional wisdom that foreign currency lending should
be more pervasive when funding markets for foreign currencies are more liquid.
I analyze these relationship through formal regression analysis and explore the
role of country characteristics in that transmission.
In order to identify this relationship, I use a matched firm-bank dataset of
loan relationships from a significant emerging market, Mexico, and explore the
role of bank characteristics in transmission. This dataset consists of all lending
relationships of non-financial firms listed on the Mexican Stock Exchange (BMV).
It includes information on the volume of the lending relationship and currency of
borrowing (foreign vs domestic). I match this data up to bank balance sheet infor-
mation from Bankscope. This allows me to examine which bank characteristics
matter for the transmission of global liquidity conditions into FX bank lending.
While the correlation of FX lending with the VIX may indeed be driven by push
factors associated with global liquidity channeled through banks, it could also
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be driven by demand side factors. The matched nature of the dataset allows me
to control for firm demand in each currency by including firm-quarter-currency
fixed effects. Thus, I focus on the role of bank characteristics interacted with
global liquidity in determining the lending outcomes.
In the country-level panel, I find that global liquidity (as proxied by the VIX)
is highly positively correlated with the share of domestic bank loans in foreign
currency. This relationship is robust across many specifications. Capital inflows
to the banking sector also correlate positively with loans in FX, indicating the
role domestic banks may play in transmitting global financing and financial con-
ditions to domestic borrowers. Country characteristics such as capital account
openness, fixed exchange rates, and institutional quality don’t appear to change
these relationships. Banking sector capital does appear to affect the VIX-FX lend-
ing relationship, but not in a robust way in the macro data.
In the matched firm-bank panel, I confirm the positive relationship of the
VIX with foreign currency lending. Even after adjusting for valuation effects,
an increase in the VIX is associated with faster growth in FX credit relative to
Peso credit. This result holds after controlling for time-varying firm and bank
characteristics. Banks that are better capitalized drive this positive relationship.
Indeed, the positive relationship of FX loan growth (relative to Peso loan growth)
with the VIX for better capitalized banks gets stronger after controlling for firm-
specific demand in foreign and domestic currency. This implies on the other end
that poorly capitalized banks lend more in FX when global funding is loose, but
restrict their FX lending when times are tight (relative to their domestic currency
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lending). These results suggest that capitalization of the domestic banking sector
may influence how strongly global financial conditions affect FX lending in a
country.
Together, these three chapters of my dissertation help to fill in some of the
gaps in our understanding of foreign currency debt and capital flows in emerg-
ing markets. This research is important for the current policy debate seeking to
understand spillovers from global financial conditions to emerging makrets and
the implications for these movements on financial risk and stability.
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Chapter 2: Foreign Currency Borrowing, Balance Sheet Shocks, and
Real Outcomes
2.1 Introduction
Much of the credit extended to emerging market firms is denominated in
foreign currencies.1 In this paper, I study the impact that foreign currency (FX)
borrowing has on firms following a large depreciation. More generally, I address
how negative shocks to firm net worth (balance sheet shocks) affect firm activ-
ity. I construct a novel dataset of currency exposures and loan-level borrowing
and examine both the financial and real consequences of negative balance sheet
shocks due to foreign currency mismatch.
Standard theory predicts that balance sheet shocks, with no offsetting changes
to firm revenue, will lead to tighter borrowing constraints and a consequent de-
cline in real activity. I find that firm size and the currency denomination of debt
are two important characteristics that determine the impact of these constraints.
Borrowing constraints are more binding following adverse balance sheet shocks
for smaller firms, indicating a net worth or size-based borrowing constraint, and
1See Caballero, Panizza, and Powell (2014); Chui, Kuruc, and Turner (2016); Du and Schreger
(2015); Maggiori, Neiman, and Schreger (2017); R. N. McCauley, McGuire, and Sushko (2015);
Shin (2013).
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for foreign currency loans, suggesting an additional tighter constraint on a firm’s
foreign currency debt. The interaction of these two constraints leads large firms
with a negative shock to decrease their foreign currency borrowing, but allows
them to increase their local currency borrowing and thus remain unconstrained
in their real activity. Small firms who are constrained in their total borrowing
contract their real activity following a negative balance sheet shock.
Balance sheet effects are difficult to identify empirically because it is hard
to separate out changes in outcomes due to firm balance sheet shocks from other
channels. For example, shocks to the supply of bank credit (the bank lending
channel) have been shown to be quantitatively large and important for real out-
comes (Chodorow-Reich, 2014). Firm specific demand shocks are also hard to
separate from the effects of firm-specific balance sheet shocks. Existing empirical
work both in macro and finance cannot cleanly identify balance sheet shocks.
I address these challenges in this paper. I construct a dataset which consists
of firm balance sheets and loan level outcomes for all listed non-financial firms in
Mexico, matched to their banks. This dataset allows me to capture developments
on both the financial and real sides of firm activity, connecting balance sheet ef-
fects to real outcomes. The dataset has two unique features that are crucial to the
identification of a balance sheet shock. First, it includes data on both firms’ FX
assets and FX liabilities. This allows me to construct a measure of true FX expo-
sure (currency mismatch) for each firm and to compare firms with differing levels
of exposure, as larger exposure results in larger shocks to a firm’s balance sheet
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for a given sized depreciation.2 Second, the data includes loan-level information
for each of the banks that the firm borrows from, in both foreign and domes-
tic currency. To my knowledge, this paper is the first to employ such matched
firm-bank data to identify the impacts on the firm of exchange rate-related bal-
ance sheet shocks.3 The matched nature of the data makes it possible to compare
firms who borrow from the same bank in the same currency at the same time and
are thus exposed to the same bank-level shocks to credit supply. Constructing
this comparison using bank*quarter*currency fixed effects controls for changes
to a firm’s supply of credit in either foreign or domestic currency, and isolates
differences in credit outcomes due to idiosyncratic shocks to firms. Failure to
control for bank credit supply shocks can bias estimates of balance sheet effects
if, for instance, firms who borrow more in foreign currency also borrow more
from stronger banks. I show that for regressions estimating the impact of the
balance sheet shock on foreign currency loan borrowing, failure to control for
credit supply shocks can bias the estimated coefficient downward (toward zero)
by 40%.
I analyze the effect of a shock to the exchange rate initiated by the collapse
of Lehman Brothers in 2008. This depreciation was large, unanticipated, and
exogenous to Mexico’s fundamentals. An endogenous exchange rate shock, such
as currency crises used in previous literature, is problematic because the cause of
2Most datasets used in these studies only have data on debt dollarization, but not assets. Ex-
ceptions include Kalemli-Özcan, Kamil, and Villegas-Sanchez (2016), Cowan, Hansen, and Óscar
Herrera (2005b), and Alvarez and Hansen (2017).
3Niepmann and Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2017a) use loan level data to show that firms with a higher
share of foreign currency loans are more likely to default on their loans, though they do not
examine changes in credit or real outcomes for these firms.
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the shock likely also caused changes in outcomes through other channels. If the
shock is anticipated, meanwhile, then firms may endogenously adjust their FX
borrowing and behavior in advance of the shock, leading to mis-measurement of
the balance sheet effect. Thus an exogenous, unanticipated depreciation is ideal
to identify the balance sheet effect.
My analysis focuses on the interaction of the firm’s pre-shock balance sheet
exposure (FX mismatch) with an indicator variable for the period following the
depreciation shock: Exposure f × Shockt. This serves as a difference-in-difference
estimator, capturing the differences in outcomes post-depreciation for firms with
different exposure (and thus different size of balance sheet shock). For financial
outcomes, I focus on loan growth in foreign and domestic currency, and for real
outcomes, I examine growth in employment and physical capital. Examining
financial outcomes is important to identify the channel by which balance sheet
shocks operate, via loss of credit. Examining real outcomes is important to un-
derstand the impacts on economic activity.
Disentangling the balance sheet effect of a depreciation from other corre-
lated effects is a significant empirical challenge. This requires separating the
change in credit outcomes for the firm due to the balance sheet deterioration from
changes in the supply of credit and changes in firm demand for credit. Control-
ling for shocks to credit supply is crucial because such shocks directly affect the
channel by which the balance sheet effect operates, through the credit available
to the firm. I address this issue using the loan level data and controlling for bank
credit supply with bank*quarter*currency fixed effects.
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I take several steps to control for changes in credit demand from the firm
that are not driven by balance sheet shocks. First, I focus on non-exporting firms,
who don’t have significant foreign currency revenues that would increase with
the favorable terms-of-trade change. Second, I control for shocks to broadly de-
fined sectors (such as changes in demand or production costs) either by including
sector interactions (with the shock) or sector*year fixed effects. Third, I control for
time-varying characteristics of the firm that might affect loan demand, including
firm size, leverage, sales, cash, derivatives, exports, and bond credit. Fourth, I
compare the interaction of the shock with FX exposure with other interacted firm
characteristics which may affect firm credit demand following the shock. Fifth,
I compare the responses of large vs. small firms in my sample;4 large and small
firms should both respond to changes in demand, but smaller firms are more
likely to be constrained following an adverse balance sheet shock. The differ-
ential reaction of small and large firms with similar currency mismatch would
indicate whether borrowing constraints are binding due to the balance sheet ef-
fect.
Real outcomes vary at the firm level rather than the loan level. In order to
control for shocks to bank credit supply in regressions on real outcomes, I con-
struct a firm-level measure of bank credit shocks from the loan level data. I show
that this measure can be used as a time varying control when time fixed effects
are included in the regression, enabling me to dynamically control for shocks
4My sample consists of listed firms, who tend to be much larger than other firms in the econ-
omy, so “small” is a relative term. Nevertheless, both large and small firms in my sample will be
subject to similar demand shocks, particularly those in the same sector in the same year, so the
difference in size will be a more salient characteristic.
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to credit supply at the firm level. I then proceed with the same difference-in-
difference estimator as before, controlling for time varying firm characteristics
and firm-specific credit supply shocks, comparing different interactions with the
shock, and comparing outcomes of large and small firms.
For loan outcomes, I find the expected balance sheet effect on foreign cur-
rency loans: firms (non-exporters) with higher currency mismatch decrease their
loan growth more than less exposed firms following the shock. Large firms with
higher mismatch, however, compensate with an even larger increase in local cur-
rency borrowing. Smaller firms do not see this increase in their peso borrowing.
Uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) fails such that foreign currency loans have
lower interest rates and are more attractive to borrowers. However, the switch
from foreign to domestic currency loans by large firms is not driven by changes
in the interest rate differential following the shock. Foreign currency loans remain
consistently cheaper than local currency loans, even comparing within-firm and
within-bank variation in interest rates. This suggests that the switch to Peso loans
is driven by borrowing constraints, where firms are subject to a borrowing con-
straint on their total borrowing and an additional, tighter constraint on their FX
borrowing.
At the firm level, the impact of the shock is largely insignificant when large
and small firms are pooled together. Consistent with results found with loan
outcomes, I find that large, exposed non-exporters (who are able to increase their
total borrowing by switching to Peso) increase their employment and investment,
while small, exposed non-exporters have no change in employment growth and
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decrease their physical capital growth relative to firms with lower mismatch.
These results together suggest that balance sheet shocks can trigger financial con-
straints that affect a firm’s ability to borrow, which can then have real effects.
My results have two implications for policy. First, Peso liquidity and the
health of the domestic banking system may be a relevant factor for risk assess-
ment, as Peso loans provide a substitute for credit lost by large firms who expe-
rience a negative balance sheet shock. This implies that negative balance sheet
effects will be stronger and more likely when a banking crisis accompanies a
currency crisis, the so-called “twin crises” (Kaminsky & Reinhart, 1999). Sec-
ond, negative real effects from balance sheet shocks are more likely to come from
small firms, so the joint distribution of size and FX mismatch is important to un-
derstand the risk to the economy. If the FX mismatch of small and medium firms
is large enough, an aggregate negative effect could be driven by the small firms,
opposite the conventional wisdom that large firms are important for aggregate
effects.
My empirical results suggest that a negative balance sheet shock leads small
firms to decrease their FX debt and decrease their investment, while it leads large
firms to decrease their FX debt, increase their Peso (and thus overall) debt, and
increase their employment and investment. I develop a stylized 3 period model
of corporate borrowing and investment to rationalize these findings. The model
features simultaneous borrowing in both foreign and domestic currency, a con-
straint on total borrowing for the firm, and a second borrowing constraint on FX
debt specifically. A constraint on total borrowing can be thought of as an incen-
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tive compatibility constraint to prevent the firm from overborrowing and finding
defaul to be optimal. However, FX borrowing presents additional risks. The risk
of a depreciation both increases the probability that a firm defaults on its debt and
decreases the value of collateral (denominated in local currency) that the lender
would recover in the event of default, relative to the size of the loan. This added
risk to the bank incentivizes the bank to restrict the amount of foreign currency
debt more tightly (or demand more collateral) than it does for overall debt. With
this rationale, I include borrowing constraints based on net worth, one for total
debt and a more restrictive constraint on FX debt. This matches the firm-level
data, where firm leverage in Peso increases with size up to a point, despite the
cost advantage of FX debt, and then Peso leverage decreases and FX leverage
increases moving to the high end of the firm-size distribution.
The intuition for the model is that failure of uncovered interest rate parity,
common in emerging markets (and exogenous to the model), makes foreign cur-
rency borrowing attractive despite the risk. When a depreciation hits, small firms
with FX mismatch experience a negative shock to their net worth and are con-
strained in their borrowing, and so must decrease their debt in response to the
shock. Large firms with FX mismatch are likewise constrained in their FX debt
due to the shock, but not in their total borrowing, so they increase their Peso debt
in order to invest at the unconstrained optimum.
Extending the model to allow for differences in firm productivity helps ex-
plain one of the more puzzling empirical results: not only are large firms with
large foreign currency mismatches not affected by the shock because they can
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borrow in Peso, they actually increase their employment and physical capital
growth relative to less exposed firms. In the model, firms that are more pro-
ductive are willing to borrow more in foreign currency because the likelihood of
future constraints binding is lower. This generates a selection into foreign cur-
rency borrowing for firms with higher future productivity. When a depreciation
hits, the smaller of these firms are constrained as before, but larger firms are un-
constrained and so are able to increase their investment via Peso borrowing to
the new optimal level, despite the shock.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2.2 summarizes
the literature and clarifies the contribution of this paper; Section 2.3 presents and
describes the data; Section 2.4 provides context for the macroeconomic environ-
ment in Mexico; Section 2.5 describes the identification strategy and results for
outcomes at the firm-bank level; Section 2.6 describes the identification strategy




Much of the empirical work studying firm balance sheet shocks has been
done in the context of exchange rate shocks.5 This literature largely uses firm-
level data and examines the effect on investment of an interaction of firm FX debt
5See Gan (2007) and Chaney, Sraer, and Thesmar (2012) for evidence of a balance sheet channel
in the context of a real estate price shock.
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with exchange rate changes.6 Most papers draw on periods involving a crisis,
with some explicitly using a difference-in-difference approach around the crisis.
Evidence of negative effects from balance sheet shocks has been found in
studies for Mexico (Aguiar, 2005; Pratap, Lobato, & Somuano, 2003), as well as
other emerging markets (Carranza, Cayo, & Galdon-Sanchez, 2003; Cowan et al.,
2005b; Echeverrya, Fergussona, Steinerb, & Aguilara, 2003; Gilchrist & Sim, 2007).
Firms with more FX debt reduce investment following the depreciation, though
exporters fare better. However, several studies find either zero or positive balance
sheet effects (Benavente, Johnson, & Morande, 2003; Bleakley & Cowan, 2008;
Bonomo, Martins, & Pinto, 2003; Luengnaruemitchai, 2003). These positive ef-
fects are sometimes attributed to firms matching their FX debt with FX revenues,
FX assets, or FX derivatives. Very few of these studies have data on FX assets
or derivatives. Exceptions include Kalemli-Özcan, Kamil, and Villegas-Sanchez
(2016), which uses a dummy variable indicator for holdings of FX assets in a sam-
ple of Latin American firms, and Cowan et al. (2005b) and Alvarez and Hansen
(2017), which find that Chilean firms with FX liabilities match with FX assets, FX
revenues, and FX derivatives. Cowan et al. (2005a) shows that controlling for FX
assets can cause the positive and insignificant coefficient on FX debt (interacted
with depreciation) to become negative and insignificant. On the extensive mar-
gin, Kim, Tesar, and Zhang (2015) shows that negative balance sheet shocks due
to FX debt can increase the probability of firm exit. However, they highlight that
6See Table 1 of Cowan, Hansen, and Óscar Herrera (2005a) for a useful comparison of FX ex-
posure measures, countries, samples, outcomes, and controls for FX assets and derivatives across
papers in the literature.
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large firms, who are often used in this literature due to data availability, actually
increase their investment and survival probability following a negative balance
sheet shock, while small firms decrease investment and increase their probability
of exit.
The existing literature largely relies on variation due to crisis episodes with-
out the ability to control for shocks to credit supply. Variation in the exchange
rate during non-crisis periods is also problematic, as it is less sudden and likely
driven by the economy’s fundamentals. Estimates using this variation are thus
more prone to bias from forward looking behavior regarding future exchange rate
realizations and simultaneity of past borrowing and investment affecting future
realizations of the exchange rate. Kalemli-Özcan, Kamil, and Villegas-Sanchez
(2016) provides an identification strategy to separate the balance sheet shock
from credit supply shocks. Using a cross-country dataset on listed firms, they
compare outcomes of exporting firms during currency crises with those in coun-
tries experiencing simultaneous currency and banking crises (the “twin crises”).
They find that during a depreciation, all exporting firms increase investment, but
when the depreciation is accompanied by a banking crisis, only foreign-owned
exporters (who have better access to capital) increase investment. Desai, Foley,
and Forbes (2008) similarly conclude that affiliate firms of US multinationals in
emerging markets are able to bypass credit constraints following sharp depre-
ciations, whereas domestic firms cannot, further illustrating the importance of
accounting for credit access and credit supply.
This paper contributes to and harmonizes the existing empirical literature
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in several ways. In addition to controlling for the value of FX assets, FX rev-
enues, and net derivatives position, I directly control for credit supply shocks us-
ing matched firm-bank data. This allows me to use a sharp depreciation episode
to measure a clear shock to the balance sheet while controlling for correlated
changes in credit conditions. My results confirm those in Kim et al. (2015), find-
ing that the conflicting results in the literature can be driven by the behavior of
large firms. By comparing domestic vs. foreign currency borrowing, I can fur-
ther explain how large firms are able to increase their investment precisely be-
cause they are able to access domestic currency debt, despite a negative balance
sheet shock. This corroborates the evidence shown in Kalemli-Özcan, Kamil, and
Villegas-Sanchez (2016), as a concurrent banking crisis, which reduces domestic
currency liquidity, is more likely to generate negative effects even for large firms.
Thus, crisis episodes in emerging markets are likely to generate negative balance
sheet effects, but these effects measured on data from large firms could be zero or
positive if there is sufficient liquidity in domestic currency loans.
Most of the existing literature does not directly examine how balance sheet
shocks affect access to credit, focusing rather on firm level outcomes like prof-
itability and investment. In addition to examining real outcomes, I test the mech-
anism of the balance sheet channel directly by examining borrowing outcomes
for these firms, cleaned of credit supply shocks, and additionally differentiate the
effects by currency of borrowing. Niepmann and Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2017a) ex-
amines the effects of balance sheet shocks on credit from the bank’s side. They
show evidence of balance sheet effects on loan repayment using loan-level data
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from US banks to firms in many emerging markets, finding that a US dollar ap-
preciation is associated with a higher likelihood of default (becoming past due on
loan payments) for firms with a higher share of loans in FX. This provides direct
evidence that firm risk due to FX mismatch can transfer to banks, even if the bank
has no FX mismatch. My research complements theirs by matching the loan-level
data to firm FX exposures, balance sheets, and real outcomes.
This paper is also related to the literature on the determinants of foreign
currency borrowing.7 I contribute to this literature by examining how exchange
rate balance sheet shocks affect the currency composition of firm borrowing.8
Methodologically, this paper is in line with much of the recent literature on the
bank lending channel, which uses credit registry and other matched firm-bank
data (Chodorow-Reich, 2014; Cingano, Manaresi, & Sette, 2016; Jiménez, On-
gena, Peydró, & Saurina, 2014; Khwaja & Mian, 2008). These papers exploit the
matched nature of their datasets for identification, often by including various
sets of fixed effects to remove confounding variation, including firm-time, bank-
time, or firm-bank fixed effects to control for possible time varying characteristics
of firms and banks and time invariant characteristics of a particular firm-bank
match. Several of these papers specifically analyze the international transmission
of shocks via the banking system (Baskaya, di Giovanni, Kalemli-Özcan, & Ulu,
7See for example Barajas and Morales (2003); Basso, Calvo-Gonzalez, and Jurgilas (2011); Ize
and Levy Yeyati (2003); Luca and Petrova (2008); Rosenberg and Tirpák (2008) for studies us-
ing macro data and Allayannis, Brown, and Klapper (2003); Brown and de Haas (2012); Brown,
Kirschenmann, and Ongena (2014); Brown, Ongena, and Yeşin (2011); Martı́nez and Werner
(2002); Salomao and Varela (2016) for studies using micro data.
8Bonomo et al. (2003) finds a similar result that large firms adjust the currency composition of
their debt towards local currency when exchange rate risk increases.
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2017; Baskaya, di Giovanni, Peydro, Kalemli-Özcan, & Ulu, 2017; Morais, Peydró,
& Ruiz, 2015; Ongena, Peydró, & van Horen, 2015; Ongena, Schindele, & Vonnak,
2016; Schnabl, 2012). While my analysis relies on an international shock (namely,
the dollar appreciation due to the 2008 financial crisis), I focus on the effect of
firm exposure to the shock, controlling for changes in credit supply.
Further, the construction of firm level bank shocks from loan level data is re-
lated to Alfaro, Garcia-Santana, and Moral-Benito (2016); Amiti and Weinstein (in
press); Greenstone, Mas, and Nguyen (2014); Niepmann and Schmidt-Eisenlohr
(2017b). My work makes an important contribution here by proving that these
bank shock estimates can be included dynamically in panel regressions when
properly demeaned.
In the theoretical literature, balance sheet effects are central to many macroe-
conomic and international finance models (Bernanke, Gertler, & Gilchrist, 1999;
Kiyotaki & Moore, 1997). These models rely on a borrowing constraint that de-
pends on the firm’s collateral or net worth. Krugman (1999) adapted this mech-
anism to study the impact of exchange rates and foreign currency debt. Recently
the theoretical literature has incorporated currency mismatch and balance sheet
shocks into general equilibrium environments (Bianchi, 2011; Céspedes, Chang,
& Velasco, 2004; Korinek, 2011; Mendoza, 2010). These papers generally assume
that firms only borrow in FX. Salomao and Varela (2016) constructs a two period
model of firm investment dynamics in which firms can choose a mix of foreign
and domestic currency debt. They find that more productive firms select into
larger FX mismatches, but they do not explore the consequences of balance sheet
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shocks for these firms.
In addition to identifying exchange rate balance sheet shocks in the data,
this paper contributes to the theoretical literature by highlighting the difference
in borrowing constraints by currency. This necessitates considering balance sheet
shocks in an environment where firms can choose the currency of their debt. I
contribute a stylized, partial equilibrium model that illustrates how separate con-
straints on total borrowing and FX borrowing, based on net worth, interact to
affect the borrowing decisions (by currency) and investment decisions of firms.
The tighter constraint on FX borrowing implies that a firm with a negative bal-
ance sheet shock may need to reduce its FX debt, but can increase its Peso debt to
compensate if it is large enough. By extending my model to include selection into
FX debt by more productive firms, my model also helps rationalize the finding
in some of the empirical literature that large firms actually increase investment
following the depreciation, despite the balance sheet shock.
2.3 Data
2.3.1 Data Description
The source of my data is quarterly financial reports of firms listed on the
Mexican stock exchange, the Bolsa Mexicana de Valores (BMV). Non-financial
listed firms are required to submit quarterly financial reports to the BMV, which
are published on the BMV website as well as distributed by the individual firms.9
9The Mexican National Banking and Securities Commission (CNBV) requires reporting of rel-
evant corporate information (i.e. may influence its stock price) to the regulators and public for
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These reports come in pdf form and contain tables for balance sheet statements,
income statements, and cash flow statements. In addition, several annex tables
include more detailed information on sales, sources of credit, and currency com-
position of the balance sheet, among other things. These reports are consolidated,
and so include the positions of any subsidiaries, whether foreign or domestic.
The data from these reports are scraped from the pdf files, harmonized across
different pdf formats and variable names, and assembled into a single dataset.
The reports include standard balance sheet variables, notably the value of
property, plant, and equipment (physical capital) and the value of derivatives
positions. In addition to standard balance sheet variables, a couple of pieces of
information reported are worth noting. Firms report the volume of external sales,
which is exports plus sales by foreign subsidiaries, which gives a more compre-
hensive measure of foreign currency revenue for the firm.10 Also, firms include a
separate line item for total employment in each quarter. This allows me to connect
financial outcomes from the balance sheet with real outcomes like employment
and investment.
The two most important and unique features of this dataset are the data on
currency composition of the balance sheet and the data on sources of credit. The
annex on currency composition lists the assets and liabilities on the balance sheet
all listed issuers on the BMV. Circular 11-28 establishes these reporting requirements, the dissem-
ination of which is managed by the BMV (Ritch, 2001). Under the new Securities Market Law
established in 2006, “listed companies are required to prepare consolidated financial statements
following the standards of the CNBV...The CNBV has established procedures to review financial
statements of the regulated entities in order to enforce compliance with accounting and auditing
requirements...The CNBV is empowered to impose sanctions for the violation of the reporting
requirements.” (OECD, 2008)
10Sales by foreign subsidiaries to buyers in Mexico are assumed to be negligible.
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in foreign currency, split into US dollar and other currencies. On average, about
90% of all foreign currency liabilities for my sample are denominated in USD. As
I cannot determine which foreign currency a given loan is in, I make the simpli-
fying assumption that all bank loans are denominated in USD for the remainder
of the paper. The currency composition of both sides of the balance sheet is used
to give a more complete picture of a firm’s on-balance sheet exposure to an ex-
change rate shock.
The second unique feature of this data is the detail on credit to the firms.
Firms list every loan product that they have outstanding, as well as bonds and
trade credit extended by other firms. For each loan, the firm indicates the name
of the bank extending the loan, the interest rate on the loan, the currency of the
loan (either Peso or FX), and the remaining maturity structure on the loan (how
much of the loan is due within 1 year, within 2 years, etc.). Loans are listed both
from banks resident in Mexico as well as cross-border banks. The combination of
data on a firm’s on-balance sheet foreign currency positions with loan level data,
split by currency, is a unique data contribution that is crucial to identifying the
impact of a balance sheet shock.
My identification strategy relies on using matched firm-bank data on credit
relationships. However, the firms list only the name of the lending bank for
each loan, with no common identifiers. I harmonize by hand all of the bank
names reported in the data, taking account of nicknames, abbreviations, different
spellings, different languages, and name changes for the bank.11 5% of loans by
11Information on each bank (location, ownership, mergers, names and nicknames, etc.) was
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volume are identified only by generic names or grouped together as “Others” or
“Various”. These observations are dropped from the main estimation sample. Of
the remaining loans, 30% (by volume) either list multiple banks as the lenders
or indicate that the loan is a syndicated loan without identifying the bank. In
these cases, I reference information on syndicated loans for these firms from the
Thompson One database. Where it is obvious who the lead bank is, I match the
loan to the lead bank. When I cannot tell who the lead bank is, I match the loan
to the largest bank by assets that I can identify as part of the syndicate. For the
few cases in which the participating banks are unclear, the loan is given its own
unique bank identifier.12 With the banks uniquely identified, loans are aggre-
gated up to the firm-bank-currency-time level.13
All data is presented in thousands of pesos.14 All FX loans are cleaned of
valuation effects and all series are deflated to 2010 pesos using Mexico’s CPI.15
The resulting dataset covers 134 firms over 2008q1-2015q2.16,17
obtained from banks’ individual web pages, wikipedia, and Bloomberg pages. I further match
these banks up to information in Bankscope, when possible, and use that information and notes
in the Foreign Bank Ownership database, provided by Claessens and Van Horen (2014), to further
identify the banks and match them up appropriately for each firm.
12Results are robust to excluding sydicated loans.
13While care has been taken to accurately match firms to banks, note that any error in the
matching process will add noise to the dependent variable, loans. This measurement error works
against my results by attenuating the estimates.
14A few financial reports are presented in thousands of US dollars. These are converted into
Peso using end of period exchange rates.
15After the 1995 Peso crisis, Mexico introduced inflation indexed lending (UDIS) that banks
could use, funded by nominal bonds which shifted the inflation risk to the government. While
such lending began to be used in mortgage lending, its use in corporate lending is scarce.
16 Balance sheet data for these firms is available from 2005q1, but I am unable to examine loan-
level trends before 2008.
17For perspective, there are about 130 firms listed on the BMV at any given time.
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2.3.2 Representativeness
Listed firms in Mexico make up an important part of the economy. The
market capitalization of these firms fluctuates around 30-40% of GDP (source
World Bank, BMV). The vast majority of listed firms in Mexico are non-financial
firms. Between 2008-2014, the total share of GDP from non-financial firms (both
listed and unlisted) was around 62%.18
Listed non-financial firms represent about 7% of total employment in Mex-
ico in 2008.19 Table A.1 plots the share of overall GDP, share of GDP in the non-
financial sector, and share of total credit to the private non-financial sector made
up by my full sample of firms. Listed firms make up around 10% of GDP, and
up to a quarter of all non-financial output in 2009. These firms also absorb a
large volume of formal credit (defined as loans + bonds) in the economy, usually
around 60% of all credit to the private non-financial sector.
The firms in my data account for a large portion of the foreign currency debt
in Mexico. Non-banks in Mexico (which includes government, households, etc.)
had US dollar debt outstanding of $117.7 Billion USD on average in 2008.20 In
that same period, the firms in my data accounted for $55.5 Billion USD in FX debt
(mostly US dollar), which is about 47% of all FX debt for non-banks in Mexico.
Relative to the largest 1000 firms in Mexico, firms in my dataset are at the
18Source for Market capitalization of listed firms is from the World Bank and BMV. Source for
GDP share of non-financial firms is INEGI.
19Source is the 2009 Economic Census in Mexico. For reference, the 1000 largest firms represent
17% of total employment.
20Source: BIS global liquidity indicators.
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top end of the size distribution. Table A.2 shows the average size, employment,
sales, equipment, and operating margin of firms in Mexico in 2008, with data in
the first two columns drawn from the 2009 Economic Census in Mexico.21 While
my sample is not necessarily representative of all firms in Mexico, it does repre-
sent an important segment of the overall economy, so their outcomes have ram-
ifications for the aggregate, as well as potential spillover effects to smaller firms,
such as through production network shocks or credit spillovers. These firms may
also be similar to large firms in other emerging markets, so their behavior could
be more widely informative.
2.3.3 Sample and Summary
For my regression analysis, I drop state owned/controlled firms, utilities,
and non-financial firms that provide auxiliary financial services.22 I also drop a
few firms that are controlled by a parent company in the sample and all firms
with no loans or no loans from an identifiable bank.23
I split the sample into exporters and non-exporters, where exporters are de-
fined as having their median share of external sales to total sales over the sample
greater than 15%. I focus my analysis in this paper on the non-exporter sample,
so as to isolate the balance sheet shock from changes in export revenues, but re-
21Note that I remove the financial firms from the “All Firms” and “1000 Largest Firms” samples.
The 1000 largest firms are then the 921 largest non-financial firms.
22The only quasi public firm is PEMEX, while the only auxiliary financial firm is American
Express Mexico.
23Some firms group smaller loans into ”various” or ”others” categories, and some loans are
identified with too generic a name for the bank in order to identify which bank it is. This drops
5% of loan volume from the sample.
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sults for exporters are in the appendix for comparison. I also split the sample by
firm size, where “small’ is defined as having average size (measured by log as-
sets) below the sample median.24 These splits break the firms roughly in half for
each group in the regression sample, as shown in Table 2.1. While large firms are
split evenly between the exporter and non-exporter samples, more of the smaller
firms are non-exporters.
These firms are spread across a variety of (broadly defined) sectors, shown
in Table 2.2, though half of the firms and observations are in the manufacturing
sector. These sectoral differences may be relevant for how firms are affected by
and respond to the exchange rate shock and global recession. I address this in
Section 2.5.
As my identification strategy relies on comparing different firms borrow-
ing from the same bank, Table 2.3 summarizes the banking relationships in the
regression sample. The vast majority of firms and loan volume in the sample are
covered by firms that maintain multiple banking relationships, with firms aver-
aging close to 7 simultaneous bank relationships. On the bank side, there are
many more banks in this sample than there are firms. This is due to the sample
being large listed firms that borrow both domestically and internationally. In ad-
dition to borrowing from banks resident in Mexico, each firm may borrow from
any one of a wide variety of cross-border banks. This makes it more likely that
these banks will lend to just one firm in the sample. Despite having a large num-
ber of banks with only one relationship with a firm in the sample, between 73-90%
24My results are robust to adjusting these cutoffs.
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of total loan volume is covered by banks with multiple borrowers in sample. The
average number of lending relationships in the sample for the full set of banks
is around 3, but that number doubles when single relationship banks (which are
dropped with the inclusion of bank-quarter fixed effects) are excluded.
Including the extensive set of fixed effects in separate samples reduces the
firm sample size to 93 firms. Table 2.4 shows how the full sample, regression sam-
ple, and fixed effects sample compare. Dropping to the main regression sample
results in firms that are slightly larger, have lower cash holdings, export slightly
more, and have mildly higher FX exposure. Relative to the full sample, the fixed
effect sample is similar except that the cash holdings are about the same and
the levels of physical capital are a little smaller. The only significant differences
between the regression and fixed-effect samples are that the fixed effect sample
firms are slightly larger on average with more employees. Otherwise, my regres-
sion samples are generally indicative of the set of listed non-financial firms in
Mexico.
Table 2.5 summarizes the loan observations of the regression sample, aggre-
gated to the firm-bank-currency level. Interest rates are loan weighted averages
up to the firm-bank-currency level. Non-exporters tend to have slightly more
and larger loan relationships in peso than they do in FX, whereas exporting firms
have substantially more and larger loan relationships in FX. However, both ex-
porter and non-exporter firms have lower interest rates on their FX borrowing
than their Peso borrowing, on average.25 Across both groups and both curren-
25 These are simple averages of the interest rates calculated at the firm-bank-currency level. I
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cies, firms tend to have about half of their outstanding loans due within 1 year.
These firms thus may need to roll over both their Peso and FX bank debt fre-
quently.
A key variable in my analysis is the firm’s foreign currency exposure (mis-
match). I define this exposure as
Exposure f ,t =
FXLiabilities f ,t − FXAssets f ,t
Assets f ,t
(2.1)
which captures the net share of assets that is exposed to foreign currency mis-
match. As a firm increases its FX exposure, it makes itself more vulnerable to a
depreciation that will have larger negative effects on the balance sheet. Table 2.6
explores the characteristics of firms that have more exposure prior to the shock.
In the left panel, firms in the telecom sector have the largest mismatch, while
the manufacturing sector, which accounts for the largest share of firms, has the
second highest exposure. Since exposure is not even across sectors, it will be im-
portant to make sure that the effects are driven by exposure and not by sectoral
differences. The right panel presents correlation coefficients for Exposure f ,t with
other firm characteristics. Exposure is higher for firms that are larger in terms
of assets and physical capital, and that have higher leverage, less cash holdings,
and a higher share of exports.26 Leverage is the strongest correlate. I control
for all of these variables in my regression analysis, and allow for interactions of
formally test the difference between FX and Peso interest rates in loan weighted regressions in
Table 2.11.
26Note that my non-exporter sample can still have non-zero FX revenues. While these revenues
are still small and infrequent, I control for them directly in the empirical analysis.
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these attributes with the shock period dummy to ensure that I am not measuring
a spurious relationship of exposure to outcomes.
The comparison between exporting and non-exporting firms highlights the
degree of exposure in the non-exporting firms. Figure 2.1 plots the time series
for the average share of sales to external purchasers (whether through exports or
direct sales by foreign subsidiaries), with scale on the left axis, and the average
on-balance sheet FX exposure, with scale on the right axis. Exporters on average
receive 40-45% of their revenues from external buyers, whereas the non-export
sample average is closer to 5% of their sales. Despite the substantial difference in
potential FX revenue, non-exporting firms still have a relatively high exposure to
FX, between 5-10% as compared to the exporter average of 10-15%. Hence while
exporters may have their balance sheet positions sufficiently hedged by their FX
revenues, it is less likely that the balance sheet positions of non-exporting firms
are adequately hedged.
To further illustrate the importance of my measure of mismatch, Figure 2.2
plots Exposure f ,t for my firms against the share of their loans denominated in FX.
As is evident in the figure, the amount of FX loan borrowing does not always give
an accurate picture of the currency exposure of the firm. Some firms with 100%
of their loans in FX have a negative exposure due to their holdings of FX assets,
while some firms with 0% of their loans in FX have positive exposure, due to FX
borrowing in other forms (bonds, etc.).
The large, listed firms in my sample have many sources of financing and
borrow both in peso and in FX. Figure 2.3 shows the liability structure of the
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exporters and non-exporters in my regression sample.27 Loans are an important
part of these firms’ liabilities, especially so for exporters at the beginning of the
sample. Exporters show a heavy reliance on FX loans early in the sample, but
reduce that segment over time, replacing it with other sources, particularly FX
bonds. Non-exporters, despite having little revenue denominated in FX, begin
the sample with half of their loans denominated in FX. Use of Peso loans becomes
increasingly important for these firms following the exchange rate shock in late
2008 and continuing through 2013.28
2.4 Context For Mexico
The source of the balance sheet shock comes from a sharp depreciation of
the exchange rate in late 2008. The collapse of Lehman brothers in the US precipi-
tated the global financial crisis. One important effect that accompanied this crisis
was an appreciation of the US dollar vis-a-vis almost every other currency. The
US Dollar Mexican Peso exchange rate is plotted in Figure 2.4. The depreciation
of the peso was both sudden and unexpected. This is important for my identifi-
cation because firms were not adjusting their currency positions in anticipation
of a depreciation, and the exchange rate shock was not driven by Mexico’s fun-
damentals. The currency movement was also large, as the dollar appreciated by
55% against the Peso.29
27Exporters are defined as having their median external sales (exports+sales by foreign sub-
sidiaries) to total sales ratio above 15%.
28The behavior of other sources of credit is considered in Section 2.6.2.
29See Sidaoui, Ramos-Francia, and Cuadra (2010) for a more detailed description of Mexico’s
experience with and response to the global financial crisis.
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The shaded area of the graph is the shock period, which captures the after-
math of the shock for 8 quarters.30 There is also a large depreciation at the end of
the sample, beginning with the Taper Tantrum in 2013.31 However, this deprecia-
tion is a long and protracted event that was likely to be anticipated and possibly
connected to Mexico’s fundamentals, making it unsuitable as an experiment. I
end my regression sample in 2013q1 to avoid this period.32
While the Lehman-induced exchange rate shock is plausibly exogenous,
there are other consequences of the global financial crisis that could potentially
also affect the firms in my sample, particularly because of Mexico’s close prox-
imity and ties to the United States. Figure 2.5 shows some of the macroeconomic
trends in Mexico around this same period. Around the crisis, there was a clear
slow down in growth in Mexico, as well as a mild decrease in exports relative
to GDP. The drop in exports occurred despite the terms-of-trade improvement,
which reflects decreased demand from its primary trading partner, the US.33 This
movement in exports directly affects the foreign currency revenues in the econ-
omy, so export status and revenue are important factors to account for in my
analysis.
Panel (b) of Figure 2.5 examines trends in financial variables. Debt inflows
30Results are robust to adjusting this period to end earlier or start earlier.
31The Taper Tantrum was a panic in emerging markets that was initiated On May 22, 2013
the Federal Reserve announced that it would begin tapering its bond purchases. This sparked
a panic in emerging markets, as an anticipated US dollar appreciation and tighter US monetary
policy meant that the FX debt accumulated during quantitative easing would inflate and become
difficult to service.
32Results are robust to extending the sample to 2015q2, the last period in my data.
3380% of Mexico’s exports are to the US, and 50% of its imports are from the US over the sample
period (UN COMTRADE database). For the remaining trade, recent evidence from Gopinath
(2015) shows that most trade is invoiced in USD, even if the US is not involved in the trade.
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to the banking and corporate sectors both dropped significantly in the aftermath
of the crisis, followed by a strong recovery. Also plotted is the growth of total
US dollar credit to non-banks throughout Latin America, which highlights the
general trends of dollar liquidity over the period, matching the capital inflows.
Changes in these flows could affect the price and availability of foreign currency
credit. Key to my identification is the ability to control for shocks to credit supply
in each currency.
Despite the growth slowdown, drop in exports, and drying up of external
and USD financing, Mexico was able to recover fairly quickly from the crisis.
Mexico’s banking system was well capitalized ahead of the shock (Sidaoui et al.,
2010). The Basel III regulatory framework released in 2010 suggests a capital ad-
equacy ratio (CAR) of about 8-10%, whereas Mexico’s aggregate CAR has been
around 16% over the whole sample period (Banco de Mexico). Mexico’s banking
system is dominated by several large foreign banks, but the Credit Institutions
Law restricts the amount of capital a subsidiary can transfer abroad to their par-
ent bank to less than 50% of Tier 1 capital, which helped keep the domestic bank-
ing sector more stable during the crisis. The strong position of domestic banks
could potentially help to absorb the loss of external financing and smooth out the
credit results for borrowing firms.
Of loans made by domestic banks, the share denominated in foreign curren-
cies was historically just below 20% prior to 2003, but has since dropped to just
under 10% since 2005 (Hardy, 2018). Banks in Mexico are required to keep their
open FX position below 15% of Tier 1 capital maintained on their balance sheet.
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However, my sample consists of large and globally active firms who do a large
share of the FX borrowing in the economy (in addition to their Peso borrowing).
Thus, this sample is pertinent for studying balance sheet effects of depreciation
shocks.
It is possible that these firms have derivatives positions that hedge their
exposure. However, their on-balance-sheet net derivatives positions appear to
be small. Figure 2.6 plots the sample average net derivatives position relative
to total assets. Any derivatives positions that would hedge against exchange
rate movements would be revealed after the exchange rate depreciates at the end
of 2008. For non-exporters, hedged positions at this time amount to only half
a percent of assets, compared to the nearly 10% exposure that these firms had
at the time and the 33% depreciation they experienced. Exporters may have a
natural hedge of FX revenues, but their derivatives positions turn negative on
average following the shock. This is due to several listed firms engaging in risky
derivatives contracts that essentially bet against a large depreciation of the peso
(Chui, Fender, & Sushko, 2014; Sidaoui et al., 2010).
Why would non-exporting firms take the risk of unhedged FX exposure on
their balance sheet? As is common in many emerging markets, deviations from
uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) make FX loans relatively attractive despite
the risk.34 Figure 2.7 plots deviations from UIP, where = 1 means UIP holds,
and > 1 indicates that FX loans are relatively cheaper than peso loans. There are
34See Salomao and Varela (2016) for evidence of UIP deviations in European countries and the
correlation of FX loans with UIP.
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consistent deviations from UIP that make FX loans attractive for even unhedged
firms to borrow in. Thus, firms will take unhedged FX positions, exposing them-
selves to potential future balance sheet shocks.
2.5 Firm-Bank Level Loan Outcomes
2.5.1 Identification Strategy
A key component to my identification strategy is an exogenous shock to
firms’ balance sheets. The sharp depreciation of the peso at the end of 2008 pro-
vides such a shock, as discussed earlier and shown in Figure 2.4. While this
shock provides a movement in the exchange rate that is exogenous to Mexico’s
fundamentals, there could be other macroeconomic effects that occurred simul-
taneously with the global financial crisis. Of particular concern are changes in
trade, which affect foreign currency revenues, and capital inflows, which affect
the credit supply.35 To address the first concern, I split the sample into exporting
firms (defined as those whose median sales share of exports is above 15%) and
non-exporting firms. Non-exporting firms are of particular interest because they
do not have the same “natural hedge” of FX revenues as exporting firms.
Financial markets worldwide were shocked following the collapse of Lehman
Brothers (concurrent with the depreciation). Credit supply shocks to a firm’s
bank could bias the estimated effect of the shock if banks that lend more in foreign
35While a depreciation is usually associated with increased exports due to the terms-of-trade
improvement, the recession in the US (Mexico’s primary trading partner) led to a reduction in
demand that overpowered the improved competitiveness.
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currency or lend more to exposed firms are affected differently from the shock.
My identification strategy addresses this by exploiting the matched nature of my
dataset between firms and banks. Firms often maintain multiple bank relation-
ships, and banks lend to many firms. By comparing multiple firms that borrow
from the same bank in the same currency, I am able to control for credit supply
shocks to a specific bank in that currency. In particular, I estimate separate regres-
sions for FX and Peso loans, and control for bank-time fixed effects, which ac-
counts for all variation in outcomes from observed and unobserved time-varying
bank factors. This leaves variation in loan outcomes coming from firm character-
istics, with FX mismatch as the main characteristic of interest.
The shock period is from 2009q1-2010q4, capturing the 2 years following
the large peso depreciation.36,37 Shockt takes a value of 1 during this period and
0 otherwise. Defining the shock in this manner allows for flexibility in the timing
of the impact for each firm, as firms may not need to roll over debt or adjust their
investment in every quarter. I take the average of my FX exposure measure ((FX
Liabilities - FX Assets)/Total Assets) over 2008 to get a time invariant measure of
exposure just prior to the shock period. I winsorize this measure for two outlier
firms, which have an unusually large stock of FX assets.38 I interact this measure
36Results are robust to adjusting the length of the shock period to end 2 or 3 quarters earlier,
or start 1 quarter earlier. Given that the exchange rate is both at a higher level and more volatile
following the Lehman collapse, I also check results using just a sample from 2009q1-2013q1 (com-
paring the immediate aftermath of the shock with normal times after the shock). Results are
robust.
37The “Taper Tantrum” episode in 2013 also sparked a depreciation of the peso, but this de-
preciation was a steady, prolonged episode, and so it is less plausible as an unexpected shock
unrelated to Mexico’s fundamentals. Hence, my main sample of interest ends before that period,
spanning 2008q1-2013q1.
38Results are stronger with the inclusion of non-winsorized outliers. I prefer a winsorized spec-
ification to ensure that results are not driven by these two firms.
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with the shock dummy to capture the balance sheet shock. Using a time-invariant
pre-shock measure of FX exposure avoids possible endogenous adjustment of the
firm’s FX position in response to the shock.
My identification assumption is that, conditional on firm fixed effects and
additional time-varying firm controls, firms with different FX exposure who bor-
row from the same bank in the same currency do not differ from each other in a
way that is correlated with the difference in their loan growth outcomes follow-
ing the shock. This improves on the existing literature, which assumes that firms
are exposed to the same credit supply shocks. The primary threat to this identi-
fication will be latent firm characteristics that are correlated with exposure and
that affect loan outcomes through some other channel during the shock period. I
discuss and address these threats in Section 2.5.2.1.
I implement my empirical strategy using the following baseline regression
for non-exporting firms, run separately by currency:
∆ log(Loancf ,b,t) = α f + αb,t + β0Exposure f × Shockt + ΦX f ,t−1 + ε
c
f ,b,t (2.2)
where log(Loancf ,b,t) is the log value of the loans outstanding at firm f from
bank b at time t (quarterly data) in currency c. The dependent variable is loan





compares the loans outstanding between the same firm-bank pair in the same
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currency over time.39 Bank-quarter αb,t and firm α f fixed effects control for time-
varying credit supply factors and time-invariant firm heterogeneity.40 In some
specifications, I also include sector dummy interactions or sector-year fixed ef-
fects to account for trends in each sector that could be correlated with the ex-
change rate shock, such as changes in demand or input cost.41
X f ,t−1 is a vector of time varying firm controls, lagged one period to avoid
simultaneity, which captures any remaining determinants of loan outcomes not
associated with the balance sheet shock. These include firm size measured by log
assets, the ratios of cash to assets, bond debt to assets, total liabilities to assets,
sales to assets, and net derivatives position relative to liabilities, as well as the
share of sales to foreigners (which includes both exports and sales by foreign
subsidiaries).42 Since my independent variable of interest varies only at the firm-
time level, but my outcome variable varies at the firm-bank-time level, I cluster
the standard errors at the firm level.43 The regressions are weighted by the lagged
39This is winsorized at 1% to reduce the influence large outliers in terms of loan outcomes, but
results are robust to not winsorizing.
40Any common effects from macroeconomic conditions varying at the quarterly level are sub-
sumed in the bank-quarter fixed effects.
41Sectors are broad categories: Construction, Energy, Health, IT, Manufacturing, Real Estate,
Restaurants and Hotels, Retail and Wholesale, Telecom, and Transportation.
42These variables are winsorized as necessary to avoid the influence of outliers, but results are
robust to either including non-winsorized controls and excluding controls.
43While clustering may be appropriate, some of the regressions have a lower number of clusters
(e.g. 34) which casts doubt on the asymptotic properties of the estimator. However, results are
robust to pooling the exporters and non-exporters together (for more clusters) and including an
exporter dummy interaction with the main variables of interest. For presentational convenience,
results are presented separately by export status. Results are also robust to using Huber-White
robust errors instead of clustered errors.
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value of log loans, log(Loancf ,b,t−1).
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It is possible that we would not observe a significant effect because firms
may receive a balance sheet shock but not hit their borrowing constraint. The
effect of a given shock should be more relevant for firms that are more vulnerable
or have less collateral, such as smaller firms. Thus, I add an interaction of the
shock with a dummy for small firms, defined as having average size (measured
by log assets) below the sample median.46
∆ log(Loancf ,b,t) = α f + αb,t + β1Exposure f × Shockt + β2Small f × Shockt
+ β3Exposure f × Small f × Shockt + ΦX f ,t−1 + εcf ,b,t (2.3)
In this specification, β1 represents the impact of the shock for large firms,
while β1 + β3 is the impact of the shock for small firms. Note that the sample
consists of some of the largest firms in the economy, so small is a relative term,
but it is useful to separate out these firms from the ultra-large firms since extreme
size may enable such firms to access capital readily despite increased risk.
My identification strategy follows a difference-in-difference framework. I
check the validity of this approach by examining pre-period placebos (to check
44This weighting allows larger loans to be given more weight in the results, so the movements
of smaller, less meaningful loans do not drive the results, but with a decreasing returns to size,
so idiosyncrasies in ultra large loans are not given undue influence on the estimates. Results are
robust to not weighting.
45All regressions are produced in STATA using reghdfe (Correia, 2016).
46Results are robust to defining the small firm dummy as being in the bottom third instead of
the bottom half.
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the parallel trends assumption), and firm specific time trends (to control for any
differential trends for each firm).
2.5.2 Results
I focus on non-exporters in my main analysis, but results for exporters can
be found in the Appendix in Tables A.4 and A.9. Table 2.7 presents my main re-
sults at the firm-bank level. In columns (1)-(4), I find that firms with a higher level
of FX mismatch have lower growth in FX loans following the depreciation. This
result holds after including bank-quarter fixed effects in column (3). Of note is the
difference between columns (2) and (3). Column (2) uses the same sample as col-
umn (3), but does not include the bank-quarter fixed effects.47 Failing to control
for changes in bank credit supply can bias the main coefficient of interest down-
ward because firms that have a currency mismatch and borrow in FX are likely
to be borrowing from larger, stronger banks. Omitting this control in column (2)
results in an estimate that is nearly 40% smaller in absolute value, though still
significant. The drop in FX loan growth appears to be general among both small
and large firms, as seen in column (4). The JointTest row at the bottom of the
table shows the p-value on the joint significance test of Exposure f × Shockt and
Exposure f × Shockt× Small f (H0 : β̂1 + β̂3 = 0). Thus, smaller firms have a statis-
tically significant, though smaller in magnitude, drop in their FX credit growth,
though the smaller magnitude is not statistically different from the larger effect
47Including the bank-quarter fixed effects reduces the sample size for FX loans because there
are many foreign banks that lend only to one firm in the sample, so their observations are wiped
out with the bank-quarter fixed effects.
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on the large firms.
Columns (5)-(8) shows the results for Peso loans. In Columns (5)-(7), firms
with more exposure have a higher loan growth than less exposed firms follow-
ing the shock. Here, accounting for credit supply shocks does not appear to be
as important, as reflected in the coefficients in columns (6) and (7). The interest-
ing difference comes in column (8), where we see that the large increase in peso
borrowing is driven by larger firms, while smaller firms see a mild (though in-
significant) decrease in Peso loan growth. Thus while all mismatched firms have
lower loan growth in FX, only the large firms increase their Peso borrowing to
compensate. Results are robust to alternate specifications of loan growth and of
exposure,48 adjusting the length of the shock period, and adjusting the cutoff for
exporter and small firm designations.49
How large are these effects? I use columns (4) and (8) of Table 2.7 to calculate
the estimated effects for small and large firms separately. For small firms, the
net impact on their FX loan growth following the shock from the FX exposure is
−0.264 and the net impact on their Peso loan growth is −0.121. If a small firm
increases their FX exposure by 10% of assets (about equivalent to increasing from
the median to the 75th percentile), then their FX loan growth will fall by 2.64% and
their peso loan growth will fall by 1.21%. For a small firm with 33% of its loans in
FX (the pre-shock average), this results in a 1.68% drop in total loan growth. For a
large firm, the estimated impact of the shock is −0.691 for FX and 0.899 for Peso.
48See Table A.5, which examines exposure measured by short term FX liabilities over assets,




A 10% increase in exposure for a large firm results in a drop of 6.91% in their FX
loan growth and an increase of 8.99% in their Peso loan growth. For a large firm
with 56.5% of its loans in FX, these effects will cancel out. The pre-shock average
large non-exporting firm had 27% of its loans in FX, which would result in a total
increase in loan growth of 4.7%.
To put the 1.68% drop for small firms and 4.7% increase for large firms in
perspective, the average loan growth rates in 2008 were 11% and 25% for small
and large firms, respectively, while the median rates were 5% and 2.8%, respec-
tively.50 Thus, for the typical small firm (in terms of loan growth), increasing
their initial FX exposure could completely stall their loan growth after the depre-
ciation shock. The increase for large exposed firms is large, more than doubling
loan growth for the typical large firm. The effects of balance sheet shocks are thus
important to the overall financial outcomes of the firm.
It could be the case that the the FX and Peso results for large firms are driven
by different sets of firms, rather than the same firms moving from FX to Peso. In
Table 2.8, I pool FX and Peso loans together in the same regression, and add an in-
teraction with an FX dummy variable to examine the relative difference between
FX and Peso borrowing for each firm. In this pooled specification, I can include
firm-quarter fixed effects in order to compare the relative loan growth of FX vs
50These numbers for 2011 were 16.8% and 9.5% for small and large average, and -0.2% and 0.8%
for small and large median.
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Peso within firm. The regression takes the form:




where c indexes currency (domestic or foreign). While this specification can con-
trol for all time-varying firm heterogeneity, it relies on variation only from firms
who borrow both in FX and Peso. In columns (1) and (2), I include firm fixed
effects and bank-quarter-currency fixed effects, the latter to account for different
credit supply shocks for each currency, and I add in the firm-quarter fixed effects
in columns (3) and (4). These results, while more difficult to interpret with the
extra interactions, reveal that there is a significant within firm difference between
Peso and FX borrowing for large exposed firms following the shock. Note that the
difference for small firms (the sum of the coefficients on Exposure f ×Shockt× FXc
and Exposure f × Shockt× Small f × FXc) is close to zero and statistically insignif-
icant, as small firms have declines in both FX and Peso growth.
Is the overall effect on loan outcomes positive or negative for large and
small firms? Table 2.9 presents results with FX and Peso loans pooled together.
Note that there are very few firms that borrow from the same bank at the same
time in both currencies. Controlling for bank supply shocks in column (1), we see
that large exposed firms do have a large and positive impact on their loan growth,
whereas small exposed firms have a negative, though not statistically significant,
impact. Controlling for credit supply shocks by currency in columns (2) and (3)
reveals a significant decline in loan growth for small firms. Thus, it appears that
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after controlling for supply shocks that small firms hit with a balance sheet shock
indeed appear to hit their borrowing constraint and decrease their overall loan
growth.
Table A.6 in the Appendix considers differences in outcomes by the remain-
ing maturity of the loans. While this measure does not capture maturity at origi-
nation, we see that most of the reduction in FX borrowing comes from short-term
FX loans for larger firms. Small exposed firms have a significantly larger decline
in their long-term FX borrowing, as compared to large exposed firms. On the
Peso, side, most of the increase in loan growth for large firms occurs in long term
Peso borrowing.
The mechanism for these effects on loan volume could work through changes
in the interest rates charged on firm borrowing. Table 2.10 presents the results
with the log of (1+ the real or nominal interest rate) as the dependent variable.51
Interest rates are loan weighted within a firm-bank-currency triplet in each period
(when aggregating the data to the firm-bank-currency level), and the regressions
are weighted by contemporaneous log(Loanscf ,b,q). The regression takes the form:
log(1 + icf ,b,t) = α f ,b + αb,t + β1Exposure f × Shockt + β2Small f × Shockt
+ β3Exposure f × Small f × Shockt + ΦX f ,t−1 + εcf ,b,t (2.5)
where α f ,b captures any time invariant variation in interest rates that is specific to
51Real rates subtract the 1-year expected inflation rate of the Peso and add on expected 1-year
Peso depreciation to FX loans. Both forecast series are from the Bank of Mexico’s survey of infla-
tion and exchange rate forecasts.
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a given firm-bank pair. This controls for any preferential or unusual banking re-
lationships that may determine the interest rate. A caveat to this analysis is that
interest rates reflect all outstanding loans in the period, not just newly granted
loans. Columns (1) and (3) show evidence of a mildly significant increase in in-
terest rates on FX loans, though the relationship is not robust in columns (2) and
(4) when the small firm interaction is included. Peso loans have coefficients sim-
ilar in magnitude, but none are significantly different from 0.
If there is a change in the interest rate differential, this could affect firm bor-
rowing in FX relative to Peso (and thus potentially explain the finding that large
exposed firms switch to Peso). Table 2.11 pools the FX and Peso loans together,
and considers the following regression:
log(1 + rcf ,b,t) =α f ,b + α f ,t + αb,t + η0FXc + η1FXc × Shockt (2.6)
+ η2FXc × Exposure f + η3FXc × Shockt × Exposure f + εcf ,b,t
where r is the real interest rate. In this specification, I can control for all time
varying firm and bank characteristics, and time-invariant firm-bank match char-
acteristics that may determine the terms of these loans. In columns (1)-(2), I find a
decrease in the differential price of FX vs. Peso loans following the depreciation,
though this effect is not significantly different for firms who are more exposed fol-
lowing the shock. The significant and negative FX coefficient indicates that there
is a premium on the interest rates for Peso loans at the individual level, even af-
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ter controlling for all observable and unobservable time varying characteristics of
both firm and bank. This premium is only reduced by 30% following the shock.
This confirms the failure of UIP seen at the aggregate level, and suggests that FX
loans are still attractive for firms (relative to Peso) following the shock if they are
able to obtain such a loan.
In column (3), we see that the increase in the real interest rate on FX loans is
driven by loans to small firms. That is, firms in the smaller half of the sample face
more expensive FX borrowing in real terms following the shock. This is impor-
tant as it means that a change in the interest rate differential cannot explain why
large firms switch to Peso borrowing following the shock. Indeed, given that the
increase in the FX interest rate is driven mainly by small firms, we would expect
that those firms would have a higher propensity to switch to the local currency.
Column (4) controls for time-vayring bank-specific factors in each currency via
bank-quarter-currency fixed effects. Fully controlling for credit supply shocks in
both currencies removes the significance of the effect for small firms and reduces
the coefficient by nearly two-thrids. This may be due to soaking up too much
variation with a heavy fixed effect specification, but shocks to bank credit supply
in each currency may play more of a role in determining the change in the interest
rate differential than does firm-specific risk.
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2.5.2.1 Threats to Identification
Given my empirical setup, the primary threats to identification are firm
characteristics that are correlated with FX mismatch and are affected by macroe-
conomic changes that occur during the shock period. I test my identification
assumption by comparing my interaction of interest, Exposure f × Shockt with
competing interactions of Shockt with other firm characteristics, similarly defined
as time-invariant pre-depreciation averages. Tables 2.12 and 2.13 show these re-
gressions, for FX and Peso loans respectively, for six firm characteristics that are
potentially correlated with exposure or determine firm outcomes following the
depreciation: ratios of exports to sales, cash holdings to assets, sales to assets, net
derivatives to liabilities, and leverage (liabilities to assets, as well as firm size (log
assets).52 Exports and size affect the main coefficient of interest the most, but in
every case the sign and significance of the coefficient on Exposure × Shockt are
robust to including these competing interactions.
As noted earlier, firms in some sectors tend to be more exposed to currency
shocks than others. It is possible that firms in different sectors are impacted dif-
ferently during the shock period for other reasons, either due to differences in
the change in demand, the change in input costs, or the change in investment
opportunities, so the exposure measure could simply be capturing differences in
outcomes by sector. In Tables 2.14 and 2.15, I explicitly include interactions of
52Note that since non-exporters are defined as having their median share of sales to foreigners
as less than 15% of total sales, some firms in the non-exporting sample will have some export
revenue.
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Shockt and Exposure f × Shockt with sector dummies, in order to see if see if the
balance sheet shocks differ by sector or if a single sector is driving the results.
These regressions include sector dummies one by one, with the column heading
indicating which sector is in the interaction term Sector f . Since the difference be-
tween small and large is important for Peso loan outcomes, Table 2.15 includes
interactions with size as well. While some of the sectors do appear to be differen-
tially affected during the shock period, none of the interactions appreciably affect
the significance or magnitude of the exposure interaction.53
Table 2.16 further tests for robustness to sectoral differences using alterna-
tive fixed effects specifications. In columns (1) and (5), I include sector-year fixed
effect as a more comprehensive way to account for trends that may affect certain
sectors and thus contaminate my identification.54 Alternatively, it is possible that
banks may differentially adjust their credit supply following the shock depend-
ing on the sector of the firm. This would violate my identification assumption
that firms borrowing from the same bank in the same currency are exposed to
the same credit supply shock in each period. Columns (2) and (6) include bank-
53The exception is column (6) of Table 2.15. Firms in the construction sector appear to have
larger impacts on their peso borrowing (larger positive for large firms, larger negative for small
firms) than firms generally. Nevertheless, the results for construction and non-construction firms
point in the same direction. Note that some of the triple and quadruple interactions in Table 2.15
are missing due to collinearity.
54My non-exporter sample largely is not exposed to changes in export revenues associated with
the exchange rate change. However, they could be negatively exposed if they import intermediate
goods which would become more expensive with the change in terms-of-trade. Exporting firms
do a lot of importing (see Blaum (2017) for evidence of this from Mexico), so the exporter sample
would be more affected by this issue, but the sector-year fixed effects do capture sector wide
changes in import cost over the shock period. For a very limited sample of firms, I compute the
share of production costs accounted for by imported inputs. Including this measure as a control
captures relevant variation (as indicated by the increase in the within-R2), but does not change
the estimated coefficient. These results are available upon request.
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sector-year fixed effects to account for this possibility. Additionally, there could
be unobservable characteristics of each firm-bank match that are correlated with
exposure and affect lending outcomes. For instance, higher mismatch firms may
match with banks that are more exposed to exchange rate shocks. Columns (3)
and (7) address this possibility by including firm-bank fixed effects. Further, dif-
ferences in the effect of exposure between large and small firms could be driven
by sector rather than by size. Indeed, most of the large manufacturing firms are
exporting firms, while the small manufacturing firms are non-exporters. Hence, it
is important to check that the differential behavior of small vs. large firms is not
driven by manufacturing firms in my sample being primarily small. Columns
(4) and (8) introduce a competing triple interaction of Exposure f , Shockt, and a
manufacturing dummy.55 In all of these cases, the main results concerning the
interaction of Exposure f and Shockt are robust.56
My regression approach follows a difference-in-difference specification. I
test the validity of the parallel trends assumption underlying this approach in
Tables A.3 for loan outcomes and A.8 for real outcomes. The first two columns
in either table highlight that the pre-periods show no significant differences in
outcomes by level of exposure leading up to the shock. The second two columns
show that the results are robust to the inclusion of firm-specific linear time trends.57
55Note that this is competing with the small firm dummy, unlike in Tables 2.14 2.15 where it is
competing with the exposure measure.
56The coefficient on the triple interaction of Exposure*Shock*Small is affected in the Peso re-
gression, but the net effect for large firms is only mildly affected and the net effect for small firms
remains statistically insignificant.
57The exception is employment outcomes in column (3) of Table A.8, which are no longer signif-
icant after including firm specific time trends. Nevertheless, the coefficients are of approximately
the same magnitude as the main specification, or larger.
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Table A.7 presents results from a few alternative specifications. First, 42% of
the loans to sample firms originate from cross-border banks. Thus, these changes
in loan outcomes may be driven by cross-border banks reacting more strongly to
the firm balance sheet shocks, as cross-border banks may differ in their access to
FX financing and exposure to the financial crisis. In columns (1) and (3), I restrict
my firm-bank sample to just banks resident in Mexico and find that the results
are robust.58 Second, the period following the depreciation was characterized
by higher volatility of the exchange rate. Thus, the results could be driven by
an increase in volatility and uncertainty about the exchange rate, rather than the
actual depreciation shock. Restricting the sample to include just the period after
the shock, comparing the immediate aftermath of the depreciation with the later
post period, delivers the same results as shown in columns (2) and (5). Lastly, I
conduct a placebo test, replacing the original shock variable with a dummy that
equals 1 from 2010q3-2011q2, a period in which there were no large exchange
rate movements, when firms should not be differentially affected by the exchange
rate. This specification delivers the expected null result.59
Overall, I find strong evidence for a balance sheet effect, whereby a deteri-
oration in net worth affects firms’ ability to borrow. This constraint on borrow-
ing appears to be tighter for loans in FX, and more binding generally on smaller
firms. This is important, as my small firms are still quite large, so the negative
effects could be larger still for out of sample firms. My results are further sugges-
58 Mexico’s banking sector is dominated by several large foreign banks, but these banks are
limited by law as to the amount of assets they can transfer to their parent bank, effectively making
them operate more independently.
59Note that results are robust to adjusting the shock period length shorter by a few quarters.
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tive that liquidity in the domestic currency may be an important factor to offset
the negative impact of FX mismatch shocks for larger firms, though the general
equilibrium repercussions of the switch from FX to Peso borrowing are less well
understood.
2.6 Firm Level Outcomes
When analyzing balance sheet shocks, we are ultimately interested in their
effects on real outcomes. Real economic activity does not vary at the loan level,
so analysis of real outcomes necessitates working at the firm level. This section
presents the empirical approach and results for my firm level analysis. I focus on
employment and investment outcomes for the baseline sample of non-exporting
firms.
2.6.1 Identification Strategy
Working at the loan level allows me to control for bank shocks (via bank-
time fixed effects) to isolate the impact of firm-level characteristics. When exam-
ining firm-level outcomes, controlling for bank shocks would be equally valu-
able. In order to do so, I construct a control for variation in bank credit sup-
ply that varies at the firm level. This is in line with the work ofAlfaro et al.
(2016); Amiti and Weinstein (in press); Greenstone et al. (2014); Niepmann and
Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2017b). I first estimate the following regression at the firm-
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bank level:60
∆ log(L f ,b,t) = α f ,t + αb,t + ε f ,b,t (2.7)
This regression separates loan growth into bank- and firm-specific factors.61 Note
that if the firm-time fixed effects are not included, the bank-time effects will be
biased, as they will attribute all of the time-variation in loan growth to the bank;
certain banks may have high loan growth because they are lending to high loan
growth firms.
I construct a firm-specific bank shock as the (loan) weighted sum of the
estimated bank shocks α̂b,t for each bank that the firm borrows from. Formally,62








I then include this variable as a control in the firm level regressions:
log(Yf ,t) = α f + αt + γ1Exposure f × Shockt + γ0BS f ,t−1 + X f ,t−1θ + e f ,t (2.9)
60Note that I have combined FX and Peso loans to get the evolution of total loans from the bank.
61These effects are computed using the felsdvreg command in STATA (Cornelissen, 2008). See
Alfaro et al. (2016) for more discussion on this approach, which extends methodology originally
developed in Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999).
62This formulation is similar to the Bartik instrument.
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log(Yf ,t) = α f + αt + γ1Exposure f × Shockt + γ2Small f × Shockt
+ γ3Exposure f × Small f × Shockt + γ0BS f ,t−1 + X f ,t−1θ + e f ,t (2.10)
where Yf ,t is either physical capital, measured as property, plant, and equip-
ment (PPE), or employment, with log(Yf ,t) winsorized at 2% to reduce the influ-
ence of outliers; α f is a firm fixed effect; αt is a time fixed effect; and the other
variables and controls are defined as in the firm-bank level regressions. Similar
to those regressions, the firm-level regressions compare outcomes for firms with
differing levels of exposure following the large depreciation shock.
There is an important econometric issue to address when using the bank
shock control. Consider a single period version of Equation 2.7:
∆ log(L f ,b) = α f + αb + ε f ,b (2.11)
When both firm and bank fixed effects are included, each set of fixed effects
will span the whole space. Thus, one individual fixed effect must be omitted
due to collinearity, and the remaining fixed effects in this set are then measured
relative to the omitted group. This would be true for each period in which we
run this regression. If we expand back to the multiple period regression in Equa-
tion 2.7, we see that in each period, one fixed effect group will be omitted, and
so the remaining fixed effects will all be estimated relative to the omitted group.
57
Since the effects in each period are measured relative to their own omitted group,
the estimates of the effects cannot be compared across time.63
This means that my constructed bank shock measure is also not comparable
over time. To address this issue, the following proposition will prove useful:
Proposition 2.6.1. Time demeaned values of the estimated α̂ f ,t and α̂b,t are the same as
the time demeaned values of a hypothetical α̂∗f ,t and α̂
∗
b,t which have all of the fixed effects
measured relative to the same benchmark (e.g. 0). Further, the constructed BS f ,t, when
time demeaned, has the same value as a time demeaned hypothetical BS∗f ,t constructed
using α̂∗b,t.
Proof: See Appendix A.2
Proposition 2.6.1 indicates that by including time fixed effects in the firm
level regression (and thus time demeaning the data), the coefficient on the bank
shock in Equation 2.9 is exactly the same as it would be if all of the fixed effects
were estimated relative to 0 rather than relative to an omitted category. This result
is useful generally when using connected datasets (such as credit registry data
or bilateral trade data) to construct similar shock estimates for use in collapsed
regressions. So long as the appropriate regression specification includes a time
63More generally, the effects are only consistently identified within a connected group of firms
and banks. A group is connected if any firm borrows from at least one bank in the group and
any bank lends to at least one firm in the group. A group is separate from another group if no
firms in the first group borrow from any banks in the second, and no banks in the first group
lend to any firms in the second. When you estimate two sets of fixed effects, both sets will span
each connected group and so be collinear. Hence, one effect in each group will need to be omitted
to avoid the dummy variable trap. Since each connected group has a different omitted effect,
the estimates of the fixed effects are all measured relative to different reference points. These
effects are therefore consistently estimated and comparable within a connected group, but not
necessarily comparable across groups. In the data, around 98% or more of observations in each
period are in the same connected group. The handful of observations not in the main group in
each period are dropped from this construction.
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fixed effect,64 the fixed effect estimates from the matched data can be used in that
regression.65
2.6.2 Results
I first examine potential substitution at the firm-level to other sources of
funding besides loans (such as bonds and trade credit). These results are pre-
sented in Table 2.17. Columns (1)-(3) present results where the dependent vari-
able is non-bank liabilities (either total, FX, or Peso). These results mirror the
bank borrowing results: large firms increase their funding, whereas small firms
do not. The increase for large firms is driven by their Peso borrowing. One spe-
cific area of concern is that the large firms may be switching to FX bond debt
in order to replace their lost FX bank debt (in addition to using more Peso bor-
rowing). Columns (4)-(6) shows that this is not the case. Though not significant,
the coefficient on the main interaction is negative for bond debt, particularly FX
bond debt, indicating that the effect of the balance sheet shock on bonds is either
unchanged or possibly negative.
Table 2.18 presents my main results at the firm level. Consistent with the
firm-bank level results, I find that while there is no measured effect of the balance
sheet shock across all firms on average, there is a difference in outcomes for large
vs. small firms. In columns (1) and (2), I show results for total bank borrowing of
64Or more generally, a fixed effect that aligns with each connected group.
65This does not absolve more general issues associated with using an estimated factor in the
regression, such as measurement error. A relatively small sample size makes bootstrapping the
errors less feasible, but the results are robust to excluding the bank shock control, so any mea-
surement error in the bank shock does not appear to be biasing the coefficients of interest.
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these firms. Large exposed firms see an increase in their bank borrowing relative
to large, less exposed firms, reflecting the increased access to Peso credit, while
small exposed firms have a net negative effect, though not statistically significant.
In columns (3) and (4), the difference in employment is similar, with exposed
large firms seeing a mild increase while small firms do not. Columns (5) and
(6) examine growth in physical capital. Here, large exposed firms again see an
increase, but smaller exposed firms see a decrease in growth.
While the total effects for small exposed firms measure as a statistical zero
for bank credit and employment, there is a significant decrease in growth of phys-
ical capital for these firms. An increase in exposure of 10% of assets for a small
firm would result in a decrease in physical capital growth of 1.14%. For the me-
dian small firm, pre-shock capital growth was on the order of 0.2%, so this shock
could represent a substantial decline for some firms, or a significant reduction
relative to their previous expansion path for others.
These results are again robust to horseraced interactions with other firm
characteristics. These results are shown in Tables 2.19 and 2.20 for employment
and capital respectively. The results are further largely robust to alternative spec-
ifications of exposure and growth measurement, shown in the appendix in Ta-
ble A.10, and to interactions with sector dummies, shown in Tables 2.21 and
2.22.66 Thus for smaller firms with a large currency mismatch, balance sheet
shocks can have negative real consequences as well as negative financial con-
66The effects on employment appear to be driven in part by the construction sector. In column
(6) of Table 2.21, balance sheet shocks to large construction firms result in positive outcomes, but
balance sheet shocks to small construction firms result in large negative outcomes. The direction
of the effect for other sectors remains the same, but is statistically insignificant.
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sequences. This provides corroborating evidence that currency mismatch and
balance sheet effects can lead to negative real outcomes via binding borrowing
constraints.
The 75th percentile firm in terms of FX exposure (for either small or large)
experienced a drop in net worth of 3.33% of assets. The median firm (either small
or large) experienced a 1.1% drop in net worth. Using the estimates from Ta-
ble 2.18, a small firm that experiences a drop in net worth of 1% of assets experi-
ences a decline in physical capital of 0.34%. For a large firm, a drop in net worth
of 1% of assets results in an increase in employment of 0.48% and an increase in
physical capital of 0.38%. If FX debt in the economy at large is primarily concen-
trated among the listed firms, then the aggregate implication is that there is not
much of a net effect of the balance sheet shock on aggregate investment, as the
smaller firms decrease investment while the larger firms increase investment.67
However, direct and indeirect impacts on firms outside of my sample may be im-
portant sources of negative real outcomes. These are discussed in Sections 2.7.4
and 2.8.
How important is it to capture the firm’s full on-balance sheet exposure to
FX, rather than relying on more limited measures (e.g. FX debt only)? Table 2.23
reports coefficients from the investment and employment regressions using alter-
native measures of FX exposure. Column (1) augments the main measue used in
this paper with an estimate of FX hedging. This is done by taking the value of the
67In unreported results, exporting firms with FX exposure are largely unaffected in their bor-
rowing and investment behavior, suggesting their positions are fully hedged.
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net derivatives position just after the depreciation (2009q1) and subtracting the
net derivatives position just before the depreciation (2008q3). This captures the
fact that if firms were using derivatives to hedge the exchange rate shock, these
positions would turn into assets with the sharp exchange rate movement. As seen
in Figure 2.6, non-exporting firms on average did see their net derivatives posi-
tion turn positive (to an asset), suggesting some derivatives use, though in mag-
nitude much smaller than their average exposure. Comparing columns (1) and
(2) suggests that accounting for firm derivative usage, albeit imperfectly, does not
appreciably alter the estimates.
Column (3) removes FX assets from the measure, as many studies rely on
just information about FX liabilities. Here the magnitude for the effect on em-
ployment at large firms decreases, while for physical capital the magnitude for
both large and small is halved. This suggests that firms holding FX liabilities may
often also hold some FX assets, so we would measure a smaller than true effect
because we over estimate their exposure. Some studies rely just on one source of
debt to get FX exposure, such as loans or bonds. Column (4) uses just FX loans in
the numerator of the exposure measure. Thea measured effects on employment
in Pane A and attenuated downwards and all estimates lose significance. The
estimates for investment remain similar to those of column (3), still underesti-
mating the impact, but recording a negative net impact for small firms. Column
(5) uses just FX bond debt in the numerator of the exposure measure. With just
this piece, we lose all significance for the investment regression in Panel B. Panel
A on employment, however, shows a large positive (though statistically insignif-
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icant) effect for large firms, and a large negative and significant effect on small
firms. These results together highight the importance of having a more compre-
hensive measure of firm FX exposure in order to accurately measure the balance
sheet effects of exchange rate shocks.
The result that large firms with a negative balance sheet shock actually have
higher growth in terms of debt, employment, and physical capital than less ex-
posed firms has been found previously in the empirical literature, yet is contrary
to the standard model. We would expect either a negative effect, if the firm is
constrained, or a null effect, if the firm is unconstrained. The positive effect of a
balance sheet shock suggests that there may be some other factors at play, possi-
bly an omitted variable that is correlated with FX exposure and leads to positive
outcomes. A large variety of observable firm characteristics fail to explain this
relationship. To address this result, I turn to a stylized model in the next section
to help rationalize this result along with my other findings.
2.7 Model
My results suggest that firms are subject to a constraint on their total bor-
rowing and a second, tighter constraint on their FX borrowing, which gives the
balance sheet shocks real impacts. In this section, I present a stylized 3 period
model which serves to illustrate qualitatively how this mechanism can generate
the behavior observed in the empirical results. The model is partial equilibrium
in nature to focus on the decisions of the firm.
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The key to the model is that firms, in addition to being constrained in their
total debt, are subject to a second borrowing constraint specifically on their FX
borrowing. These constraints both depend on the net worth of the firm, which
in this model is directly related to firm size. This assumption is justified in Fig-
ure 2.8, which plots the bank debt of non-exporting firms in my sample in Peso
and FX against their size (log assets). As firms get larger, they increase their lever-
age in Peso before increasing their leverage in FX.68 This is striking as the lower
price of FX debt and failure of UIP suggests that firms would desire to do the
opposite.
The constraint on total borrowing that the firm faces can be derived from
an incentive compatibility constraint, in which the firm should not have the in-
centive to default on their debt (under most realizations of the exchange rate).
The additional constraint on FX borrowing reflects the risks faced by the bank.
Niepmann and Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2017a) provide evidence that firms that bor-
row more in FX have a higher probability of defaulting on their loans (both FX
and Peso) in the event of a depreciation. Further, most collateral backing loans
to firms is denominated in local currency (see Calomiris, Larrain, Liberti, and
Sturgess (2017) and Fleisig, Safavian, and de la Peña (2006) for evidence that im-
movable collateral is frequently required to secure lending in emerging markets).
That means that when a loan is made in FX and the exchange rate depreciates, the
bank recovers a smaller share of the loan value in the event of default, increasing
68Size based borrowing constraints (as in Gopinath, Kalemli-Özcan, Karabarbounis, and
Villegas-Sanchez (2017)) may match the data better, but are not necessary to generate the qualita-
tive results observed in my analysis.
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their downside risk. Thus, the bank has an incentive to limit FX borrowing in
addition to limiting total borrowing.69
2.7.1 General Framework
There are 3 periods t ∈ {0, 1, 2}. The economy is populated by firms (or
entrepreneurs) who seek to maximize their period 2 wealth. Firms are endowed
with initial wealth w0. Firms are risk neutral and produce using technology yt =
f (kt) = zkαt . Capital depreciates fully upon use.
The timing works as follows: at t = 0, firms inherit their initial wealth (their
size) and make borrowing and investment decisions. At the beginning of t = 1,
a depreciation shock is realized. Firms produce and repay their debt (which may
be affected by the depreciation), or default and exit if they are unable to repay,
and then use the remaining profits to make borrowing and investment decisions.
At the beginning of t = 2, uncertainty about the exchange rate is again resolved,
firms produce, repay their debt or default, and consume their profits.
Firms can borrow in Peso and FX, but the rate of currency depreciation is
uncertain, and UIP fails such that FX debt is attractive.70 UIP failure takes the
following form: E[1 + φ] = 1+r1+r∗
1
γ , where γ > 1 captures the deviation from UIP,
r > r∗ are the interest rates on local and foreign currency loans, respectively, and
φ is the rate of depreciation of the local currency. Firms are subject to constraints
69This incentive may strengthen if the bank faces higher penalties for not repaying its FX credi-
tors as compared to domestic Peso creditors. In this model, I leave the explicit problem generating
this constraint un-modeled.
70UIP failure is shown in the aggregate in Figure 2.7 and in the microdata at the firm level in
Table 2.11.
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on their total borrowing and on their FX borrowing.
2.7.2 Firm’s Problem at t = 1
The problem is solved recursively. At the end of t = 1, firms take as given
wealth w1 and solve the following problem:71
max
d2,d∗2
z2kα2 − (1 + r)d2 − (1 + r∗)E[1 + φ2]d∗2 (2.12)
s.t.
k2 = w1 + d2 + d∗2 (2.13)
0 ≤ d2 + d∗2 ≤ κ0w1 (2.14)
0 ≤ d∗2 ≤ κ1w1 (2.15)
where d is Peso debt, d∗ is FX debt, z is the (potentially firm specific) pro-
ductivity, and k is investment in physical capital. κ1 < κ0, which means that
the borrowing constraint on FX loans is tighter than for the firm’s overall bor-
rowing. Solving the t = 1 problem leads to decision rules d2(w1), d∗2(w1), and
k2(w1), which depend on wealth carried intro period 1. Note thatthe firm maxi-
mizes expected period 2 profit, where the only source of uncertainty is the period
2 exchange rate realization.
The solution consists of several cases and is fully laid out in Appendix A.3.
Figure 2.9 illustrates the relationship between wealth w1 and investment k2. The
71This formulation is similar to that in Aghion, Bacchetta, and Banerjee (2001).
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different cases are determined by which constraints are binding and the funding
source (Peso, FX, or own wealth) with which the marginal unit of investment is
financed.
Starting from 0 in Figure 2.9, as a firm increases in w1, investment k2 in-
creases since higher wealth relaxes the total borrowing constraint. While the





Once wealth is sufficiently large, the firm can make this level of investment, so
investment is flat though FX debt increases with increasing wealth, which relaxes
the FX borrowing constraint. Once the marginal unit of debt switches to FX, the




1−α , so firms increase FX debt with
increasing wealth (which relaxes their FX debt constraint). Once wealth is suf-
ficiently large, the firm makes the new optimal level of investment. When the
marginal unit of investment is purchased solely with wealth, then investment
increases one-for-one with wealth.
The purpose of this model is to rationalize the patterns of borrowing and
investment outcomes for small firms and large firms after a balance sheet shock.
Small firms are constrained in their total borrowing, while large firms may be
constrained only in their FX borrowing. Therefore, I focus my analysis on the
first two cases, given by wealth cutoffs W1 and W2 corresponding to the first
increasing slope and flat segment of the investment curve in Figure 2.9.72,73
72Note, however, that the pattern from the other cases matches the data plotted in Figure 2.8:
as the firm gets bigger, the firm levers up in peso, decreases total borrowing while shifting to FX
debt, then levers up in FX debt, and finally decreases bank debt as firm size becomes extremely
large.
73There is also a case 0, where firms default in period 1 and exit, and so does not involve any
decisions for period 2.
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For illustration, consider two firms that have the same initial wealth w0 and





.74 A large depreciation will lead to a larger decrease in w1 for the
more exposed firm. Proposition 2.7.1 summarizes the response of borrowing and
investment to a shock to w1 for firms in the first two cases.
Proposition 2.7.1. If 0 < w1 ≤ W1, then a negative shock to w1 results in lower FX








If W1 < w1 ≤ W2, then a negative shock to w1 (such that w1 remains above
the lower threshold) results in lower FX debt, higher peso debt, higher total debt, and




> 0, ∂d2∂w1 < 0,
∂(d2+d∗2)
∂w1
< 0, and ∂k2∂w1 = 0
Proof: See Appendix.
The intuition for the first case is straightforward: the firm is constrained
in their borrowing, and a negative shock to net worth causes that constraint to
bind more tightly, so the firm must borrow and invest less. The intuition for the
second case is as follows: the firm is constrained in their FX debt, so the negative
shock forces them to reduce their FX debt. They remain unconstrained in their
total debt. So, the firm makes up for the lost wealth and lost FX debt with an
increase in Peso debt. The increase in Peso debt is thus larger than the decrease
in FX debt, so total debt rises.
This matches most of my key empirical results shown in Table 2.7 and Ta-
ble 2.18. However, the model does not explain why large exposed non-exporters
74The depreciation is quite unexpected, so this assumption could be justified that small and
random differences may generate differences in exposure orthogonal to other firm characteristics.
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have higher investment and employment following the shock, rather than un-
changed real outcomes.75 Further, I have assumed firms of the same size ran-
domly have different levels of FX mismatch. If I relax this assumption, firms of
the same size would choose exactly the same exposure in period 0. To address
these two issues, I allow firms to differ from each other in terms of their period 1
and 2 productivity (z1, z2).76 I next describe the firm’s period 0 problem and the
role of productivity in determining FX exposure and real outcomes.
2.7.3 Firm’s Problem at t = 0
At t = 0, firms solve the following problem, taking the decision rules d2(w1, z1, z2),
d∗2(w1, z1, z2), and k2(w1, z1, z2) and initial wealth w0 as given:
max
d1,d∗1
E[z2k2(w1, z1, z2)α − (1 + r)d2(w1, z1, z2)− (1 + r∗)(1 + φ2)d∗2(w1, z1, z2)]
(2.16)
s.t.
w1 = z1kα1 − (1 + r)d1 + (1 + r∗)(1 + φ1)d∗1 (2.17)
k1 = w0 + d1 + d∗1 (2.18)
d1 + d∗1 ≤ κ0w0 (2.19)
75This is also found empirically elsewhere in the literature. See for example Kim et al. (2015).
76This need not be the only way to generate these results, but it is useful as a simple extension
to the model. Note that the main empirical results that exposed firms decrease FX borrowing,
exposed small firms decrease investment, and large exposed firms increase Peso (and total) bor-
rowing, do not require this additional assumption of differences in future productivity.
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d∗1 ≤ κ1w0 (2.20)
(z1, z2) are known at t = 0. The solution for d1 and d∗1 depends on the
distribution of 1+ φ and may not have a closed form depending on the functional
form of the CDF, G(·).
Differences in productivity have a couple of key effects that can generate the
patterns observed in the empirical analysis. The first concerns the cross-sectional
difference in firm productivity, highlighted by Proposition 2.7.2
Proposition 2.7.2. For a given initial wealth w0, firms that are more productive in period






The intuition is that higher d∗1 increases your probability of being constrained,
but higher z1 decreases your probability of being constrained or defaulting. So,
firms that have higher z1 can borrow more in the cheaper currency while main-
taining an equal or lower probability of default than firms with lower z1.77 This
mechanism is modeled more fully in Salomao and Varela (2016), which presents
a model of firm dynamics that generates more productive firms selecting into FX
borrowing. They confirm this prediction with data for firms in Hungary.78
77 Since borrowing decisions made in period 0 affect how binding constraints will be for period
1 borrowing decisions, the FX borrowing constraint may be slack in period 0 for lower productiv-
ity firms.
78In my data, large non-exporting firms with higher income and more productive capacity
(higher levels of physical capital) tend to have larger FX mismatches. However, I do not have data
on hours worked or wage bill, so I cannot compute standard measures of total factor productivity
directly. While exposed firms tend to have higher absolute income and higher levels of physical
capital, those characteristics do not explain the positive results for exposed large firms following
the depreciation. Thus, modeling this as an unobserved future opportunity is appropriate and
is one possibility that rationalizes the fact found here, and elsewhere in the literature, that large
exposed firms sometimes do better following a depreciation.
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The second effect of productivity differences concerns the increase in pro-
ductivity over time. Increased future productivity increases the optimal scale of
current investment. If the firm is unconstrained in period 1 and future productiv-
ity is higher than current productivity (z2 > z1), the firm will increase investment
k2 up to the new optimal level. Note that, all things equal, the probability of
being constrained increases with higher future productivity as the optimal in-
vestment size gets larger, requiring more debt: ∂Pr(w1<Wi)∂z2 > 0 ∀ i ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4},
where Wi’s are the cutoffs for the different cases of the solution, detailed in Ap-
pendix A.3. Higher future productivity decreases your probability of default.
Combining the cross-sectional and dynamic differences in productivity gen-
erates the desired results. Firms with higher productivity in period 1 select into
FX debt in period 0, but if there is a negative balance sheet shock in period 1,
only the firms who initially had more wealth will be unconstrained. These un-
constrained firms will be able to increase their investment k2 up to a higher opti-
mal level, relative to firms who are less productive in period 1 (and so chose less
FX exposure). I assume that Corr(z1,
z2
z1
) > 0, so that currently more productive
firms are also more likely to have productive future investment opportunities.
Formally, I consider two types of firms: unproductive firms who have productiv-
ity z̄ in both periods, and productive firms who have productivity z1 and z2 such
that z̄ < z1 < z2.79 Proposition 2.7.3 gives the conditions whereby a firm with
increasing productivity would choose a higher proportion of their debt in FX:
79The results are similar if firms differ in their initial productivity z1, while all firms face the
same productivity growth rate: z2 = (1 + gz)z1.
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Proposition 2.7.3. Let z̄ be the productivity level of unproductive firms in both periods
and z1, z2 be the productivity of highly productive firms, such that z̄ < z1 < z2. Then









1, for a given constant X1.
Proof: See Appendix.
This condition implies that the increase in z2 over z1 cannot be too large, or
the firm will avoid FX debt in period 0 because their constraint (for the higher
level of investment) would be more likely to bind in period 1. Under these con-
ditions, highly productive firms will borrow more in FX in period 0. Thus, the re-
sult in the data that large exposed firms do better following the depreciation can
be explained in the model by selection into exposure in period 0 by firms with
higher current productivity and increasing future productivity (that is, they have
productive future investments to make). These firms borrow more in FX initially
and experience a large balance sheet shock. Highly productive but small firms
(in terms of initial wealth w0, which implies smaller k1) are constrained as before,
while larger firms are unconstrained, and so they can increase their investment
up to the new optimal level.
For illustration, suppose that the realized depreciation is large enough that
the productive firms (who borrow more in FX in period 0) end up with lower w1
than unproductive firms of the same initial w0.80 This is not necessary, but serves
as a useful demonstration that these results are not due to more productive firms
making more money in period 1 than their less productive counterparts. The ef-









fects on period 1 decisions are illustrated in Figure 2.10. Consider 4 firms with
high or low productivity and high or low initial wealth: {(wH, zH), (wH, zL),
(wL, zH), (wL, zL)}. For firms with lower initial wealth, the drop in net worth
that the productive firms experience (given their higher FX exposure) leads to
lower borrowing and investment, relative to less exposed firms, due to the bind-
ing borrowing constraint. For large (high wealth) firms, the negative shock to net
worth leaves them in the unconstrained range, and so they are able to increase
borrowing and investment up to the new optimal level k2, but decrease FX bor-
rowing and increase Peso borrowing to do so. Thus, comparing exposed firms to
less exposed firms of the same w0 size following the shock, the large firms invest
more but the small firms invest less.
2.7.4 Other Explanations
While productivity differences with selection into FX exposure is a plausible
explanation for the increase in real outcomes for more exposed large firms, one
important caveat with the preceeding discussion is that these differences imply
that more productive large firms would increase their real activity regardless of
the exchange rate shock. This would violate the parallel trends assumption in the
empirical section. Thus, while the proposed model may be a useful framework,
especially for understanding the reallocation of debt by currency, other explana-
tions are important to pursue.
One possibility is that the exchange rate movement itself changes the op-
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portunity set of large vs small firms. For example, large firms may have their
revenues tied to the US dollar via production chains where they serve as suppli-
ers to exporting firms. For firms in my sample, the large non-exporting firms with
large FX exposure tend to be in services or the construction industry. Thus, this
explanation is possible in principle, though less likely in practice for my sample.
A more promising explanation relies on general equilibrium effects. In the
event of a negative capital shock, banks may reallocate their resources to safer
borrowers (e.g. very large firms). Carabarı́n, de la Garza, and Moreno (2015)
find for Mexico that as alternative sources of funding (FX bond markets) open up
for these large firms, that frees up capital in the banking sector to lend more to
small and medium sized firms. The converse could certainly be the case. General
equilibrium effects could also operate through changes in demand during the
recession that favor larger firms. For example, the construction firm HOMEX re-
ported to their investors following this episode that while government contracts
had generally declined in the aggregate, their firm actually saw an increase in the
number of government contracts won. These mechanisms appear to be promis-
ing avenues to pursue for future research in a general equilibrium model of FX
borrowing and investment.
2.8 Conclusion
In this paper, I estimate the effect of balance sheet shocks following a depre-
ciation for firms with currency mismatch. I construct a unique dataset of listed
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non-financial firms in Mexico that combines firm balance sheet data, including
data on real outcomes, export revenues, and currency exposures, with loan level
data for each firm that includes the currency of borrowing as well as the identity
of the lending bank. I exploit an exogenous and sudden depreciation episode
connected with the financial crisis in the US as an experiment. Using matched
firm-bank data, I control for bank credit supply shocks with bank-quarter fixed
effects and isolate the impact of pre-existing differences in firm characteristics on
responses to the depreciation. I thus identify the mechanism of the balance sheet
shock, and differentiate these effects by currency. I estimate bank credit supply
shocks at the firm level, and show how to include this measure as a time-varying
control in firm-level regressions. I then examine the effect of the balance sheet
shock for real firm-level outcomes, focusing on employment and investment.
I find that non-exporting firms with a higher currency mismatch on their
balance sheet have slower loan growth in FX following the depreciation shock.
However, large firms with higher FX exposure compensate for this by increas-
ing their Peso borrowing, while smaller exposed firms do not. These results are
robust to numerous alternative specifications and controls. While the borrowing
costs for FX loans relative to peso increase following the shock, compressing the
interest rate differntial, the decrease in the real interest rate differential between
FX and Peso loans was driven by the small firms who did not switch. FX loans
remain cheaper in real terms for all firms, but this result suggests that FX loans
were still as attractive as before to large firms in terms of the cost advantage they
afford.
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At the firm level, I find that total bank borrowing by large non-exporters
with a mismatch increases, while smaller non-exporters with a mismatch do not
increase the growth of their bank debt. Larger firms consequently see higher
growth in their investment and employment, while smaller firms do not see
higher employment growth and experience lower investment growth. Together,
these results suggest that balance sheet effects can lead to binding borrowing
constraints, that these constraints may bind more tightly on FX loans and smaller
firms, and that these binding constraints can affect real outcomes. I explore the
theoretical implications in a stylized 3 period model to highlight the role of the
additional borrowing constraint in FX. This model helps to rationalize my empir-
ical findings, including showing that selection into FX debt by productive firms
can lead to the counterintuitive result that some firms with negative balance sheet
shocks have higher growth outcomes.
This paper helps to harmonize and complement existing research by iden-
tifying and highlighting the roles of firm size and currency of debt for borrowing
constraints. I show that the null or positive impact of balance sheet shocks found
in some studies could be due to their focus on large firms that are able to sub-
stitute lost FX credit for domestic currency credit after the shock. This suggests
that some firms can avoid a binding borrowing constraint after a shock if they
are able to switch to Peso, but otherwise balance sheet effects can have real im-
pacts on these firms. The stability and liquidity of the domestic banking sector
could be a factor for emerging market policy makers to consider when assessing
the risk posed by corporate borrowing in foreign currencies. Further, risk assess-
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ment should focus on the exposure of small and medium sized firms, as that is
where the largest negative real impacts are likely to occur.
An important implication of my results is that the observed movement of
the largest firms into the Peso credit market could have spillover effects for smaller
firms (especially those not in my sample) by crowding them out of local currency
borrowing. The converse result has been found for listed firms in Mexico by
Carabarı́n et al. (2015), who find that when these large firms can increase their ac-
cess to the FX bond market, that frees up the domestic banking system and leads
to increased lending to smaller firms. Thus, negative aggregate effects that are
often observed with large exchange rate shocks could be driven by a few differ-
ent channels. First, negative effects could arise if FX borrowing is pervasive prior
to the shock among the small and medium sized firms who are more likely to be
constrained in the event of a shock. Second, negative effects could occur due to a
misallocation of capital from risky to safe borrowers. This is an important area to
study for future reserach. As most existing research relies on large firms for data
and analysis of their FX debt, firm level studies may fail to examine the portion of
the economy where negative effects might be stronger. A more complete look at
the distribution of FX debt among the universe of firms and analysis accounting
for general equilibrium channels should be a priority in this line of research.
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Figure 2.1: Exports and Exposure
(a) Non-Exporters (b) Exporters
Source: Author’s calculations. FX Exposure is (FX Liabilities - FX Assets)/Total Assets, right
axis. Exports is share of external sales relative to total sales, left axis.
Figure 2.2: Exposure vs Loan Share
Source: Author’s calculations
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Figure 2.3: Aggregate Capital Structure, Billions Peso
(a) Non-Exporters (b) Exporters
Source: Author’s calculations
Figure 2.4: US Dollar - Mexican Peso Exchange Rate
Source: FRED. Data is daily.
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Figure 2.5: Macroeconomic Trends of Mexico
(a) Exports and GDP Growth (b) Capital Inflows and Dollar Liquidity
Source: World Bank WDI, Avdjiev, Hardy, Kalemli-Özcan, and Servèn (2017), BIS. Debt inflows
is defined as portfolio debt inflows (e.g. bonds) plus other investment debt inflows (e.g. loans)
capital flows from external creditors to resident banks or non-bank firms. USD credit to LA
non-banks is total credit provided to non-bank institutions resident in Latin American countries.
Figure 2.6: Average Net Derivatives Position to Assets
Source: Author’s calculations. Figures expressed as percent.
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Figure 2.7: UIP Deviations
Source: Banco de Mexico, FRED. UIP Deviation defined as (st/E[st+1]) ∗ ((1 + rt)/(1 + r∗t )),
where st is the exchange rate expressed as dollars per peso, E[st+1] is the year ahead expected
exchange rate (from survey of professional forecasters), and r and r∗ are the the interest rates on
1 year treasury bills for Mexico and the U.S., respectively. All rates are period averages over each
quarter.
Figure 2.8: Bank Debt vs Firm Size
Source: Author’s calculations. Regression sample, non-exporters
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Table 2.1: Firms by Category
Non-
Exporters Exporters Total
Small 44 20 64
Large 28 32 60
Total 72 52 124
Firms are from the regression sample, which in-
cludes just firms with loan data from identifiable
banks over 2008q1-2013q1. Exporters are defined as
having their median share of external sales to total
sales over the sample greater than 15%. Small firms
are defined as having their average size (measured
by log assets) below the sample median.











Real Estate 6 339
Restaurants 8 669
Retail and Wholesale 11 578
Telecom 12 1313
Transportation 6 464
Total 124 13 070
Firms are from the regression sample, which includes
just firms with loan data from identifiable banks over
2008q1-2013q1.
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Table 2.3: Firm-Bank Relationships
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




















2008 94 80 0.851 0.995 7.280 221 94 0.425 0.732 3.095
2009 89 81 0.910 0.991 6.831 204 82 0.402 0.797 2.980
2010 94 77 0.819 0.957 6.638 220 84 0.382 0.742 2.836
2011 90 73 0.811 0.955 6.644 202 67 0.331 0.760 2.960
2012 89 77 0.865 0.943 6.798 186 82 0.441 0.876 3.253
2013 87 75 0.862 0.941 6.782 180 82 0.456 0.900 3.278
2014 88 75 0.852 0.936 6.898 191 93 0.487 0.902 3.178
This table presents annual (quarter 4) summary statistics on the frequency of different types of firm-bank relationships
within the loan data using end-of-year data for the regression sample. Column (1) lists the number of firm; columns
(2)-(4) deal with firms who borrow from multiple banks, listing the number of them, the share of firms, and the share of
loans accounted for, respectively; column (5) gives the average number of bank relationships each firm in sample has;
column (6) lists the number of banks; columns (7)-(9) deal with banks that lend to multiple firms, listing the number,
the share of banks, and the share of loans accounted for, respectively; and column (10) gives the average number of
firms each bank lends to in sample.








Sample Full-Reg Reg-FE Full-FE
Firms 74 54 51
N 2537 1685 1493
log(Assets) 16.27 16.37 16.50 −0.10 * −0.14 ** −0.23***
Liabilities/Assets 53.91 53.24 52.73 0.67 0.51 1.19
Cash/Assets 7.59 6.99 7.21 0.59*** −0.21 0.38
PPE/Assets 39.39 39.03 37.94 0.37 1.09 1.45*
Employment 18.09 16.77 18.68 1.32 −1.92 * −0.60
Output/Assets 20.59 20.02 20.52 0.57 −0.50 0.75
External Sales/Sales 17.61 19.31 20.26 −1.70 ** −0.95 −2.65***
FX Exposure 7.86 9.16 9.17 −1.31 ** −0.01 −1.31**
Samples as described in the text. N reports the number of firm-time observations. The first 3 data
columns are the means for each sample, with all figures expressed in percent, except Employment (mea-
sured in thousands of persons) and log(Assets) (where assets are measured in thousands of pesos). PPE
is property, plant, and equipment. FX Exposure is defined as (FX Liabilities - FX Assets)/Total Assets.
The last 3 data columns are the differences between those means, along with their statistical significance.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 2.5: Firm-Bank Level Loan Summary
Panel A: Non-Exporters, Peso Loans
Obs Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
Volume 3980 0.65 0.20 1.19 0.00 13.90
Interest Rate 3980 11.21 11.75 4.79 0 25.52
Short Term Share 3980 0.54 0.50 0.41 0 1
Panel B: Non-Exporters, FX Loans
Obs Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
Volume 2040 0.64 0.09 2.57 0.00 43.00
Interest Rate 2039 9.24 8.74 4.75 0 35.43
Short Term Share 2040 0.55 0.49 0.41 0 1
Panel C: Exporters, Peso Loans
Obs Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
Volume 1814 0.75 0.28 1.46 0.00 13.50
Interest Rate 1814 12.62 12.43 3.81 0 30.25
Short Term Share 1814 0.53 0.46 0.43 0 1
Panel D: Exporters, FX Loans
Obs Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
Volume 5228 1.25 0.16 4.89 0.00 99.00
Interest Rate 5228 9.80 9.05 5.00 0 36.73
Short Term Share 5228 0.51 0.40 0.43 0 1
Loan volume is expressed in billions of Pesos. Interest rate is nominal. Short term share
is the share of the loan that is due within 1 year divided by the total amount of the loan.
The maximum loan volume is expressed in billions of pesos.
Table 2.6: Correlates with Exposure
Sector
Mean Exposure
in 2008 Observations Variable
Correlation
Coefficient
Construction 1.99 35 Assets 0.08∗∗∗
Health 0.00 16 Employment −0.03
IT 4.73 1 PPE/Assets 0.11∗∗∗
Manufacturing 5.71 85 Liabilities/Assets 0.45∗∗∗
Real Estate −3.03 16 Profit/Assets −0.03
Restaurants 0.65 20 Cash/Assets −0.28 ∗∗∗
Retail and Wholesale 2.18 26 Sales/Assets −0.05
Telecom 14.78 40 Exports/Sales 0.24∗∗∗
Transportation 3.27 20 Bond Debt/Assets 0.05∗
Total 4.78 259 N 1033
Sample is non-exporting firms over 2005-2008. Left side of the table show the average FX exposure in 2008
for each sector. The right side of the table shows the correlation coefficients of various firm characteristics
with exposure over 2005-2008. Sample size for correlations is 1033, except for profits where it is 986. t-stat on
significance is non-directional. PPE is property, plant, and equipment * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 2.7: Growth in Bank Loans (%), Firm-Bank Level
FX Peso
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Shockt 0.0553 0.0265 -0.0423∗∗ -0.0397
(0.0353) (0.0368) (0.0210) (0.0239)
Exposure f × Shockt -0.402∗∗∗ -0.322∗∗∗ -0.542∗∗∗ -0.691∗∗∗ 0.404∗∗ 0.464∗ 0.477∗ 0.899∗∗∗
(0.0825) (0.103) (0.108) (0.209) (0.196) (0.256) (0.250) (0.279)
Small f × Shockt -0.288∗∗ 0.0710∗
(0.119) (0.0389)
Exposure f × Small f × Shockt 0.427 -1.020∗∗∗
(0.270) (0.299)
Observations 1636 764 764 764 2818 2377 2377 2377
R2 0.054 0.096 0.475 0.484 0.032 0.034 0.151 0.154
Firms 40 34 34 34 49 47 47 47
FirmFE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
BankQuarterFE No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
FirmControls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
JointTest 0.0505 0.314
Sample spans 2008q1-2013q1, Firms reports the number of firms in each regression. Dependent variable is the log difference of loans
outstanding in FX or Peso at the firm-bank level in each period, winsorized at 1%. Exposure is the firm’s average 2008 net FX position
to assets, with 2 outlier firms winsorized. Small is a dummy equal to one if the firm’s average size (measured by log assets) is below the
sample median. Shock is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 in 2009 and 2010 and 0 otherwise. Firm Controls include one quarter lags
of firm size (log assets), cash to assets ratio winsorized at 1%, total liabilities to assets ratio winsorized at 2%, bond credit to assets, share of
sales to foreigners (including exports and sales by foreign subsidiaries), sales to assets ratio, and net derivatives position to total liabilities
winsorized at 3%. Regressions are weighted by the lagged value of log loan. Errors are clustered at the firm level. JointTest reports the
p-value of the F-test that the sum of the coefficients of Exposure*Shock and Exposure*Shock*Small is equal to 0. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, ***
p < 0.01
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Table 2.8: Growth in Bank Loans (%), Firm-Bank Level - FX vs Peso
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Exposure f × Shockt 0.449∗ 0.837∗∗∗
(0.246) (0.270)
Exposure f × FXc 0.396∗∗∗ 0.787∗∗∗ 0.185 0.542∗∗∗
(0.146) (0.174) (0.162) (0.139)
Exposure f × Shockt × FXc -0.798∗∗∗ -1.173∗∗∗ -0.358∗ -0.656∗∗∗
(0.260) (0.255) (0.206) (0.238)
Shockt × Small f 0.0653
(0.0397)
Exposure f × Shockt × Small f -0.947∗∗∗
(0.290)
Small f × FXc 0.235∗∗∗ 0.219∗∗∗
(0.0740) (0.0642)
Exposure f × Small f × FXc -0.927∗∗∗ -0.784∗∗∗
(0.244) (0.194)
Shockt × Small f × FXc -0.281∗∗∗ -0.275∗∗∗
(0.0765) (0.0766)
Exposure f × Shockt × Small f × FXc 1.046∗∗∗ 0.752∗
(0.315) (0.378)
Observations 3142 3142 2964 2964
R2 0.200 0.204 0.411 0.413
Firms 50 50 47 47
FirmFE Yes Yes - -
FirmQuarterFE No No Yes Yes
BankQuarterCurrencyFE Yes Yes Yes Yes
FirmControls Yes Yes - -
Sample spans 2008q1-2013q1, Firms reports the number of firms in each regression. Dependent
variable is the log difference of loans outstanding at the firm-bank level in each period, win-
sorized at 1%. Exposure is the firm’s average 2008 net FX position to assets, with 2 outlier firms
winsorized. Small is a dummy equal to one if the firm’s average size (measured by log assets) is
below the sample median. Shock is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 in 2009 and 2010 and 0
otherwise. FX is a dummy equal to 1 if the loan is in foreign currency. Firm Controls include one
quarter lags of firm size (log assets), cash to assets ratio winsorized at 1%, total liabilities to assets
ratio winsorized at 2%, bond credit to assets, share of sales to foreigners (including exports and
sales by foreign subsidiaries), sales to assets ratio, and net derivatives position to total liabilities
winsorized at 3%. Regressions are weighted by the lagged value of log loan. Errors are clustered
at the firm level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 2.9: Growth in Bank Loans (%), Firm-Bank Level - All Loans
(1) (2) (3)
Exposure f × Shockt 0.553∗ 0.529∗ 0.324∗
(0.275) (0.272) (0.187)
Small f × Shockt 0.0419 0.0348 0.0453
(0.0375) (0.0390) (0.0406)
Exposure f × Small f × Shockt -0.724∗∗ -0.789∗∗ -0.565∗∗
(0.291) (0.305) (0.234)
Observations 3413 3142 3112
R2 0.197 0.200 0.254
Firms 51 50 50
FirmFE Yes Yes -
FirmBankFE No No Yes
BankQuarterFE Yes - -
BankQuarterCurrencyFE No Yes Yes
FirmControls Yes Yes Yes
JointTest 0.121 0.0129 0.0244
Sample spans 2008q1-2013q1, Firms reports the number of firms in each re-
gression. Dependent variable is the log difference of loans outstanding at
the firm-bank level in each period, winsorized at 1%. Exposure is the firm’s
average 2008 net FX position to assets, with 2 outlier firms winsorized.
Small is a dummy equal to one if the firm’s average size (measured by
log assets) is below the sample median. Shock is a dummy variable tak-
ing a value of 1 in 2009 and 2010 and 0 otherwise. Firm Controls include
one quarter lags of firm size (log assets), cash to assets ratio winsorized
at 1%, total liabilities to assets ratio winsorized at 2%, bond credit to as-
sets, share of sales to foreigners (including exports and sales by foreign
subsidiaries), sales to assets ratio, and net derivatives position to total li-
abilities winsorized at 3%. Regressions are weighted by the lagged value
of log loan. Errors are clustered at the firm level. JointTest reports the p-
value of the F-test that the sum of the coefficients of Exposure*Shock and
Exposure*Shock*Small is equal to 0. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 2.10: Interest Rates, Firm-Bank Level
Nominal FX Real FX Nominal Peso Real Peso
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Exposure f × Shockt 0.0175∗ 0.0106 0.0177∗ 0.0114 0.0117 0.0128 0.0123 0.0134
(0.00892) (0.00852) (0.00905) (0.00888) (0.0151) (0.0239) (0.0158) (0.0249)
Shockt × Small f 0.00399 0.00342 0.00800 0.00832
(0.00512) (0.00521) (0.00718) (0.00751)
Exposure f × Shockt × Small f 0.00882 0.00819 -0.0105 -0.0106
(0.0193) (0.0196) (0.0302) (0.0314)
Observations 884 884 883 883 2662 2662 2662 2662
R2 0.942 0.943 0.967 0.967 0.893 0.894 0.892 0.893
Firms 34 34 34 34 48 48 48 48
FirmBankFE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
BankQuarterFE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
FirmControls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
JointTest 0.257 0.265 0.873 0.855
Sample spans 2008q1-2013q1, Firms reports the number of firms in each regression. Dependent variable in columns (1)-(2) is the log
of 1 + the loan weighted nominal interest rate at the firm-bank level in each period. Depedent variable in columns (3)-(4) is the log of
the nominal rate, plus the expected Peso depreciation rate for the foreign currency loans, minus expected Peso inflation rate. Shock is a
dummy variable taking a value of 1 in 2009 and 2010 and 0 otherwise. FX is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the loan is denominated in
foreign currency. Small is a dummy equal to one if the firm’s average size (measured by log assets) is below the sample median. Firm
Controls include one quarter lags of firm size (log assets), cash to assets ratio winsorized at 1%, total liabilities to assets ratio winsorized
at 2%, bond credit to assets, share of sales to foreigners (including exports and sales by foreign subsidiaries), sales to assets ratio, and
net derivatives position to total liabilities winsorized at 3%. Regressions are weighted by log loan. Errors are clustered at the firm level.
JointTest reports the p-value of the F-test that the sum of the coefficients of Exposure*Shock and Exposure*Shock*Small is equal to 0. * p
< 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 2.11: Real Interest Rate Differential, Firm-Bank Level
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FXc -0.0503∗∗∗ -0.0504∗∗∗ -0.0459∗∗∗
(0.00450) (0.00531) (0.00711)
FXc × Shockt 0.0154∗∗∗ 0.0154∗∗ 0.00645
(0.00468) (0.00650) (0.00767)
FXc × Exposure f 0.00347
(0.0244)
FXc × Shockt × Exposure f -0.00151
(0.0264)
FXc × Small f -0.00880 -0.00502
(0.00892) (0.00627)
FXc × Shockt × Small f 0.0172∗∗ 0.00650
(0.00809) (0.00611)
Observations 4348 3860 4348 4003
R2 0.909 0.904 0.909 0.971
Firms 59 48 59 58
FirmBankFE Yes Yes Yes Yes
BankQuarterFE Yes Yes Yes -
FirmQuarterFE Yes Yes Yes Yes
BankQuarterCurrencyFE No No No Yes
Sample spans 2008q1-2013q1, Firms reports the number of firms in each regression. Depen-
dent variable is the log of 1 + the loan weighted nominal interest rate at the firm-bank level
in each period, plus expected Peso depreciation for foreign currency loans, minus expected
Peso inflation rate. Shock is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 in 2009 and 2010 and 0
otherwise. FX is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the loan is denominated in foreign currency.
Small is a dummy equal to one if the firm’s average size (measured by log assets) is below
the sample median. Regressions are weighted by log loan. Errors are clustered at the firm
level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 2.12: Growth in FX Loans (%), Firm-Bank Level, Horseraces
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Exports Cash Derivatives Size Leverage Sales
Exposure f × Shockt -0.399∗∗ -0.592∗∗∗ -0.549∗∗∗ -0.487∗∗∗ -0.557∗∗∗ -0.565∗∗∗
(0.147) (0.148) (0.132) (0.0962) (0.157) (0.111)
Horse f × Shockt -0.00355 -0.00282 0.00302 0.0193 0.000405 0.00485
(0.00375) (0.00535) (0.0257) (0.0251) (0.00342) (0.00487)
Observations 764 764 764 764 764 764
R2 0.476 0.475 0.475 0.476 0.475 0.476
Firms 34 34 34 34 34 34
FirmFE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
BankQuarterFE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
FirmControls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample spans 2008q1-2013q1, Firms reports the number of firms in each regression. Dependent variable is the
log difference of loans outstanding in FX at the firm-bank level in each period, winsorized at 1%. Exposure is
the firm’s average 2008 net FX position to assets, with 2 outlier firms winsorized. Horse is the firm characteristic
indicated in the column heading. Exports is the 2008 average of the firm’s external sales (exports + sales by
foreign subsidiaries) over total sales. Cash is the 2008 average of cash to assets, with 2 outlier firms winsorized.
Derivatives is the 2008 average of the net derivatives position to liabilities. Size is the 2008 average of log of
assets. Leverage is the ratio of liabilities to assets. Sales is the ratio of sales to assets. Shock is a dummy variable
taking a value of 1 in 2009 and 2010 and 0 otherwise. Firm Controls include one quarter lags of firm size (log
assets), cash to assets ratio winsorized at 1%, total liabilities to assets ratio winsorized at 2%, bond credit to
assets, share of sales to foreigners (including exports and sales by foreign subsidiaries), sales to assets ratio,
and net derivatives position to total liabilities winsorized at 3%. Regressions are weighted by the lagged value
of log loan. Errors are clustered at the firm level. JointTest reports the p-value of the F-test that the sum of the
coefficients of Exposure*Shock and Exposure*Shock*Small is equal to 0. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 2.13: Growth in Peso Loans (%), Firm-Bank Level, Horseraces
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Exports Cash Derivatives Size Leverage Sales
Exposure f × Shockt 0.854∗∗∗ 0.998∗∗∗ 0.924∗∗∗ 0.898∗∗∗ 1.103∗∗∗ 0.885∗∗∗
(0.279) (0.267) (0.277) (0.293) (0.238) (0.266)
Shockt × Small f 0.0838∗∗ 0.264∗∗∗ 0.0610 -0.409 -0.116 0.115
(0.0384) (0.0646) (0.0407) (1.012) (0.140) (0.0845)
Exposure f × Shockt × Small f -1.332∗∗∗ -1.305∗∗∗ -0.975∗∗∗ -0.846∗∗ -1.210∗∗∗ -1.012∗∗∗
(0.402) (0.307) (0.307) (0.330) (0.267) (0.290)
Horse f × Shockt 0.00654∗ 0.00694∗∗ -0.00723 0.00124 -0.00403∗∗ 0.00101
(0.00331) (0.00283) (0.0154) (0.0502) (0.00165) (0.00224)
Horse f × Shockt × Small f -0.00140 -0.0304∗∗∗ -0.0841 0.0309 0.00376 -0.00225
(0.00506) (0.00949) (0.0538) (0.0600) (0.00288) (0.00330)
Observations 2377 2377 2377 2377 2377 2377
R2 0.155 0.157 0.154 0.154 0.156 0.154
Firms 47 47 47 47 47 47
FirmFE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
BankQuarterFE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
FirmControls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
JointTest 0.134 0.0769 0.691 0.749 0.439 0.314
Sample spans 2008q1-2013q1, Firms reports the number of firms in each regression. Dependent variable is the log difference
of loans outstanding in Peso at the firm-bank level in each period, winsorized at 1%. Exposure is the firm’s average 2008
net FX position to assets, with 2 outlier firms winsorized. Horse is the firm characteristic indicated in the column heading.
Exports is the 2008 average of the firm’s external sales (exports + sales by foreign subsidiaries) over total sales. Cash is
the 2008 average of cash to assets, with 2 outlier firms winsorized. Derivatives is the 2008 average of the net derivatives
position to liabilities. Size is the 2008 average of log of assets. Leverage is the ratio of liabilities to assets. Sales is the ratio
of sales to assets. Shock is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 in 2009 and 2010 and 0 otherwise. Firm Controls include
one quarter lags of firm size (log assets), cash to assets ratio winsorized at 1%, total liabilities to assets ratio winsorized at
2%, bond credit to assets, share of sales to foreigners (including exports and sales by foreign subsidiaries), sales to assets
ratio, and net derivatives position to total liabilities winsorized at 3%. Regressions are weighted by the lagged value of
log loan. Errors are clustered at the firm level. JointTest reports the p-value of the F-test that the sum of the coefficients of
Exposure*Shock and Exposure*Shock*Small is equal to 0. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 2.14: Growth in FX Loans (%), Firm-Bank Level - Robustness To Sectors
Telecom Manufacturing Construction Transportation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Exposure f × Shockt -0.581∗∗∗ -0.577∗∗∗ -0.364∗∗ -0.561∗∗∗ -0.428∗∗∗ -0.424∗∗∗ -0.576∗∗∗ -0.575∗∗∗
(0.117) (0.171) (0.166) (0.181) (0.111) (0.106) (0.107) (0.107)
Shockt × Sector f 0.0633 0.0677 -0.119 -0.252 0.130∗ 0.136∗∗ -0.389∗∗∗ -0.543∗∗∗
(0.0778) (0.114) (0.114) (0.192) (0.0767) (0.0648) (0.109) (0.0802)
Exposure f × Shockt × Sector f -0.0180 0.630 -0.113 1.449
(0.364) (0.508) (0.646) (1.003)
Observations 764 764 764 764 764 764 764 764
R2 0.475 0.475 0.477 0.478 0.477 0.477 0.478 0.478
Firms 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34
FirmFE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
BankQuarterFE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
FirmControls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample spans 2008q1-2013q1, Firms reports the number of firms in each regression. Dependent variable is the log difference of loans outstanding
in FX or Peso at the firm-bank level in each period, winsorized at 1%. Sector is a dummy variable taking a value of one if the firm is in the
sector indicated in the column heading. Exposure is the firm’s average 2008 net FX position to assets, with 2 outlier firms winsorized. Small
is a dummy equal to one if the firm’s average size (measured by log assets) is below the sample median. Shock is a dummy variable taking
a value of 1 in 2009 and 2010 and 0 otherwise. Firm Controls include one quarter lags of firm size (log assets), cash to assets ratio winsorized
at 1%, total liabilities to assets ratio winsorized at 2%, bond credit to assets, share of sales to foreigners (including exports and sales by foreign
subsidiaries), sales to assets ratio, and net derivatives position to total liabilities winsorized at 3%. Regressions are weighted by the lagged value
of log loan. Errors are clustered at the firm level. JointTest reports the p-value of the F-test that the sum of the coefficients of Exposure*Shock and
Exposure*Shock*Small is equal to 0. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 2.15: Growth in Peso Loans (%), Firm-Bank Level - Robustness To Sectors
Telecom Manufacturing Construction Transportation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Exposure f × Shockt 0.855∗∗ 1.614∗∗∗ 0.934∗∗∗ 0.936∗∗∗ 0.889∗∗∗ 0.417∗∗ 0.908∗∗∗ 0.907∗∗∗
(0.318) (0.205) (0.277) (0.276) (0.278) (0.159) (0.279) (0.278)
Shockt × Small f 0.0784∗ 0.0966∗∗ 0.0754∗ 0.0912∗∗ 0.0836 0.0561 0.0705∗ 0.0680∗
(0.0403) (0.0393) (0.0425) (0.0437) (0.0502) (0.0515) (0.0400) (0.0395)
Exposure f × Shockt × Small f -0.963∗∗∗ -1.703∗∗∗ -1.163∗∗∗ -2.132∗∗ -1.111∗∗∗ -0.551∗∗ -1.042∗∗∗ -0.998∗∗∗
(0.334) (0.218) (0.360) (0.841) (0.308) (0.228) (0.300) (0.298)
Shockt × Sector f 0.0531 0.125∗ 0.153∗∗∗ 0.157∗∗∗ -0.0261 -0.0692 0.0777∗ 0.0512
(0.0741) (0.0675) (0.0496) (0.0494) (0.0537) (0.0510) (0.0411) (0.0402)
Shockt × Small f × Sector f 0.184∗ 0.173∗ -0.117 -0.153 -0.0709 0.0300 0.0403 0.251∗∗∗
(0.109) (0.102) (0.0871) (0.0931) (0.0820) (0.0687) (0.0947) (0.0714)
Exposure f × Shockt × Sector f -1.283∗∗∗ 1.308∗∗∗ -2.501∗∗
(0.327) (0.292) (0.978)
Exposure f × Shockt × Small f × Sector f 1.082 -4.377∗∗
(0.872) (2.164)
Observations 2377 2377 2377 2377 2377 2377 2377 2377
R2 0.155 0.157 0.155 0.155 0.155 0.158 0.154 0.155
Firms 47 47 47 47 47 47 47 47
FirmFE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
BankQuarterFE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
FirmControls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
JointTest 0.370 0.471 0.330 0.153 0.123 0.336 0.275 0.455
Sample spans 2008q1-2013q1, Firms reports the number of firms in each regression. Dependent variable is the log difference of loans outstanding in FX
or Peso at the firm-bank level in each period, winsorized at 1%. Sector is a dummy variable taking a value of one if the firm is in the sector indicated
in the column heading. Exposure is the firm’s average 2008 net FX position to assets, with 2 outlier firms winsorized. Small is a dummy equal to one
if the firm’s average size (measured by log assets) is below the sample median. Shock is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 in 2009 and 2010 and 0
otherwise. Firm Controls include one quarter lags of firm size (log assets), cash to assets ratio winsorized at 1%, total liabilities to assets ratio winsorized
at 2%, bond credit to assets, share of sales to foreigners (including exports and sales by foreign subsidiaries), sales to assets ratio, and net derivatives
position to total liabilities winsorized at 3%. Regressions are weighted by the lagged value of log loan. Errors are clustered at the firm level. JointTest
reports the p-value of the F-test that the sum of the coefficients of Exposure*Shock and Exposure*Shock*Small is equal to 0. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p
< 0.01
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Table 2.16: Growth in Bank Loans (%), Firm-Bank Level, Alternate Fixed Effects
FX Peso
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Exposure f × Shockt -0.479∗∗ -0.780∗∗ -0.552∗∗∗ -0.723∗∗∗ 0.817∗∗ 0.833∗∗ 0.717∗∗∗ 0.918∗∗∗
(0.231) (0.324) (0.133) (0.214) (0.359) (0.388) (0.185) (0.276)
Shockt × Small f -0.212 0.0182 -0.0289 0.0768∗ 0.0697∗
(0.127) (0.0442) (0.0655) (0.0393) (0.0392)
Exposure f × Shockt × Small f -0.964 -1.145∗∗ -1.117∗∗ -0.821∗∗∗ -1.791∗∗
(0.942) (0.444) (0.464) (0.256) (0.788)
Shockt ×Manufacturing -0.208 0.0644
(0.182) (0.0549)
Exposure f × Shockt ×Manufacturing 1.843 0.578
(1.123) (0.781)
Observations 760 1511 749 764 2376 2690 2351 2377
R2 0.500 0.354 0.560 0.486 0.165 0.182 0.215 0.155
Firms 34 40 33 34 47 49 47 47
FirmFE Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes Yes N/A Yes
QuarterFE N/A Yes N/A N/A N/A Yes N/A N/A
SectorYearFE Yes N/A No No Yes N/A No No
BankQuarterFE Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes
BankSectorYearFE No Yes No No No Yes No No
FirmBankFE No No Yes No No No Yes No
FirmControls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
JointTest 0.118 0.115 0.523 0.270
Sample spans 2008q1-2013q1, Firms reports the number of firms in each regression. Dependent variable is the log difference of loans outstanding
in FX or Peso at the firm-bank level in each period, winsorized at 1%. Exposure is the firm’s average 2008 net FX position to assets, with 2 outlier
firms winsorized. Small is a dummy equal to one if the firm’s average size (measured by log assets) is below the sample median. Shock is a dummy
variable taking a value of 1 in 2009 and 2010 and 0 otherwise. Firm Controls include one quarter lags of firm size (log assets), cash to assets ratio
winsorized at 1%, total liabilities to assets ratio winsorized at 2%, bond credit to assets, share of sales to foreigners (including exports and sales by
foreign subsidiaries), sales to assets ratio, and net derivatives position to total liabilities winsorized at 3%. Regressions are weighted by the lagged
value of log loan. Errors are clustered at the firm level. JointTest reports the p-value of the F-test that the sum of the coefficients of Exposure*Shock
and Exposure*Shock*Small is equal to 0. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 2.17: Growth in Firm Level Non-Bank Financing (%)
Non-Bank Liabilities Bond Debt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Total FX Peso Total FX Peso
Exposure f × Shockt 0.331∗∗ -0.425 0.814∗ -0.179 -0.201 0.249
(0.161) (0.285) (0.405) (0.303) (0.147) (0.479)
Shockt × Small f 0.0517 -0.167∗ 0.109∗ -0.193∗∗ -0.0321 -0.143
(0.0365) (0.0877) (0.0595) (0.0771) (0.0515) (0.0910)
Exposure f × Shockt × Small f -0.482∗∗ 0.335 -0.672 0.525 -0.122 0.176
(0.211) (0.330) (0.434) (0.438) (0.320) (0.556)
Observations 844 517 790 837 837 844
R2 0.217 0.273 0.161 0.082 0.084 0.076
Firms 52 40 47 52 52 52
FirmFE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
TimeFE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
BankShock Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
FirmControls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
JointTest 0.292 0.585 0.405 0.296 0.267 0.130
Sample spans 2008q1-2013q1, Firms reports the number of firms in each regression. Dependent variable
in columns (1)-(3) is the log difference of non-bank liabilities outstanding at the firm level in each period,
winsorized at 2%. Dependent variable in columns (4)-(6) is the log difference of bond debt at the firm level
in each period, winsorized at 2%. Exposure is the firm’s average 2008 net FX position to assets, with 2 outlier
firms winsorized. Small is a dummy equal to one if the firm’s average size (measured by log assets) is below
the sample median. Shock is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 in 2009 and 2010 and 0 otherwise. Bank
shock is a control for credit supply shocks to each firm, as constructed in the text. Firm Controls include
one quarter lags of firm size (log assets), cash to assets ratio winsorized at 1%, total liabilities to assets ratio
winsorized at 2%, bond credit to assets, share of sales to foreigners (including exports and sales by foreign
subsidiaries), sales to assets ratio, and net derivatives position to total liabilities winsorized at 3%. Errors
are clustered at the firm level. JointTest reports the p-value of the F-test that the sum of the coefficients of
Exposure*Shock and Exposure*Shock*Small is equal to 0. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 2.18: Growth in Firm Level Outcomes (%)
Bank Debt Employment PPE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Exposure f × Shockt 0.250 0.479∗∗ 0.0672 0.160∗∗ 0.0325 0.128∗
(0.162) (0.202) (0.0477) (0.0796) (0.0579) (0.0653)
Shockt × Small f 0.0770∗ 0.00519 0.0166
(0.0439) (0.0146) (0.0111)
Exposure f × Shockt × Small f -0.598∗∗ -0.234∗∗ -0.249∗∗∗
(0.239) (0.108) (0.0839)
Observations 848 848 765 765 787 787
R2 0.206 0.210 0.162 0.168 0.198 0.207
Firms 52 52 51 51 52 52
FirmFE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
TimeFE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
BankShock Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
FirmControls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
JointTest 0.391 0.340 0.0290
Sample spans 2008q1-2013q1, Firms reports the number of firms in each regression. Dependent variable in
columns (1) and (2) is the log difference of bank credit outstanding at the firm level in each period, winsorized
at 1%. Dependent variable in columns (3) and (4) is the log difference of employment at the firm level in each
period, winsorized at 2%. Dependent variable in columns (5) and (6) is the log difference of physical capital
outstanding, measured as property, plant, and equipment, at the firm level in each period, winsorized at
2%. Exposure is the firm’s average 2008 net FX position to assets, with 2 outlier firms winsorized. Small
is a dummy equal to one if the firm’s average size (measured by log assets) is below the sample median.
Shock is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 in 2009 and 2010 and 0 otherwise. Bank shock is a control
for credit supply shocks to each firm, as constructed in the text. Firm Controls include one quarter lags of
firm size (log assets), cash to assets ratio winsorized at 1%, total liabilities to assets ratio winsorized at 2%,
bond credit to assets, share of sales to foreigners (including exports and sales by foreign subsidiaries), sales
to assets ratio, and net derivatives position to total liabilities winsorized at 3%. Errors are clustered at the
firm level. JointTest reports the p-value of the F-test that the sum of the coefficients of Exposure*Shock and
Exposure*Shock*Small is equal to 0. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 2.19: Growth in Employment (%), Horseraces
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Exports Cash Derivatives Size Leverage Sales
Exposure f × Shockt 0.169∗ 0.158∗ 0.180∗∗∗ 0.188∗∗∗ 0.158∗∗ 0.157∗
(0.0865) (0.0798) (0.0632) (0.0558) (0.0739) (0.0798)
Shockt × Small f 0.00368 -0.00277 0.00606 -0.460∗ -0.00830 0.0272
(0.0162) (0.0194) (0.0149) (0.248) (0.0304) (0.0225)
Exposure f × Shockt × Small f -0.410∗∗ -0.229∗∗ -0.248∗∗ -0.227∗∗ -0.252∗∗ -0.240∗∗
(0.184) (0.112) (0.0990) (0.0959) (0.112) (0.103)
Horse f × Shockt -0.00104 -0.000195 -0.00575 -0.0180 0.0000479 -0.000113
(0.00157) (0.000805) (0.00426) (0.0109) (0.000348) (0.000410)
Horse f × Shockt × Small f 0.00345 0.00145 -0.000449 0.0281∗ 0.000312 -0.00115
(0.00244) (0.00228) (0.0146) (0.0151) (0.000630) (0.000715)
Observations 765 765 765 765 765 765
R2 0.170 0.168 0.169 0.170 0.168 0.171
Firms 51 51 51 51 51 51
FirmFE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
TimeFE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
BankShock Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
FirmControls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
JointTest 0.134 0.381 0.395 0.627 0.296 0.248
Sample spans 2008q1-2013q1, Firms reports the number of firms in each regression. Dependent variable is the log difference of
employment at the firm level in each period, winsorized at 2%. Exposure is the firm’s average 2008 net FX position to assets,
with 2 outlier firms winsorized. Small is a dummy equal to one if the firm’s average size (measured by log assets) is below
the sample median. Horse is the firm characteristic indicated in the column heading. Exports is the 2008 average of the firm’s
external sales (exports + sales by foreign subsidiaries) over total sales. Cash is the 2008 average of cash to assets, with 2 outlier
firms winsorized. Derivatives is the 2008 average of the net derivatives position to liabilities. Size is the 2008 average of log of
assets. Leverage is the ratio of liabilities to assets. Sales is the ratio of total sales to assets. Shock is a dummy variable taking
a value of 1 in 2009 and 2010 and 0 otherwise. Bank shock is a control for credit supply shocks to each firm, as constructed in
the text, lagged one period. Firm Controls include one quarter lags of firm size (log assets), cash to assets ratio winsorized at
1%, total liabilities to assets ratio winsorized at 2%, bond credit to assets, share of sales to foreigners (including exports and
sales by foreign subsidiaries), sales to assets ratio, and net derivatives position to total liabilities winsorized at 3%. Errors are
clustered at the firm level. JointTest reports the p-value of the F-test that the sum of the coefficients of Exposure*Shock and
Exposure*Shock*Small is equal to 0. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 2.20: Growth in Physical Capital (%), Horseraces
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Exports Cash Derivatives Size Leverage Sales
Exposure f × Shockt 0.127∗ 0.131∗ 0.160∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗ 0.158∗∗ 0.119∗∗
(0.0656) (0.0671) (0.0513) (0.0583) (0.0694) (0.0576)
Shockt × Small f 0.0178 0.0175 0.0189∗ -0.130 -0.0205 0.0500∗∗
(0.0115) (0.0155) (0.0103) (0.190) (0.0277) (0.0198)
Exposure f × Shockt × Small f -0.347∗∗∗ -0.251∗∗∗ -0.284∗∗∗ -0.279∗∗∗ -0.295∗∗∗ -0.251∗∗∗
(0.123) (0.0860) (0.0765) (0.0809) (0.0967) (0.0743)
Horse f × Shockt 0.000426 0.000299 -0.00932∗∗∗ -0.0116 -0.000530 0.000798
(0.000816) (0.000593) (0.00328) (0.00893) (0.000356) (0.000526)
Horse f × Shockt × Small f 0.000998 0.0000631 0.0108 0.00821 0.000805 -0.00177∗∗
(0.00149) (0.00192) (0.00835) (0.0117) (0.000661) (0.000788)
Observations 787 787 787 787 787 787
R2 0.208 0.207 0.212 0.208 0.209 0.212
Firms 52 52 52 52 52 52
FirmFE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
TimeFE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
BankShock Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
FirmControls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
JointTest 0.0261 0.0387 0.0324 0.0211 0.0324 0.00984
Sample spans 2008q1-2013q1, Firms reports the number of firms in each regression. Dependent variable is the log difference
of physical capital outstanding, measured as property, plant, and equipment, at the firm level in each period, winsorized at
2%. Exposure is the firm’s average 2008 net FX position to assets, with 2 outlier firms winsorized. Small is a dummy equal to
one if the firm’s average size (measured by log assets) is below the sample median. Horse is the firm characteristic indicated
in the column heading. Exports is the 2008 average of the firm’s external sales (exports + sales by foreign subsidiaries) over
total sales. Cash is the 2008 average of cash to assets, with 2 outlier firms winsorized. Derivatives is the 2008 average of the
net derivatives position to liabilities. Size is the 2008 average of log of assets. Leverage is the ratio of liabilities to assets. Sales
is the ratio of total sales to assets. Shock is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 in 2009 and 2010 and 0 otherwise. Bank
shock is a control for credit supply shocks to each firm, as constructed in the text, lagged one period. Firm Controls include
one quarter lags of firm size (log assets), cash to assets ratio winsorized at 1%, total liabilities to assets ratio winsorized at 2%,
bond credit to assets, share of sales to foreigners (including exports and sales by foreign subsidiaries), sales to assets ratio, and
net derivatives position to total liabilities winsorized at 3%. Errors are clustered at the firm level. JointTest reports the p-value
of the F-test that the sum of the coefficients of Exposure*Shock and Exposure*Shock*Small is equal to 0. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05,
*** p < 0.01
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Table 2.21: Growth in Employment (%) - Robustness to Sectors
Telecom Manufacturing Construction Transportation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Exposure f × Shockt 0.412∗∗∗ 0.363 0.390∗∗∗ 0.394∗∗∗ 0.411∗∗∗ 0.446∗∗∗ 0.397∗∗∗ 0.397∗∗∗
(0.145) (0.229) (0.129) (0.128) (0.110) (0.0710) (0.133) (0.133)
Shockt × Small f 0.00532 0.00513 0.0114 0.0212 0.00712 0.00343 0.00867 0.00891
(0.0211) (0.0209) (0.0201) (0.0218) (0.0137) (0.0141) (0.0199) (0.0201)
Exposure f × Shockt × Small f -0.425∗∗ -0.378 -0.319∗ -0.677∗∗ -0.372∗∗ -0.310∗∗ -0.409∗∗ -0.417∗∗
(0.183) (0.248) (0.177) (0.296) (0.159) (0.126) (0.176) (0.184)
Shockt × Sector f -0.0228 -0.0281 -0.0209 -0.0206 0.0442 0.0434 0.00868 0.0101
(0.0255) (0.0212) (0.0146) (0.0145) (0.0306) (0.0293) (0.0138) (0.0140)
Shockt × Small f × Sector f 0.00385 0.00438 -0.0121 -0.0390 0.0194 0.0600∗ -0.00835 -0.0233
(0.0326) (0.0324) (0.0261) (0.0273) (0.0406) (0.0338) (0.0197) (0.0363)
Exposure f × Shockt × Sector f 0.106 -0.0555 0.120
(0.218) (0.177) (0.226)
Exposure f × Shockt × Small f × Sector f 0.551∗ -1.552∗∗∗
(0.298) (0.360)
Observations 526 526 526 526 526 526 526 526
R2 0.238 0.239 0.240 0.244 0.252 0.260 0.237 0.237
Firms 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43
FirmFE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
TimeFE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
BankShock Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
FirmControls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
JointTest 0.914 0.905 0.583 0.298 0.742 0.218 0.924 0.885
Sample spans 2008q1-2013q1, Firms reports the number of firms in each regression. Dependent variable is the log difference of employment at the
firm level in each period, winsorized at 2%. Sector is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the firm is in the sector indicated in the column heading.
Exposure is the firm’s average 2008 net FX position to assets, with 2 outlier firms winsorized. Small is a dummy equal to one if the firm’s average size
(measured by log assets) is below the sample median. Shock is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 in 2009 and 2010 and 0 otherwise. Bank shock
is a control for credit supply shocks to each firm, as constructed in the text. Firm Controls include one quarter lags of firm size (log assets), cash to
assets ratio winsorized at 1%, total liabilities to assets ratio winsorized at 2%, bond credit to assets, share of sales to foreigners (including exports and
sales by foreign subsidiaries), sales to assets ratio, and net derivatives position to total liabilities winsorized at 3%. Errors are clustered at the firm
level. JointTest reports the p-value of the F-test that the sum of the coefficients of Exposure*Shock and Exposure*Shock*Small is equal to 0. * p < 0.10,
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 2.22: Growth in Physical Capital (%) - Robustness to Sectors
Telecom Manufacturing Construction Transportation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Exposure f × Shockt 0.205∗∗ 0.252∗ 0.214∗∗∗ 0.217∗∗∗ 0.204∗∗∗ 0.186∗∗∗ 0.214∗∗∗ 0.215∗∗∗
(0.0836) (0.134) (0.0760) (0.0773) (0.0626) (0.0461) (0.0776) (0.0776)
Shockt × Small f 0.00982 0.0100 0.0160 0.0235∗ -0.00239 -0.00285 0.0103 0.00941
(0.0128) (0.0128) (0.0123) (0.0130) (0.0133) (0.0133) (0.0122) (0.0122)
Exposure f × Shockt × Small f -0.346∗∗ -0.391∗∗ -0.272∗ -0.533∗∗∗ -0.327∗∗ -0.307∗∗ -0.352∗∗ -0.323∗∗
(0.156) (0.190) (0.160) (0.169) (0.141) (0.132) (0.156) (0.154)
Shockt × Sector f 0.0107 0.0157 0.0187 0.0191 -0.0221 -0.0225 0.00862 0.00333
(0.0185) (0.0187) (0.0122) (0.0123) (0.0216) (0.0214) (0.00911) (0.00905)
Shockt × Small f × Sector f 0.0252 0.0249 -0.0525∗ -0.0728∗∗ 0.0442∗ 0.0453 -0.0103 0.0453
(0.0229) (0.0228) (0.0274) (0.0317) (0.0253) (0.0270) (0.0272) (0.0288)
Exposure f × Shockt × Sector f -0.104 0.0350 -0.447∗∗
(0.145) (0.112) (0.189)
Exposure f × Shockt × Small f × Sector f 0.404∗∗ -0.0664
(0.176) (0.298)
Observations 547 547 547 547 547 547 547 547
R2 0.220 0.221 0.223 0.226 0.222 0.222 0.219 0.220
Firms 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44
FirmFE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
TimeFE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
BankShock Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
FirmControls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
JointTest 0.276 0.281 0.678 0.0162 0.332 0.365 0.305 0.404
Sample spans 2008q1-2013q1, Firms reports the number of firms in each regression. Dependent variable is the log difference of physical capital outstanding,
measured as property, plant, and equipment, at the firm level in each period, winsorized at 2%. Sector is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the firm
is in the sector indicated in the column heading. Exposure is the firm’s average 2008 net FX position to assets, with 2 outlier firms winsorized. Small is
a dummy equal to one if the firm’s average size (measured by log assets) is below the sample median. Shock is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 in
2009 and 2010 and 0 otherwise. Bank shock is a control for credit supply shocks to each firm, as constructed in the text. Firm Controls include one quarter
lags of firm size (log assets), cash to assets ratio winsorized at 1%, total liabilities to assets ratio winsorized at 2%, bond credit to assets, share of sales to
foreigners (including exports and sales by foreign subsidiaries), sales to assets ratio, and net derivatives position to total liabilities winsorized at 3%. Errors
are clustered at the firm level. JointTest reports the p-value of the F-test that the sum of the coefficients of Exposure*Shock and Exposure*Shock*Small is
equal to 0. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Exposure f × Shockt 0.184∗∗ 0.160∗∗ 0.105 0.021 0.442
Exposure f × Small f × Shockt -0.268∗∗ -0.234∗∗ -0.177∗∗ -0.064 -0.707∗∗
Total Effect (Small) -0.084 -0.074 -0.072 -0.043 0.265∗∗










Exposure f × Shockt 0.128∗ 0.128∗ 0.079∗ 0.106 0.081
Exposure f × Small f × Shockt -0.253∗∗∗ -0.249∗∗∗ -0.140∗∗∗ -0.179∗∗ -0.28
Total Effect (Small) -0.125∗∗ -0.121∗∗ -0.061∗ -0.073∗ -0.199
Sample spans 2008q1-2013q1, Firms reports the number of firms in each regression. Dependent variable in
Panel A is the log difference of employment at the firm level in each period, winsorized at 2%. Dependent
variable in Panel B is the log difference of physical capital outstanding, measured as property, plant, and
equipment, at the firm level in each period, winsorized at 2%. Exposure variable in column (1) is FX
liabilities minus FX assets minus estimated derivatives hedging (as described in the text), divided by total
assets; in coplumn 2, FX assets minus FX liabilities, divided by total assets; in column (3), FX liabilities
divided by total assets; in column (4), FX loans divded by total assets; in column (5), FX bonds divided
by total assets. Exposure variables are all defined as the 2008 average. Shock is a dummy variable taking
a value of 1 in 2009 and 2010 and 0 otherwise. Small is a dummy equal to one if the firm’s average size
(measured by log assets) is below the sample median. All regressions include firm fixed effects, time fixed
effects, and time-varying firm controls consisting of one quarter lags of firm size (log assets), cash to assets
ratio winsorized at 1%, total liabilities to assets ratio winsorized at 2%, bond credit to assets, share of sales
to foreigners (including exports and sales by foreign subsidiaries), sales to assets ratio, and net derivatives
position to total liabilities winsorized at 3%. Errors are clustered at the firm level. Total Effect (Small) reports
the sum of the coefficients of Exposure*Shock and Exposure*Shock*Small, with their estimated significance.
All regressions also include Shock*Small. N=765 for PanelA, N=787 for Panel B. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, ***
p < 0.01
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Chapter 3: Gross Capital Flows by Banks, Corporates and Sovereigns
3.1 Introduction
International capital flows have nontrivial consequences for the transmis-
sion of real and financial shocks across borders and countries’ own macroeco-
nomic outcomes. The domestic macroeconomic environment and global shocks
also affect the amount and direction of capital flows. It is apparent from the his-
tory of financial crises that the vulnerability to external shocks can vary greatly
depending on which economic sector(s) are on the receiving side of capital in-
flows. For example, sovereign debt proved to be the Achilles’ heel in the Latin
American crises, while private sector debt financed by capital inflows was the
key source of fragility in the Asian financial crises. During the latest global fi-
nancial crisis, in the US, the culprit was the domestic household debt held by US
and global banks. By contrast, in the European countries, sovereigns’ and banks’
external borrowing played the central role.
A great deal of empirical and theoretical work on capital flows has focused
on the behavior of net flows, defined as the difference between purchases of do-
mestic assets by foreign residents (gross capital inflows by foreigners) and the
purchases of foreign assets by domestic residents (gross capital outflows by do-
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mestic agents). Researchers usually measure net flows as the current account bal-
ance with a reversed sign, sometimes excluding changes in reserves. There has
been recent attempts to investigate the behavior of domestic and foreign investors
separately, focusing on gross inflows and gross outflows around crisis events.
Forbes and Warnock (2012), Broner, Didier, Erce, and Schmukler (2013), Milesi-
Ferretti and Tille (2011), and Bluedorn, Duttagupta, Guajardo, and Topalova (2013),
are some examples. These papers document that gross flows are much larger and
more volatile than net flows, tend to be procyclical, and respond systematically
to changes in global conditions. These properties make gross flows first order for
financial stability issues.1
An important contribution of this paper is to introduce a new comprehen-
sive dataset on gross capital inflows and outflows at the quarterly frequency for
a balanced panel of 85 countries for inflows and 31 countries for outflows. We
report total inflows and outflows and also the decomposition by borrower and
lender sectors.2
We see two distinct advantages of our data. First, the large number of devel-
oping countries and emerging markets is a big advantage of our capital inflows
1See Caballero (2016), Obstfeld (2012), Catão and Milesi-Ferretti (2014), and Borio and Disyatat
(2011).
2Galstyan, Lane, Mehigan, and Mercado (2016) use data after 2013 from IMF’s CPIS to examine
portfolio debt and portfolio equity stocks by the sectoral identity of the issuer and holder of the
security. We focus on the flow of portfolio debt by sector over a much longer time horizon in
quarterly data and analyze it in conjunction with other investment debt inflows by sector over
the same time horizon. Arslanalp and Tsuda (2014b) and Arslanalp and Tsuda (2014a) decompose
sovereign/government loan and bond debt by creditor, both foreign and domestic. They employ
QEDS data to split by foreign and domestic and BIS data to identify external bank lenders, similar
to our approach but only for the sovereign where we consider all three sectors: banks, corporates
and the soveregins. Broner, Erce, Martin, and Ventura (2014) identify the creditors for external
sovereign bonds using data derived from national sources and the OECD.
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dataset relative to standard sources.3 Second, our sectoral breakdown of debt in-
flows into 3 borrowing groups, sovereigns (government and central bank), banks,
and corporates, is of utmost importance since increased financial integration in-
creases the risk of crises through debt linkages.4
Debt flows are generally the largest component in total capital flows. Fig-
ure 3.1 illustrates this clearly.5 Panel (a) shows the share of total debt in total ex-
ternal liabilities. Debt represents the majority of external liabilities globally and
in advanced countries (AE). In emerging markets (EM), debt and non-debt lia-
bilities are of similar magnitude. Panel (b) highlights that other investment debt
(usually bank credit or loans) is the bulk of debt stocks. Portfolio debt (bonds)
in panel (c) represents nearly half of AE external debt and around a third of EM
external debt. Thus, it is important to consider both types of external debt.
In terms of sectoral composition of debt, panels (d)-(i) highlight the sectoral
share of external debt stocks for each flow type and country group. In AE, banks
hold the lion’s share of external debt liabilities, whereas in EM, corporates, banks
and sovereigns have more or less equal shares. This is interesting since in general
it is thought that all types of agents enjoy easier access to international capital
3The set of countries in our 85 country capital inflows data includes 25 advanced, 34 emerging,
and 26 developing economies from 1996q1 to 2014q4. If we go to an annual frequency, we can
have 89 countries for inflows, adding 4 more developing economies. For capital outflows data
we have 16 advanced and 15 emerging economies for 2004q1–2014q4. This is because of the fact
that foreign assets of lender types are poorly recorded. For total outflows one can have of course
more countries but our aim here is to decompose outflows by banks, corporates and sovereigns as
we do inflows. We combine the general government and central bank sectors into a single public
sector in order to increase data coverage.
4Lane (2013) discusses the importance and difficulty of analyzing sectoral financial positions
for understanding and assessing risk. See also Lane (2015).
5This figure plots stocks. The flow version delivers a similar picture, though more noisy, and
is plotted in Appendix B.6 in Figure B.1.
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markets in AE than in EM. It seems that banks do most of the intermediation
of external funds in AE, while corporates and sovereigns might be borrowing
more domestically. What is more surprising is that the conventional wisdom that
most other investment debt is owed by banks and most portfolio debt is owed by
corporates holds for AE but not for EM. In the latter, most of the portfolio debt is
attributable to sovereigns, and banks and corporates have equal shares in other
investment debt.
The composition of external debt is remarkably stable over time, with few
exceptions.6 The share of other investment debt in total external liabilities is de-
creasing and the share of portfolio debt is increasing in AE over time. This seems
to be partly driven by the global financial crisis: in these countries, the share of
bank-held debt declines and that of sovereign debt increases following the crisis.
For EM, sector shares are more stable over time, although prior to the crisis there
is a declining trend in the share of debt vis-a-vis equity.
Figure 3.2 shows the counterpart of Figure 3.1 for the composition of ex-
ternal asset stocks in debt instruments, including reserves.7 Panel (a) shows the
share of debt in total external assets. Debt assets represents the majority of ex-
ternal assets; 80 percent in EM and 60 percent in AE on average during 2000s,
though share of debt assets in total external assets is on a declining trend for both
set of countries. Panel (b) highlights that other investment debt is the bulk of
debt asset stocks in AE, whereas portfolio debt assets in panel (c) represents only
6We use a balanced sample of countries to prevent entry/exit of countries into the sample from
distorting time series patterns in the composition of debt.
7There are not enough developing countries in the outflows sample to include an average for
the group.
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40 percent of the AE economies external debt assets. For EM, other investment
debt assets represent half of the external debt assets, portfolio debt assets are not
important, and the remainder consists of reserves.
In terms of sectoral composition, panels (d)-(i) highlight the sectoral share of
external debt asset stocks for each flow type and country group. In EM the public
sector is overwhelmingly the main lender to other countries. This is primarily
driven by their accumulation of reserve assets, which are included in the total
debt figure. In AE, as is the case for borrowing, banks do the lion’s share of
external lending, while corporates also have a big share of AE lending in portfolio
debt assets. For EM, banks and corporates do about an equal share of lending
in other investment debt, while corporates lead in terms of portfolio debt. The
composition of external debt assets is also very stable over time, as in the case of
debt liabilities.
These data patterns highlight the importance of separating external debt
liabilities and assets by sector for a more complete understanding of the drivers
of capital flows and lead us to a re-evaluation of conventional stylized facts on
capital flows. Using our dataset we document four new stylized facts. First, the
well-known positive correlation between capital inflows and outflows is driven
by banking flows, mainly by global banks in advanced countries. The literature
shows a high degree of correlation between capital inflows and outflows and an
increase in this correlation over time (see Forbes and Warnock (2012), Broner et al.
(2013) Bluedorn et al. (2013) and Davis and van Wincoop (2017), for example). We
find that this correlation is driven mainly by the borrowing and lending patterns
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of global banks who are in general domiciled in advanced countries. This results
holds both for unconditional correlations and correlations conditional on VIX and
GDP growth.
To establish the other three facts, we run separate quarterly panel regres-
sions of capital inflows and outflows on lagged global risk appetite (VIX) and
countries’ own lagged GDP growth. These regressions are country fixed effect
specifications, which means we identify from within variation, that is from changes
in VIX, GDP growth and capital flows.8 We find that, during domestic economic
downturns, inflows to domestic banks and corporates decline in all countries.
In terms of outflows, banks in advanced countries invest less abroad, decreas-
ing their outflows, whereas banks and corporates in emerging markets do not
respond to their own recessions in terms of outflows. Results are symmetric and
can be interpreted for boom periods as well. Hence, in terms of business cycle
properties of capital inflows, banks’ and corporates’ inflows move procylically
everywhere, but for outflows, only banks of AEs invest overseas proylically, in-
creasing their outflows when their own economies experience a boom.9
8Cerutti, Claessens, and Puy (2015) uses quarterly BOP data aggregated for a group of emerg-
ing economies, and shows in time series regressions that VIX is negatively correlated with their
estimated common factor for all types of capital flows. Nevertheless, the correlation is not ro-
bust to including GDP growth. Cerutti, Claessens, and Puy (2016) find that inflows to emerging
economies have strong co-movement with VIX and that this link is stronger in bank flows.
9The results on the response of capital flows to GDP growth are robust and resonate with the
theoretical and empirical results in Blanchard, Ostry, Ghosh, and Chamon (2015). These authors
find, in a sample of 19 EM, that other investment debt flows are positively correlated with GDP
growth and portfolio debt flows are negatively correlated or not robustly correlated. Due to
their instrumentation strategy they interpret their results causally as loans (other investment debt
flows) being expansionary, whereas bond flows (portfolio debt) being contractionary. Our results
show that their result on other investment debt flows is driven by private sector inflows, both
banks and corporates. We also explain their non-robust zero/negative correlation of bond flows
(portfolio debt) with GDP growth in EM. This is due to the fact that in EM, public and corporate
bond flows are correlated with GDP growth with opposite signs.
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Our third fact is on the role of sovereigns.10 In response to country-specific
slowdowns, private and public inflows respond in opposite directions—a fact
driven by emerging markets’ sovereigns. While inflows to private sector de-
cline, the sovereigns behave in a countercyclical manner by borrowing more from
abroad and drawing down reserves in response to economic downturns in emerg-
ing markets. Another way to put these results is that advanced country sovereign’s
inflows are acyclical and emerging market sovereigns’ inflows are countercylical
with respect to own business cycles. Hence, public debt inflows seem to do most
of the risk sharing when private debt markets collapse in emerging markets dur-
ing recessions.
Our fourth fact is about the global shocks. In response to adverse global
credit supply shocks, such as an increase in the VIX, inflows to domestic banks
and corporates decline, while domestic banks and corporates invest less abroad,
decreasing their outflows. Sovereigns do not respond to such supply shocks on
average since our regressions condition on countries’ own business cycle.11,12
10Aguiar and Amador (2011), Gourinchas and Jeanne (2013), and Alfaro, Kalemli-Özcan, and
Volosovych (2014) separate public and private flows at an annual frequency. However, all these
studies focus on net flows. These papers show, net capital might be flowing out of a country
in the aggregate (i.e., the country may run a current account surplus), but one of the two sectors
considered might still be engaging in net borrowing.This can also be the case for a particular asset
class (capital flow type) instead of the borrowing sector. See, for example, Ju and Wei (2010), who
show that FDI can flow in on net and reserves can flow out on net, generating two-way capital
flows.
11Other investment debt inflows to emerging market sovereigns do respond positively and
significantly to the VIX, but not their total debt inflows.
12Unconditional correlations of VIX with aggregate capital inflows, shown in Appendix B.6,
deliver similar results in terms of sign of the relationship but different results in terms of size
and significance. Two main differences driving this are the use of cross country variation in
the panel regressions instead of aggregates in the unconditional correlations, and controlling for
domestic GDP growth in the regressions. The correlations show that all private debt flows (that is,
inflows to banks and corporates in both portfolio debt and other investment debt) are negatively
correlated with global risk appetite, as measured by the VIX. By contrast, inflows to sovereigns are
positively correlated with the VIX. Rey (2013) uses quarterly BOP data and shows that across all
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These four facts are inconsistent with standard international macroeconomic
models, which treat domestic and foreign investors symmetrically. In those mod-
els, all agents respond to a boom in the domestic economy by investing more in
the domestic economy and vice versa for a bust. For global shocks, again, since
all countries are affected, there is no difference in the way domestic and foreign
agents respond to global shocks. Our results imply that foreign and domestic
investors behave differently in response to domestic and global shocks, where
our measure of “investors” are sectors such as banks, corporates and the public
sector.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 3.2 describes the con-
struction and coverage of our data; Section 3.3 illustrates descriptive patterns;
Section 3.4 presents the results from our empirical analysis; and Section 3.5 con-
cludes.
3.2 A New Dataset for Capital Flows Research
3.2.1 Data Construction
What is commonly called “gross flows” in the literature is actually more
accurately described as “net inflows” and “net outflows”. Net inflows are gross
liability flows, net of repayments. Net outflows are gross asset flows, net of dis-
investment. Capital flows data found in the BOP, which is based on residency
geographic regions, portfolio equity, portfolio debt, and other investment debt are all negatively
correlated with the VIX. Nier, Sedik, and Mondino (2014) and Forbes and Warnock (2012) find
similar results to Rey.
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principle, conform to this definition. Thus, although these measures are often
called “gross”, they can be positive or negative. The separation of flows into
asset and liability flows allows interpreting liability flows as net inflows from
foreign agents, and asset flows as net outflows by domestic agents. This is the
primary working definition of capital flows, which we use across all data sources
for consistency.13
The focus of this paper is on the differentiation of capital flows by sector
in the domestic economy. The term “sector” is used here to refer to institutional
sectors: general government, central banks, depository corporations except the
central bank (“banks”), and other sectors (“corporates”).14
To build our dataset, we combine and harmonize several publicly available
sources: Balance of Payments (BOP) and International Investment Position (IIP)
statistics of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Locational Bank Statistics
(LBS) and Consolidated Bank Statistics (CBS) from Bank for International Set-
tlements (BIS), International Debt Securities (IDS) from BIS, Quarterly External
Debt Statistics (QEDS) of IMF and World Bank (WB), and Debt Reporting System
(DRS) data of WB.15
Our base dataset is the Balance of Payments (BOP) data produced by the
13See Section B.1 in the appendix for more discussion about the definitions and terms associated
with the capital flow literature and capital flow data.
14It should be noted that the BOP category “other sectors” is broader than what is captured
than the term “corporates”. Nevertheless, in most cases, there is fairly broad overlap between the
two categories. That is why, in the rest of this paper, we use the two terms interchangeably for
presentational convenience.
15It should be noted that, even though combining different data sources to complement
BOP/IIP statistics is rarely done at the global level, this is exactly what many country-level
BOP/IIP compilers do on a regular basis (e.g. many country BOP/IIP compilers use the BIS IBS
data series on banks’ cross-border deposit liabilities to the residents of their respective countries
in order to enhance their BOP/IIP compilation).
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IMF, which is the most comprehensive dataset on international capital flows. This
data is reported to the IMF by country statistical offices. The BOP data captures
capital flows into and out of a country. The accompanying stock measures of
external assets and liabilities are captured in the IMF’s International Investment
Position (IIP) data. Capital flows are measured as asset flows (outflows), liability
flows (inflows), and net flows. We focus on the financial account portion of the
data and the BPM6 version. More details on the BOP data, along with its different
presentations and versions, are given in Appendix B.2.16
In theory, each type of capital flow can be disaggregated by sector (bor-
rower and lender type). In practice, however, the coverage tends to be sparse,
especially for EM/developing countries and earlier years. To be absolutely clear,
capital flow types (asset classes) are generally very well reported in aggregate
terms in the BOP data, and the reporting of the sectoral breakdowns has im-
proved in recent years. Nevertheless, for most emerging/developing countries
and years before 2005 the reporting of the data by sector is much less exhaustive.
Figure 3.3 illustrates the structure of the BOP data. In simple terms, capital
flows in the BOP are split into three main categories: direct investment, portfo-
lio investment, and other investment.17 Each of these categories can be split into
debt and equity components. For portfolio investment debt and equity and other
investment debt, the flows can be further subdivided by domestic sector: banks,
corporates, government, and central bank. Other investment debt can also be
16See the 6th Edition Balance of Payments Manual Appendix 8 for more details on the differ-
ences between BPM5 and BPM6.
17Other categories include reserves (asset flows to the central bank) and financial derivatives
(small and sparsely reported, previously a part of portfolio investment).
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decomposed by instrument (loans, currency and deposits, trade credit and ad-
vances, and other accounts payable/receivable18 ) and then by sector.
To construct our capital inflows dataset, we start with BOP data by sector,
and incorporate data from the BIS and the WB on external bond and loan flows
to expand the limited quarterly sectoral coverage available in the BOP.19 We sim-
ilarly construct our dataset for outflows, and incorporate data from the BIS to
complement coverage for portfolio debt and other investment debt outflows.
We undertake a “filling” exercise to complete the missing sectoral data on
debt inflows in the BOP. Assuming missing data is zero may or may not be ac-
curate depending on the country under consideration, so we fill missing values
with data from other sources.20 We start by identifying the appropriate variables
from the BOP data. This is not as easy as it sounds since, unfortunately, in the
public download of the BOP data the sector breakdown of other investment debt
category is shown under other investment equity category.21
18Another instrument, insurance and pensions schemes, is also detailed, though it is very small
and sparsely reported.
19The IMF’s Coordinated Investment Portfolio Survey (CPIS) database also reports data on sec-
toral breakdowns for portfolio equity and portfolio debt flows. However, these breakdowns are
available only since 2013 and, more importantly, the CPIS does not have data on other investment
debt flows.
20It is difficult to distinguish missing from a true zero in the BOP data.
21In the public download of the BOP data, available from the IMF’s website, the variables for
other investment debt by sector are mislabeled, and so may be difficult to find. They are labeled
as “...Other Investment, Other Equity..., Debt Instruments, ...”. For example, the full label for
other investment debt for Other Sectors (which we refer to as “Corporates”) is “Financial Ac-
count, Other Investment, Other Equity, Net Incurrence of Liabilities, Debt Instruments, Other
Sectors, US Dollars”. The letter codes (EDD2 Codes) for these variables are BFOLOO BP6 USD,
BFOLOGFR BP6 USD, BFOLODC BP6 USD, and BFOLOCBFR BP6 USD. On the asset flow
side, these variables are BFOADO BP6 USD, BFOADG BP6 USD, BFOADDC BP6 USD, and
BFOADCB BP6 USD.In reality, other investment equity (which is usually very small) is the only
category within other investment that is not split by borrowing sector. We thank Gian-Maria
Milesi-Ferretti and IMF Statistics for helping us uncover this.
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Figure 3.1: Composition of External Debt Liabilities: Share by Sector
(a) Share of Debt in Total
Stocks
(b) Share of Other
Investment in Total Debt
Stocks
(c) Share of Portfolio Debt
in Total Debt Stocks
(d) Share of Sectors in
Total Debt - Advanced
(e) Share of Sectors in
Other Investment Debt -
Advanced
(f) Share of Sectors in
Portfolio Debt - Advanced
(g) Share of Sectors in
Total Debt - Emerging
(h) Share of Sectors in
Other Investment Debt -
Emerging
(i) Share of Sectors in
Portfolio Debt - Emerging
Source: IIP, QEDS, and BIS, authors’ calculations.
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Figure 3.2: Composition of External Debt Assets: Share by Sector
(a) Share of Debt in Total
Asset Stocks
(b) Share of Other
Investment Debt in Total
Debt Assets
(c) Share of Portfolio Debt
in Total Debt Assets
(d) Sector Shares of Total
Debt Assets - Advanced
(e) Sector Shares of Other
Investment Debt Assets -
Advanced
(f) Sector Shares of
Portfolio Debt Assets -
Advanced
(g) Sector Shares of Total
Debt Assets - Emerging
(h) Sector Shares of Other
Investment Debt Assets -
Emerging
(i) Sector Shares of
Portfolio Debt Assets -
Emerging
Source: IIP and BIS, authors’ calculations. Total Debt includes official reserves. Note that
Norway is dropped from the asset sample due to lack of stock data.
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Figure 3.3: BOP Data Structure
by flow typea















































a This structure is the same for inflows and outflows. Reserves are only classified as outflows.
b The breakdowns of these variables by sector exist in the BOP data but the coverage is sparse for many countries and quarters.
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Other investment debt flows are important since the vast majority of exter-
nal bank flows are in this category.22 Crucially, this category also includes some
cross-border loans to corporates and loans to sovereigns, such as IMF credit.23 In
most countries, sovereigns tend to borrow externally primarily via bonds, which
appear under the portfolio debt category. When bond financing to emerging mar-
ket borrowers, including governments, dries up, emerging market sovereigns
rely more on loans.24
In order to get a larger, longer, and balanced panel of countries with debt
flows split by sector, we proceed with the following methodology for our data
filling exercise. When the BOP data reports the total for the category and reports
data for 3 out of the 4 sectors, we take the total and subtract the 3 reported sectors
in order to obtain the fourth sector. If there is still missing data, we construct mea-
sures of portfolio debt and other investment debt inflows by sector from several
alternative datasets.25 One such dataset is the data from BIS on debt securities
issued in international markets, which we use to fill in portfolio debt flows. An-
other one is the BIS dataset on cross-border banking, which we use to fill the
missing data under other investment debt.26 Here, we only use loan lending by
22Milesi-Ferretti and Tille (2011) and Cerutti et al. (2015) separate out the banking sector within
other investment debt category to investigate this category on its own.
23Other studies examining gross capital inflows using only BOP data sometimes exclude official
reserves and IMF credit in order to focus on private inflows (see Forbes and Warnock (2012),
Bluedorn et al. (2013), and Milesi-Ferretti and Tille (2011) for example). Milesi-Ferretti and Tille
(2011) additionally exclude central bank loans and deposits. Bluedorn et al. (2013) analyze private
flows by removing from reserves, IMF credit, and most government-related components included
under the other investment debt category from total flows.
24Figure B.1 in Appendix B.6 shows that this is the case during the global financial crisis.
25The capital flight literature also uses techniques of internal filling with the BOP and exter-
nal filling with other datasets in order to identify unreported private capital flows. See Chang,
Claessens, and Cumby (1997) for a discussion. See also Claessens and Naudé (1993).
26Note that it takes a few steps to construct estimates by sector from the BIS loan data. We
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BIS reporting banks, so as not to capture direct investment flows or debt securi-
ties holdings.27,28 We then complement these loans with any other non-missing
data from the BOP for particular instruments within other investment debt (trade
credit, IMF credit, etc.) to get a more complete and accurate measure of other in-
vestment debt flows for each sector.29,30
While the BIS data has extensive coverage and captures a vast amount of
capital flows, in some cases it may not match well with the BOP data.31 In these
cases, we rely first on measures derived from IIP, produced concurrently with
the BOP data by the IMF, and the Quarterly External Debt Statistics (QEDS) data,
produced jointly by the IMF and World bank. These data have the same sectoral
and capital flow definitions and breakdowns, making them comparable to the
BOP data. These are stock measures, which we first difference with a simple
currency adjustment to approximate flows. While imperfect, these stock derived
detail this process in the Appendix. The BIS bank data captures the overwhelming majority of
cross-border banking activity (BIS, 2015), but some banking flows between non-BIS reporting EM
may not be captured (e.g. Chinese banks lending to Nigeria, etc.).
27Debt security flows would already be captured in portfolio debt (or the equivalent filling
series). In principle, there could be an overlap between “direct investment debt” series and the
“BIS loans” series if the loan is from a BIS reporting bank to an offshore non-financial entity in
which it has at least a 10% ownership stake. In practice, we expect this to be small.
28A few AEs have had some discrepancies between the BOP data and the BIS Bank data, in
particular Japan, Switzerland, and the US. These are isolated cases that are well known. We make
sure to use BOP data, which is generally well reported for these cases, and other data sources first
to avoid these issues.
29It is almost always the case that when the total is missing, the underlying instruments are
also missing, except for perhaps IMF credit.
30In some cases, the flows for other investment debt, by sector or for total, is reported as com-
ing from just one instrument (usually loans) even though in reality it reflects flows from other
instruments as well (e.g. trade credit). So, summing these instruments can capture the proper to-
tal in some cases (this almost always not necessary since other investment debt itself is reported
when the underlying instruments have non-missing data). We thank Gian-Maria Milesi-Ferretti
for bringing this to our attention.
31An important example is advanced economy government bonds, which are issued domesti-
cally and then traded abroad. These flows would not be captured by the BIS debt securities data,
which captures bonds that are issued in international markets.
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measures often line up very well with reported BOP data and allow us to be more
accurate as we fill missing data.
We deflate GDP and all capital flows to 1996 USD and express them in
billions.32 Additionally, we construct accompanying stock measures of external
debt by sector. Here, we rely first on the IIP data as the main source. When this
is missing after the internal fill, we rely on QEDS data on external debt by sector.
We fill any remaining observations with our BIS estimates.
A detailed description of the datasets and our construction of the estimates
to fill missing data can be found in the Appendix. Here, we briefly illustrate
the validity of our approach. To gauge how well our estimates capture the true
inflows, we undertake a counterfactual exercise. We take a sample of countries
where BOP data by sector is non-missing over 2006q1-2013q4. Then we compare
this data to our estimates done for this period as if the BOP data was missing.
Then, for each country group, we plot the aggregate flows for each sector and
capital flow type using non-missing BOP data, and our constructed estimates.
Figures B.1 and B.2 in Appendix B.4 report these plots for both other investment
debt flows and portfolio debt flows for each sector. The match is pretty strong
and speaks to the quality of our constructed estimates to fill missing data over the
entire sample. The correlation between the two series is over 98 percent. On the
whole, our filled series capture most of the volume and variation of inflows for
most countries and allow us to extend substantially the coverage of our sample.
32Quarterly GDP data is from Datastrem and national sources. We deflate series using US CPI
from FRED.
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There are few important details to note. We remove exceptional financing
flows to banks and corporates, within portfolio debt and other investment debt,
and reassign them to the central bank. Exceptional financing captures financial
flows made or fostered by the authorities for balance of payments needs. Thus,
they can be seen as a substitute for reserves or IMF Credit.33
Direct investment contains both debt and equity flows and is split by debt
and equity components in the BOP data. However, it is not disaggregated by
sector in the BOP data. Nevertheless, debt flows between related enterprises are
recorded as direct investment debt only when at least one counterparty is a non-
financial firm. Direct investment debt flows between two financial firms (includ-
ing banks) are instead classified as either portfolio investment debt or other in-
vestment debt. If direct investment debt flows from non-financial firms to finan-
cial firms are negligible, then we can think all direct investment debt as flows ei-
ther from financial firms to non-financial firms or flows from non-financial firms
to non-financial firms. In either case, the borrowing sector is the non-financial
sector and hence direct investment debt inflows can be assigned in full to the
debt inflows of the corporate sector. We include direct investment debt in to-
tal debt in our regression analysis of inflows, while more particular detail of the
contribution of direct investment debt is discussed in Appendix B.6.3.
To complement our extensive dataset on capital inflows, we also construct a
dataset of capital outflows. As with the inflows, we primarily use the BOP data.
We combine the general government and central bank sectors into a single public
33See the 6th Edition BOP Manual, paragraph A1.1.
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sector. As before, we do an internal fill on missing sectors if the remaining two
sectors and the total are non-missing.34 The one external fill that we do is for
the bank sector. We fill in portfolio debt asset flows and other investment debt
asset flows using the BIS LBS by residency data which has data on bank cross-
border claims in each instrument. This data only covers banks domiciled in BIS
reporting countries, and so is more limited in terms of coverage.
3.2.2 Coverage of the New Dataset
We divide the countries into three groups by level of development: Ad-
vanced, Emerging, and Developing.35 See Appendix B.5 for specific details about
the countries. For reference, our primary sample of capital inflows using the an-
nual data consists of the following 89 countries:
Advanced (25): Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United
Kingdom, United States
Emerging (34): Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Colombia, Croa-
tia, Czech Republic, Egypt, Estonia, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Kaza-
khstan, Latvia, Lebanon, Lithuania, Macedonia, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, Philip-
pines, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South
34Note that combining government and central banks into a single sector makes the internal
filling exercise more fruitful, as only bank and corporates needs to be non-missing in order to fill
missing data for the public sector.
35We rely on the 2000 IMF WEO classification to define the group of advanced economies.
Generally, the WEO does not divide emerging and developing countries into separate groups.
We use the MSCI and IEO-IMF classifications to guide the definition of our EM group.
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Africa, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, Uruguay, Venezuela
Developing (30): Albania, Angola, Bangladesh, Belarus, Bolivia, Costa Rica,
Cote d’Ivoire, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Gabon, Ghana, Guatemala,
Jamaica, Kenya, Liberia, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Namibia, Nigeria,
Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Serbia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Trinidad and
Tobago, Tunisia, Vietnam
At the quarterly frequency, our sample drops to 85 countries, leaving off El
Salvador, Mongolia, Montenegro, and Serbia. For the regression and correlation
analysis below where we use quarterly GDP, our sample is further limited due to
unavailability of quarterly GDP for many emerging/developing countries.
The outflow sample consists of 31 countries (15 advanced, 16 emerging) at
a quarterly frequencey spanning 2004q1-2014q4. For the annual data, we have
31 countries (13 advanced and 18 emerging) spanning 2002-2014. Details on the
sample are in Appendix B.5.
Table 3.1 illustrates the impact of our data filling exercise on sample cover-
age for inflows. For each capital flow type, sector, and country group, the table
shows the percentage of observations in our balanced panel that come from the
raw BOP data, from our internal filling procedure, and from our filling from ex-
ternal data sources. Generally speaking, developing countries, central banks, and
portfolio debt tend to have less data available in the original BOP. Our internal
filling procedure makes a large difference for the coverage of central banks, but
otherwise does not provide many more observations for portfolio debt and/or
developing countries. Our external filling procedure, on the other hand, makes
122
a large difference, especially for the quarterly data, where 25-40 percent of obser-
vations for EM and 75-90 percent of observations for developing countries that
were missing under portfolio debt are filled. In the case of other investment debt,
only 11 percent of observations are filled for EM, but for developing countries
40-50 percent of observations are filled. A sizeable number of observations are
filled by external data also for advanced economies: 20-30 percent for portfolio
debt observations, and 15-18 percent of other investment debt.
Our filling exercise has a dramatic impact on the time and country coverage
of the data. A balanced sample requires that portfolio debt and other investment
debt not be missing for any of the 4 sectors in any period. With 8 components
required to be non-missing in each period, the probability that at least one is
missing is high. With no adjustments to the BOP data, we have 0 countries in
our sample (12 in the annual data). After our internal BOP fill, our sample of
countries increases to 10 (16 in the annual data). After incorporating the IIP, BIS,
and QEDS data, our balanced sample increases to 85 countries (89 in the annual
data). Given the advantages of a balanced country sample for cross-section and
panel regression analysis, the impact of our data filling on sample size can be
very consequential.
Figure 3.4 compares aggregate inflows as measured by our filled data and
from the BOP alone, for total external debt for banks and corporates in our sam-
ples of AE and EM. We plot annual flows here for clarity. These graphs show that
generally both series tell the same story, but there are periods in which account-
ing for the missing data makes a significant difference. For advanced economy
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Table 3.1: Data Filling Summary
Annual Quarterly
Flow Sect. Group BOP Int. Fill Ext. Fill BOP Int. Fill Ext. Fill
PD GG Adv. 80.6 0.0 19.4 79.4 0.0 20.6
PD GG Em. 82.4 0.3 17.3 74.2 0.8 25.0
PD GG Dev. 40.2 0.7 59.1 25.0 0.1 74.9
PD CB Adv. 9.5 58.3 32.2 7.5 60.5 32.0
PD CB Em. 23.5 40.6 35.9 19.5 35.6 44.9
PD CB Dev. 11.2 8.2 80.5 2.6 4.8 92.7
PD DC Adv. 67.6 3.6 28.8 67.7 3.4 28.8
PD DC Em. 61.7 4.1 34.3 55.6 3.5 40.9
PD DC Dev. 18.6 1.6 79.8 10.3 0.7 89.0
PD OS Adv. 75.4 0.0 24.6 74.7 0.0 25.3
PD OS Em. 69.8 2.3 28.0 64.4 1.9 33.6
PD OS Dev. 29.3 0.5 70.2 13.3 0.3 86.5
OID GG Adv. 80.0 2.1 17.9 78.4 3.2 18.4
OID GG Em. 93.7 0.8 5.6 88.1 0.9 11.0
OID GG Dev. 87.7 0.0 12.3 49.7 0.0 50.3
OID CB Adv. 68.2 13.9 17.9 65.8 15.4 18.7
OID CB Em. 87.4 6.6 6.0 79.2 9.8 11.0
OID CB Dev. 74.6 13.3 12.1 46.0 6.7 47.3
OID DC Adv. 81.9 0.0 18.1 81.4 0.0 18.6
OID DC Em. 94.0 0.0 6.0 89.0 0.0 11.0
OID DC Dev. 77.7 6.1 16.1 48.0 1.8 50.2
OID OS Adv. 84.0 0.4 15.6 82.8 0.1 17.2
OID OS Em. 94.4 0.0 5.6 89.0 0.0 11.0
OID OS Dev. 88.4 1.1 10.5 52.5 0.7 46.8
Balanced Sample 12 16 89 0 10 85
This table displays the percentage of total observations in our final sample
of Advanced (Adv.), Emerging (Em.) and Developing (Dev.) countries (89
for annual, 85 for quarterly) that is derived from each step of our data con-
struction. BOP = Percent coverage of sample from raw BOP data; Int. Fill =
Percent coverage of sample from Internal Filling exercise; Ext. Fill = Percent
coverage of sample from non BOP data sources. OID = other investment
debt; PD = portfolio debt; GG = General Government; CB = Central Bank;
DC = Banks; OS = Corporates. The last line indicates the number of coun-
tries in our balanced sample 1996 to 2014 that we have data for each sector
non-missing.
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corporates, a significant expansion leading up to the 2008 crisis and a contraction
following it is missed. This is due primarily to filling in portfolio debt data for
the US and Spain for the 2008 surge, as well as a few other AE for the earlier
2001 peak. For EM, both banks and corporates had much larger flows relative to
the BOP measure following the 2008 collapse, driven primarily by filling data for
other investment debt inflows for China.
Figure 3.4: Aggregate External Debt Inflows for Banks and Corporates, Billions
1996 USD
(a) Advanced Bank (b) Advanced Corporate
(c) Emerging Bank (d) Emerging Corporate
Source: BOP, IIP, QEDS, and BIS, authors’ calculations. Debt is portfolio debt + other investment
debt. BOP series is only BOP data, Filled is BOP data filled by other data sources when missing.
Figure 3.5 plots total external debt inflows for government and central bank
sectors. Missing U.S. government portfolio debt drives the difference for the
AE in panel (a). Emerging market governments and advanced central banks are
fairly well represented in terms of volume. Note that net inflows can be negative
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Figure 3.5: Aggregate External Debt Inflows for Governments and Central
Banks, Billions 1996 USD
(a) Advanced Government (b) Advanced Central Bank
(c) Emerging Government (d) Emerging Central Bank
Source: BOP, IIP, QEDS, and BIS, authors’ calculations. Debt is portfolio debt + other investment
debt. BOP series is only BOP data, Filled is BOP data filled by other data sources when missing.
as well as positive, which is the case for emerging market central banks where
some missing data consists of negative net inflows, which brings our filled data
below the raw BOP total. The surge at the end of the sample for emerging market
central banks is driven by China.
Our dataset captures a large volume of capital inflows by sector that may
otherwise be missed. Additionally, our data increases the number of both large
and small countries with debt inflow data by sector over a long time horizon at
the quarterly frequency.
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3.3 Descriptive Patterns in the Data
In this section, we present patterns and trends observed in our data over
time. We use the annual version of the dataset for clarity in the figures.
Figure 3.6: Aggregate External Debt Inflows, Billions 1996 USD











(i) Other Investment Debt,
Developing
Source: BOP, IIP, QEDS, and BIS, authors’ calculations. Total debt is portfolio debt + other
investment debt.
Figure 3.6 (a)-(c) plots the aggregate debt inflows by sector for each coun-
try group. The buildup and collapse surrounding the 2008 financial crisis (or
global financial crisis, GFC) is the most striking feature in all of these figures. An
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interesting distinction between AE and EM is the response following the crisis.
While advanced country flows collapse and remain fairly low, flows to emerging
and developing countries rebound and increase across all sectors. An impor-
tant difference in flows by sector is in the evolution of debt inflows to govern-
ments. Across all country groups, governments see an increase in debt inflows
precisely when private flows collapse, with an especially large and sustained in-
crease for developing nations relative to their private flows. Advanced-country
central banks also see a small increase as private flows collapse.
Panels (d)-(i) plot portfolio debt and other investment debt flows. We see
that the increase in inflows for governments comes primarily in the form of bonds,
with the exception of developing country governments who also see an increase
in other investment debt funding, that is loans. Advanced economy corporates
also have a significant amount of their inflows coming from portfolio debt. Al-
though emerging market banks and corporates see an increase in bond flows in
the wake of the GFC, the aggregate pattern of their flows is driven primarily by
other investment debt. Advanced country banks get the lion’s share of capital
inflows prior to 2008, the majority of which is in the form of other investment,
but they see consistent negative net inflows for several years following the GFC
reflecting the deleveraging of these institutions. Developing country banks and
corporates are also primarily receiving inflows in the form of other investment
debt.
Much of the increase in emerging-market private debt after 2008 is attributable
to a few large EM. Foremost among these is China, whose debt inflows are shown
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Figure 3.7: Emerging Market External Debt Inflows, Billions 1996 USD
(a) China Debt (b) India Debt (c) Brazil Debt
Source: BOP, IIP, QEDS, and BIS, authors’ calculations. Debt is portfolio debt + other investment
debt.
in Figure 3.7. China is a large country with poor sector coverage in the BOP data,
so much of the measured effect is derived from our data filling series. Both bank
and corporate inflows increase substantially, but bank inflows to China have been
much larger. In India, the corporate sector has been the dominant recipient of
debt flows, though bank flows increased a lot after 2010. Brazil saw a sustained
increase in corporate debt inflows, and volatile increases in bank and government
flows.
The finding that public sector inflows increase when private inflows are
falling is an important pattern that complements existing work on public vs pri-
vate net flows (Aguiar & Amador, 2011; Alfaro, Kalemli-Özcan, & Volosovych,
2014; Gourinchas & Jeanne, 2013). The public sector is often able to borrow from
abroad even as such funding dries up for the private sector. Thus, the public sec-
tor acts as a countervailing force to the private sector, smoothing the total debt
inflows into the country. Thus far our figures have plotted aggregate flows, but
figures showing the dynamic patterns of average flows to GDP are shown in Ap-
pendix B.6. Figure 3.8 illustrates the impact of the public sector for an average
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country using the average of flows to GDP. It plots the cross-country average of
total debt flows (portfolio debt + other investment debt) to GDP as compared
to flows from just the private sectors (Banks and Corporates) for advanced and
emerging countries. The VIX is shown in red (right axis), for reference. For ad-
vanced economies, the steep fall in private inflows after the global financial cri-
sis is mitigated by a few years of substantial government borowing from abroad.
These public inflows disappear by 2014, where private flows recover. For EM, the
story is more pronounced. The crash in total capital flows is much less than that
of private capital flows, reflecting increased public sector debt inflows following
the crisis. We see a similar pattern, that is more government borrowing when
private sector flows had collapsed, during 1998–2002. As private flows recover
heading towards 2008, the difference between total and private flows disappears.
Figure 3.8: Total vs Private Average Debt Inflows, Percent of GDP
(a) Advanced (b) Emerging
Source: BOP, IIP, QEDS, and BIS, authors’ calculations.
Turning to outflows, Figure 3.9 plots the debt asset flows for a subset of 31
countries, defined in Appendix B.5, over 2002-2014. The public sector is the sum
130
of central banks and general government sectors, and total debt asset flows for
the public sector include the flow of reserves.
For advanced countries, we see the same pattern for total and other invest-
ment debt as we see with inflows, with the landscape of flows dominated by the
buildup of private flows in the mid-2000s, led by the banking sector, followed
by a sharp contraction at the time of the global financial crisis. The public sec-
tor plays a relatively small role for AE outflows. Portfolio debt outflows for AEs
show a sharp contraction for banks at the time of the crisis, but there is actually
an increase in external portfolio debt investment by the corporate sector, followed
by a brief contraction corresponding more closely to the Eurozone crisis.
Emerging market banks and corporates show a contraction in their other
investment debt outflows followed by a much stronger rebound than that seen
in AEs. However, the decline in corporate other investment debt is offset by an
increase in corporate portfolio debt outflows. EM public sector sees a drop in
both portfolio and other investment outward investment around the crisis, but
portfolio debt recovers robustly in the following years. However, public sector
outflows, and total EM debt outflows, are clearly dominated by reserves, as seen
in panel (b), with a large buildup and collapse mirroring the private sector inflow
and outflows pattern.
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Figure 3.9: Aggregate Asset Flows, AHKS Outflow Sample, Billions USD
(a) Total Debt Asset
Flows, Advanced
(b) Total Debt Asset
Flows, Emerging
(c) Portfolio Debt Asset
Flows, Advanced
(d) Portfolio Debt Asset
Flows, Emerging
(e) Other Investment Debt
Asset Flows, Advanced
(f) Other Investment Debt
Asset Flows, Emerging
Source: BOP and BIS, authors’ calculations.
3.4 Empirical Analysis
3.4.1 Comovement of Capital Inflows and Outflows
Table 3.2 presents correlations of inflows and outflows across sectors. These
correlations are partial correlations of debt flows/country GDP, conditional on
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country fixed effects, lagged log of VIX, and lagged GDP growth.36 The sample
is our asset flow sample detailed in Appendix B.5, consisting of 31 countries (15
advanced and 16 emerging) over 2004q1-2014q4. The public sector consists of
general government and central bank sectors. Debt is the sum of portfolio and
other investment debt, and also reserves in the case of public sector outflows.
The strength of inflow-outflow correlation within the bank sector is strik-
ing. Even conditioning on GDP growth and VIX, which can drive capital flow
behavior as we show below, banks still show a high degree of matching between
their inflows and outflows. This is clearly the case in AEs, but banks are still
the strongest positive correlation in EMs though with lower magnitude. Within
sector correlations are also relatively high for corporates and banks relative to
cross-sector correlations. Interestingly, inflows and outflows are always posi-
tively correlated regardless of sector, but the key to understanding the inflow-
outflow comovement is the banking sector. All of the negative correlations in this
table have to do with the public sector, either public inflows with private inflows
or public outflows with private outflows. While small, except in the case of EM
public outflow with bank inflow, these patterns reinforce the point that the public
sector often behaves differently than the private sector.
Table 3.3 plots these correlations for AE and EM while distinguishing by in-
strument. The correlations are presented as a heatmap, with blue values indicat-
ing positive correlations, red values indicating negative correlations, and darker
36Unconditional correlations of aggregated inflows are presented in Appendix B.6, with uncon-
ditional aggregate inflow-outflow correlations in Table B.9.
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shading indicating stronger correlations. Examining these heatmaps makes it
clear to see that the strongest comovement at this disaggregation is among AE
banks, particularly within other investment debt flows. Global banks’ borrowing
and lending patterns within their internal capital market combined with their
hedging motives produce a strong correlation between capital inflows and out-
flows, especially for AE. Corporate other investment debt flows also appear to be
highly correlated, while public sector inflows are broadly negatively correlated
with other inflows.
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s Public 0.24 0.17 0.03 1.00
Bank 0.15 0.77 0.19 -0.08 1.00















s Public 0.27 0.20 0.01 1.00
Bank 0.14 0.81 0.21 -0.03 1.00















s Public 0.23 0.18 0.11 1.00
Bank 0.08 0.27 0.02 -0.33 1.00
Corp 0.03 0.07 0.21 -0.04 0.01 1.00
Sample consists of 31 countries (15 advanced, 16 emerging) over
2004q1-2014q4, and is described in Appendix B.5. N=1408, 660, and
704 respectively for each panel. Correlations are conditional on coun-
try fixed effects, lagged log VIX, and lagged GDP growth.
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Sample consists of 31 countries (15 advanced, 16 emerging) over 2004q1-2014q4, and is described in Appendix B.5. Correla-
tions are conditional on country fixed effects, lagged log VIX, and lagged GDP growth. Blue indicates a positive correlation,
red indicates a negative correlation, with darker shadings indicating stronger correlations.
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EMs don’t display correlations as strong as those of AEs at this disaggre-
gation, but it is still easy to see that the strongest positive correlation is that of
other investment debt outflows of banks with bank inflows. Corporate other in-
vestment debt flows show some correlation as well. An interesting feature of the
emerging markets panel is that outflows of public other investment debt have a
strong negative correlation with inflows of other investment to banks. This sug-
gests that there is more to understand about the relationship between the banking
sector and the sovereign, particularly when it comes to EM capital flows.
3.4.2 Panel Regressions: Capital Inflows by Sector
We next examine the response of capital inflows by sector to global risk
apetite measured by the VIX (push factor) in conjunction with the business cycle
properties of capital inflows, measured as the response of inflows to GDP growth
(pull factor) in a panel regression setup with our quarterly data. We focus on a
very simple specification to illustrate our results:
INFLOWit
GDPit
= αi + β log(VIXt−1) + γGDPGrowthit−1 + εit (3.1)
Our dependent variable is capital flows as a percent of GDP. INFLOWit is
a measure of capital inflows for country i in quarter t. We examine inflows by
capital flow type as well as by sector.37 GDPit is quarterly GDP from datastream
and national sources. The dependent variables are capital flows expressed as a
37Regressions by capital flow type across all types, without splitting by sector, can be found in
Table B.10 in the Appendix
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percent of GDP. αi is a country fixed effect. VIXt−1 is the implied volatility of
S&P 500 index options, measured in logs. The VIX is often used as a measure
of global risk aversion, and is a standard push factor for capital inflows, par-
ticularly in EM. GDPGrowthit−1 is real GDP growth year-on-year for country i
in the previous period, which is a standard pull factor attracting foreign capital
to a particular country. Our standard errors are clustered at the country level.
Using quarterly GDP data significantly restricts our sample along both country
and time dimensions. We use a balanced sample, detailed in Appendix B.5 of 55
countries (23 advanced, 28 emerging, 4 developing) over 2002q4-2014q4.
For total debt inflows, we take direct investment debt (DID) and add it to
corporate and total debt to obtain a more complete measure of debt inflows.38
Table 3.4 shows our regressions on total debt inflows. Columns (1)-(4) in each
panel are portfolio debt plus other investment debt, while columns (5)-(6) add
direct investment debt to that total.39 The public sector is the sum of government
and central bank sector flows.
For the full set of countries in Panel A, total debt inflows respond negatively
to increases inthe VIX. This response is driven by the private sector (banks and
corporates), and holds (with larger magnitude) when DID is included in columns
(5) and (6). The public sector’s response to the VIX is positive, reflecting pat-
terns shown in the aggregate data, but the response is not significant. Similarly
38Recall that with the assumption that direct investment debt flows from offshore non-financial
firms to onshore banks are negligible, we can allocate direct investment debt to the corporate
sector.
39Observations missing DID data over this time period, 2002q4-2014q4, are dropped in columns
(5)-(6). See Appendix B.6 for more discussion of FDI and DID.
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Table 3.4: Drivers of Total Debt Inflows, by Sector (Quarterly AHKS data,
missing filled from Public Sources)
Panel A: All Countries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)





log(VIXt−1) -4.974∗∗∗ 0.960 -4.362∗∗∗ -1.572∗∗∗ -5.744∗∗∗ -2.003∗∗∗
(1.260) (0.667) (0.989) (0.419) (1.516) (0.696)
GDP Growthit−1 0.232∗∗∗ -0.00864 0.190∗∗∗ 0.0501∗∗∗ 0.239∗∗∗ 0.0730∗∗∗
(0.0650) (0.0146) (0.0490) (0.0156) (0.0541) (0.0164)
Observations 2695 2695 2695 2695 2615 2615
R2 0.041 0.002 0.045 0.028 0.044 0.028
CountryFE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: Advanced Economies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)





log(VIXt−1) -9.101∗∗∗ 0.813 -7.630∗∗∗ -2.284∗∗ -10.57∗∗∗ -3.196
(2.676) (1.400) (2.068) (0.962) (3.132) (1.563)
GDP Growthit−1 0.506∗∗∗ 0.0616 0.363∗∗ 0.0819 0.480∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗
(0.179) (0.0340) (0.131) (0.0466) (0.141) (0.0420)
Observations 1127 1127 1127 1127 1109 1109
R2 0.065 0.002 0.056 0.026 0.065 0.027
CountryFE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel C: EM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)





log(VIXt−1) -2.261∗∗ 1.077 -2.265∗∗∗ -1.073∗∗∗ -2.336∗∗ -1.117∗∗∗
(0.829) (0.652) (0.706) (0.253) (0.922) (0.374)
GDP Growthit−1 0.116∗∗∗ -0.0394∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗∗ 0.0381∗∗∗ 0.142∗∗∗ 0.0635∗∗∗
(0.0347) (0.0123) (0.0346) (0.00928) (0.0416) (0.0161)
Observations 1372 1372 1372 1372 1310 1310
R2 0.071 0.021 0.116 0.075 0.073 0.053
CountryFE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample is from 2002q4-2014q4, countries as listed in Appendix B.5. Total Debt is the sum of Portfolio Debt
and Other Investment Debt inflow data, constructed by AHKS as described in Section 3.2. Dependent
variables are expressed as a percentage of GDP. VIX is the implied volatility of S&P 500 index options. GDP
growth is calculated as a year-on-year percentage growth. Errors are clustered at the country level. ** p <
0.05, *** p < 0.01
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for GDP growth, the total and private sector respond positively to a domestic
boom, while the public sector is mildly countercyclical and not significant in its
response. This pattern is largely the same in Panel B for the AE countries, but
with larger coefficients.
Inflows for EM countries in Panel C also follow a similar pattern. As the
VIX rises or as GDP falls, total or private inflows fall. This is in contrast to total
debt flows to the public sector, which run counter-cyclical to domestic growth
and show a positive (though insignificant) coefficient on the VIX.40 These results
are the gross inflows analog to the results found in Alfaro, Kalemli-Özcan, and
Volosovych (2014) for net debt flows. They show, using the DRS data explored in
Appendix B.6, that net flows to public sector are counter-cyclical, due primarily to
sovereign to sovereign flows, while debt flows to the private sector are procycli-
cal. Our results thus complement theirs and contribute to our understanding of
upstream gross capital flows together with net flows.
The global financial crisis (GFC) is a prominent feature in the landscape of
capital flows, and it has generated a lot of discussion about how the nature of cap-
ital flows may have changed in its wake.41 Tables B.11 and B.12 in Appendix B.6
show our regressions for total debt for advanced and emerging economies, split
40The results for total debt on GDP growth are robust to the inclusion of a time trend and other
pull factors, as shown in Tables B.13 and B.14 in Appendix B.6. Results on the VIX are robust
to the inclusion of a time trend and the TED spread, but significance drops with the inclusion of
other factors capturing US monetary conditions, such as the federal funds rate and the slope of
the yield curve. These results are also robust to measuring GDP growth as the differential growth
over the advanced economy average growth. We show these results for total debt in Tables B.15
and B.16
41For instance, Cerutti, Claessens, and Ratnovski (2016) find using BIS data that the VIX is
significantly associated with bank lending flows to the bank and non-bank sectors, and this was
especially the case after the GFC. Shin (2013) highlights how bond flows to EM have increased
after the GFC.
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into pre-GFC (2002q4-2007q4) and post-GFC (2008q1-2014q4) periods. For ad-
vanced economies, flows are significantly associated with the VIX before the GFC
with the expected negative sign, but after the crisis they are more strongly driven
procylically by GDP growth.42 EM similarly see a stronger connection to the VIX
prior to the GFC and stronger connection to GDP growth after it, with the ex-
pected signs. Banking flows in EM move opposite to the VIX in both the pre and
post GFC periods.
In Tables 3.5-3.6, we separately show regressions for other investment debt
and portfolio debt. In Table 3.5, we see the standard results of a negative re-
lationship with the VIX and a positive relationship with GDP growth for other
investment debt inflows. However, public inflows have these signs reversed and
do not exhibit significant relationships.
Examining advanced and emerging countries separately reveals more detail
on these relationships. Looking at just advanced economies, Panel B shows the
same results in the first 4 columns as in Panel A, with the exception that the
coefficient on GDP growth for flows to the public sector is now positive.
Panel C shows these results for EM, which exhibit some unexpected fea-
tures. Total other investment debt flows do not show a significant coefficient on
the VIX, but this is because different sectors are pulling in opposite directions.
While the public sector response to the VIX is not significant for total debt flows,
column (2) reveals a positive and significant coefficient on the VIX, opposite the
42Avdjiev, Hardy, Kalemli-Özcan, and Servén (2017) similarly find that international bank lend-
ing became much less sensitive to global risk conditions following the crisis.
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Table 3.5: Drivers of Other Investment Debt Inflows, by Sector (Quarterly AHKS
data, missing filled from Public Sources)
Panel A: All Countries
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total Public Banks Corp.
log(VIXt−1) -3.814∗∗∗ 1.017 -3.645∗∗∗ -1.186∗∗∗
(1.148) (0.636) (0.878) (0.301)
GDP Growthit−1 0.202∗∗∗ -0.00423 0.166∗∗∗ 0.0397∗∗∗
(0.0459) (0.0161) (0.0380) (0.00780)
Observations 2695 2695 2695 2695
R2 0.035 0.002 0.043 0.022
CountryFE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: Advanced Economies
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total Public Banks Corp.
log(VIXt−1) -7.365∗∗∗ 0.287 -6.073∗∗∗ -1.579∗∗
(2.380) (1.269) (1.817) (0.672)
GDP Growthit−1 0.360∗∗∗ 0.0304 0.294∗∗∗ 0.0353∗∗
(0.120) (0.0490) (0.0938) (0.0159)
Observations 1127 1127 1127 1127
R2 0.044 0.001 0.048 0.012
CountryFE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel C: EM
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total Public Banks Corp.
log(VIXt−1) -1.511 1.500∗∗ -2.130∗∗∗ -0.880∗∗∗
(0.875) (0.704) (0.719) (0.213)
GDP Growthit−1 0.140∗∗∗ -0.0167 0.113∗∗∗ 0.0440∗∗∗
(0.0360) (0.00855) (0.0330) (0.00917)
Observations 1372 1372 1372 1372
R2 0.087 0.018 0.113 0.090
CountryFE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample is from 2002q4-2014q4, countries as listed in Appendix B.5. Other
Investment Debt inflow data is constructed by AHKS, as described in Sec-
tion 3.2. Public inflows are defined as the sum of General Government
and Central Bank inflows. Dependent variables are expressed as a per-
centage of GDP. VIX is the implied volatility of S&P 500 index options.
GDP growth is calculated as a year-on-year percentage growth. Column
(5) of Panel A and Column (3) of Panel C use data solely from BOP, with
missing data left unfilled. Errors are clustered at the country level. ** p <
0.05, *** p < 0.01
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negative response of the private sectors (banks and corporates). Note that while
other investment debt is usually not the primary form of financing for the public
sector, it can account for an important share at times, including IMF credit and
other official flows. Thus at least along some margins, the public sector does in-
deed respond opposite to the private sector in response to external shocks. For
GDP growth, total, banks, and corporates have a positive relationship, but flows
to the public sector show a negative and insignificant coefficient.
Table 3.6 examines portfolio debt inflows. For all countries and advanced
economies in Panels A and B, there is not much in terms of significant relation-
ships. Total and corporate portfolio debt inflows exhibit a significantly negative
relationship to the VIX for the full set of countries, but advanced economies show
no systematic relationship of portfolio debt inflows due to either cyclical or global
factors
In Panel C for EM, we find our expected negative relationship between the
VIX and inflows across all sectors, though the coefficient is again only signif-
icant for the total and for the corporate sector. The coefficient on the VIX for
public flows is significant only at the 10% level, suggesting that emerging market
sovereigns may share the same fate as their corporates in international bond mar-
kets, but that may not be uniform for all EM. For GDP growth, we find a negative
and significant relationship for public and corporate sectors, but not for banks
(who have a positive but insignificant coefficient) or for the total.
This decomposition of results by sector helps highlight a possible reason
why Blanchard et al. (2015) find a null result on bond inflows: bank sector port-
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Table 3.6: Drivers of Portfolio Debt Inflows, by Sector - (Quarterly AHKS data,
missing filled from Public Sources)
Panel A: All Countries
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total Public Banks Corp.
log(VIXt−1) -1.160∗∗ -0.0572 -0.717 -0.386∗∗
(0.531) (0.201) (0.381) (0.183)
GDP Growthit−1 0.0297 -0.00441 0.0237 0.0104
(0.0323) (0.0135) (0.0156) (0.0119)
Observations 2695 2695 2695 2695
R2 0.006 0.000 0.008 0.005
CountryFE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: Advanced Economies
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total Public Banks Corp.
log(VIXt−1) -1.736 0.526 -1.557 -0.705
(1.263) (0.360) (0.901) (0.435)
GDP Growthit−1 0.147 0.0311 0.0689 0.0466
(0.0938) (0.0363) (0.0476) (0.0364)
Observations 1127 1127 1127 1127
R2 0.025 0.004 0.019 0.018
CountryFE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel C: EM
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total Public Banks Corp.
log(VIXt−1) -0.750∗∗∗ -0.423 -0.135 -0.192∗∗∗
(0.234) (0.207) (0.108) (0.0567)
GDP Growthit−1 -0.0242 -0.0228∗∗ 0.00457 -0.00596∗∗∗
(0.0121) (0.00906) (0.00625) (0.00170)
Observations 1372 1372 1372 1372
R2 0.010 0.010 0.003 0.010
CountryFE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample is from 2002q4-2014q4, countries as listed in Appendix B.5. Portfolio
Debt inflow data is constructed by AHKS, as described in Section 3.2. De-
pendent variables are expressed as a percentage of GDP. VIX is the implied
volatility of S&P 500 index options. GDP growth is calculated as a year-on-
year percentage growth. Errors are clustered at the country level. ** p < 0.05,
*** p < 0.01
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folio debt inflows may be acyclical, perhaps weakly procyclical in some cases,
while public and corporate inflows follow a much clearer countercyclical pat-
tern. Indeed, our results suggest that different sectors, and even different flow
types to the same sector, can move in different directions relative to domestic or
international cycles. These contrasting patterns can be obscured without such a
decomposition.
3.4.3 Panel Regressions: Capital Outflows by Sector
For debt outflows, we use the same regression setup as the inflow regres-
sions. The sample for outflows is somewhat smaller and shorter, covering 31
countries (15 advanced, 16 emerging) over 2004q1-2014q4, with the sample de-
tailed in Appendix B.5. We focus again on portfolio debt and other investment
debt outflows, but we also include flows of official reserves in this analysis.
Table 3.7 shows our regressions for total debt outflows. Columns (1)-(4)
include just the sum of portfolio debt and other investment debt, while columns
(5) and (6) add in reserve flows to the total. Debt outflows respond negatively
to the VIX, reflecting domestic agents retracting their external investments when
global risk apetite is low. The response is particularly strong for the banking
sector and insignificant for the public sector. As for GDP growth, interestingly
when the domestic economy is growing faster, total debt outflows (driven by the
domestic banking sector) increases. Thus, domestic banks invest more abroad
when the domestic economy is stronger.
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Table 3.7: Drivers of Total Debt Outflows, by Sector (Quarterly BOP data,
missing Bank data filled from BIS)
Panel A: All Countries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)





log(VIXt−1) -6.790∗∗∗ -0.398 -4.986∗∗∗ -1.407∗∗∗ -6.675∗∗∗ -0.282
(2.054) (1.135) (1.759) (0.503) (2.091) (1.313)
GDP Growthit−1 0.130∗∗∗ 0.0180 0.0978∗∗ 0.0145 0.158∗∗∗ 0.0460∗∗
(0.0431) (0.0139) (0.0359) (0.00982) (0.0432) (0.0172)
Observations 1408 1408 1408 1408 1408 1408
R2 0.047 0.002 0.043 0.015 0.051 0.006
CountryFE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: Advanced Economies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)





log(VIXt−1) -11.61∗∗∗ 0.0888 -9.121∗∗ -2.575∗∗ -10.66∗∗ 1.040
(3.772) (2.400) (3.233) (0.966) (3.965) (2.606)
GDP Growthit−1 0.339∗∗ 0.0553 0.263∗∗ 0.0204 0.337∗∗ 0.0533
(0.116) (0.0361) (0.0969) (0.0230) (0.118) (0.0401)
Observations 660 660 660 660 660 660
R2 0.082 0.004 0.087 0.025 0.074 0.004
CountryFE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel C: EM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)





log(VIXt−1) -2.223∗∗∗ -0.813 -1.048∗∗∗ -0.362∗∗ -2.906∗∗∗ -1.496
(0.588) (0.495) (0.309) (0.152) (0.831) (0.958)
GDP Growthit−1 0.0387 -0.00157 0.0269 0.0135 0.0746∗∗∗ 0.0343∗∗
(0.0195) (0.00914) (0.0154) (0.00989) (0.0234) (0.0159)
Observations 704 704 704 704 704 704
R2 0.045 0.009 0.017 0.011 0.067 0.020
CountryFE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample is from 2004q1-2014q4, countries as listed in Appendix B.5. Total debt is sum of Other In-
vestment Debt and Portfolio Debt, outflow data is primarily from IMF BOP, as described in the text.
Public outflows are defined as the sum of General Government and Central Bank outflows. Depen-
dent variables are expressed as a percentage of GDP. VIX is the implied volatility of S&P 500 index
options. GDP growth is calculated as a year-on-year percentage growth. Errors are clustered at the
country level. ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Advanced economies in Panel B reflect the same patterns as the full sample
in Panel A, except the coefficients are much larger. EM in Panel C have the same
responses to the VIX as Panel A, with smaller coefficients, but results on GDP
growth suggest some different patterns. There is no significance on the relation-
ships for any of the sectors or the total when excluding reserves, but accounting
for reserves in the total or in the public sector brings a significant procyclical re-
lationship. This implies possible precautionary saving by the public sector in the
form of reserves for EM.
Tables 3.8 and 3.9 show the relationships for other investment debt and
portfolio debt outflows separately, with reserve flows included in Table 3.9. Pan-
els A and B of Table 3.8 reflect the same patterns as total debt outflows. One
difference, however, is that the response of the corporate sector to the VIX, while
negative, is not significant. For EM, the responses are again similar to those in
Table 3.7, with the exception that the total and corporate sector responses to GDP
growth in columns (1) and (4) are significant and positive. The banking sector
does have a larger though insignificant coefficient, but the strong procyclical re-
sponse of corporate outflows in the form of other investment debt is a bit more
surprising.
Table 3.9 shows the response of portfolio debt outflows by sector and re-
serves. Unlike the other tables, here the full set of countries in Panel A reflects
more the behavior of the EM than the advanced economies. The advanced economies
in panel A have a negative relationship of total portfolio debt to the VIX, but the
response of individual sectors is not strong enough to register significance. EM
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Table 3.8: Drivers of Other Investment Debt Outflows, by Sector (Quarterly BOP
data, missing Bank data filled from BIS)
Panel A: All Countries
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total Public Banks Corp.
log(VIXt−1) -5.321∗∗∗ 0.104 -4.370∗∗∗ -1.056
(1.909) (0.805) (1.591) (0.543)
GDP Growthit−1 0.126∗∗∗ 0.00452 0.102∗∗∗ 0.0203
(0.0411) (0.0152) (0.0345) (0.0100)
Observations 1408 1408 1408 1408
R2 0.041 0.000 0.043 0.016
CountryFE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: Advanced Economies
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total Public Banks Corp.
log(VIXt−1) -9.375∗∗ 0.544 -8.129∗∗ -1.791
(3.614) (1.748) (2.948) (1.084)
GDP Growthit−1 0.306∗∗ 0.0219 0.256∗∗ 0.0275
(0.111) (0.0423) (0.0876) (0.0277)
Observations 660 660 660 660
R2 0.071 0.001 0.084 0.020
CountryFE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel C: EM
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total Public Banks Corp.
log(VIXt−1) -1.447∗∗∗ -0.268 -0.737∗∗ -0.442∗∗
(0.461) (0.278) (0.330) (0.185)
GDP Growthit−1 0.0477∗∗ -0.00515 0.0353 0.0175∗∗
(0.0187) (0.00711) (0.0188) (0.00805)
Observations 704 704 704 704
R2 0.040 0.001 0.019 0.022
CountryFE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample is from 2004q1-2014q4, countries as listed in Appendix B.5. Other
Investment Debt outflow data is primarily from IMF BOP, as described in
the text. Public outflows are defined as the sum of General Government
and Central Bank outflows. Dependent variables are expressed as a per-
centage of GDP. VIX is the implied volatility of S&P 500 index options.
GDP growth is calculated as a year-on-year percentage growth. Errors
are clustered at the country level. ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 3.9: Drivers of Portfolio Debt Outflows, by Sector (Quarterly BOP data,
missing Bank data filled from BIS)
Panel A: All Countries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total Public Banks Corp.
Reserves
Only
log(VIXt−1) -1.469∗∗∗ -0.502 -0.615∗∗ -0.351 0.115
(0.503) (0.388) (0.300) (0.384) (0.485)
GDP Growthit−1 0.00391 0.0135 -0.00389 -0.00571 0.0280∗∗∗
(0.0159) (0.0100) (0.00930) (0.00573) (0.0100)
Observations 1408 1408 1408 1408 1408
R2 0.011 0.008 0.005 0.003 0.007
CountryFE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: Advanced Economies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total Public Banks Corp.
Reserves
Only
log(VIXt−1) -2.232∗∗ -0.455 -0.992 -0.784 0.951
(0.958) (0.734) (0.595) (0.778) (0.583)
GDP Growthit−1 0.0329 0.0334 0.00661 -0.00711 -0.00203
(0.0467) (0.0291) (0.0276) (0.0166) (0.00951)
Observations 660 660 660 660 660
R2 0.018 0.010 0.008 0.006 0.021
CountryFE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel C: EM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total Public Banks Corp.
Reserves
Only
log(VIXt−1) -0.775∗∗ -0.545 -0.310∗∗ 0.0796 -0.683
(0.351) (0.316) (0.132) (0.171) (0.774)
GDP Growthit−1 -0.00891 0.00358 -0.00840 -0.00409 0.0358∗∗
(0.00879) (0.00559) (0.00529) (0.00392) (0.0129)
Observations 704 704 704 704 704
R2 0.014 0.018 0.010 0.003 0.017
CountryFE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample is from 2004q1-2014q4, countries as listed in Appendix B.5. Portfolio Debt out-
flow data is primarily from IMF BOP, as described in the text. Public outflows are defined
as the sum of General Government and Central Bank outflows. Dependent variables are
expressed as a percentage of GDP. VIX is the implied volatility of S&P 500 index options.
GDP growth is calculated as a year-on-year percentage growth. Errors are clustered at
the country level. ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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on the other hand exhibit a significant negative response to VIX that is driven by
the banking sector. Outward portfolio debt investment does not show any signif-
icant cyclicality across any of the sectors or country groups, but reserve flows are
procyclical for EM. This confirms the relationship observed in Table 3.7 Panel C
columns (5) and (6), that reserve flows are an important procyclical capital flow
for EM.
3.5 Conclusion
We construct a new data set for gross capital flows during 1996–2014 for a
large set of countries at a quarterly frequency. We decompose debt inflows and
outflows by borrower and lender type: banks, corporates and sovereigns. We
use the standard BOP data from IMF (BMP6) as the starting source and, in order
to get a larger, longer, and balanced panel of countries with debt flows split by
sector, we proceed with a data filling exercise. When the BOP data by sector is
missing, we fill the missing data by using other publicly available data from IMF,
WB, and BIS. Our data captures the volume and variation of aggregate flows for
most countries and allows us to extend the coverage of the standard samples
substantially.
To gauge how well our constructed estimates capture the true flows, we
undertake a counterfactual exercise. We take a sample of countries where BOP
data by sector is non-missing over 2006q1–2013q4. Then we compare this data
to our estimates done for this period as if the BOP data was missing. We match
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pretty well the aggregate patterns and the correlation between the two series is
over 98 percent. At the sector level, our external filling procedure makes a large
difference, where 25-40 percent of observations for EM and 75-90 percent of ob-
servations for developing countries that are missing in BOP data are filled. A
sizeable number of observations for advanced economies – around 15-30 percent,
depending on the debt flow type – are filled by external data.
We establish four new stylized facts using our new dataset. First, the well-
known positive correlation between capital inflows and outflows is driven by
banking flows, mainly by borrowing and lending of global banks in advanced
countries. Second, during domestic economic downturns (booms), inflows to
domestic banks and corporates decline (increase) in all countries and banks in
advanced countries invest less (more) abroad, decreasing (increasing) their out-
flows, whereas banks and corporates in emerging markets do not change their
outflows. Third, private and public inflows respond in opposite directions to do-
mestic business cycles—a fact driven by emerging markets’ sovereigns. During
a downturn (boom), inflows to private sector decline (increase) but the sovereigns
behave in a countercyclical manner by borrowing more (less) from abroad. Fourth,
in response to adverse (positive) global credit supply shocks, such as an increase
(decrease) in the VIX, inflows to domestic banks and corporates decline (increase),
while domestic banks and corporates invest less (more) abroad, decreasing (in-
creasing) their outflows. Sovereigns do not respond to such supply shocks on
average. These four facts are inconsistent with the standard models in which
all foreign and domestic agents invest or disinvest in the same countries as a re-
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sponse to domestic and global shocks.
Our results highlight the importance of separating capital flows by bor-
rower and lender type to understand better the potential systemic risks that capi-
tal flows may pose for the borrowing country and the lending country. They also
show the difficulty of establishing stylized facts about the business cycle proper-
ties of capital flows and the relation between capital flows and global push factors
in a sample that combines EM and AE countries. Our new dataset will be useful
for research on capital flows. It will be helpfull to develop models that better fit
the facts, as well as to inform policy makers’ decisions, not only in terms of sys-
temic risk considerations, but also in terms of monetary policy spillovers from
advanced to emerging markets.
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Chapter 4: The Global Financial Cycle and Foreign Currency Lend-
ing in Emerging Markets
4.1 Introduction
International credit conditions can affect the volume of foreign currency
(FX) credit flowing into emerging markets, presenting risks to financial stabil-
ity. This paper analyzes the role of the domestic banking sector as a transmission
point for global liquidity and how the currency composition of bank lending is
affected. With a new dataset of the foreign currency loan share of the banking
sector, I explore the link between global liquidity and foreign currency lending
in emerging markets. I further address the channels of transmission for this rela-
tionship using a matched bank-firm dataset from one emerging market, Mexico.
The increase in size and scale of international capital flows and financial
linkages has led to important discussions of and concerns about financial cy-
cles at the global level. With such large amounts of funding at play, swings in
liquidity and credit can have massive impacts on smaller economies that are fi-
nancially integrated (Bruno & Shin, 2014a; Cerutti, Claessens, & Ratnovski, 2014;
Chung, Lee, Loukoianova, Park, & Shin, 2014; Miranda-Agrippino & Rey, 2014;
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Rey, 2013). Much of international funding is in US Dollars or other major curren-
cies, and easier credit conditions make more funding available in these currencies
from the international financial market (R. McCauley, McGuire, & Sushko, 2015).
Thus, external push factors can drive the flow of credit, usually denominated in
foreign currencies, into emerging markets. Such increases in foreign currency
credit present risks for financial stability, such as currency mismatch and rollover
risk (Acharya et al., 2015; Caballero et al., 2014; Chui et al., 2014).
Domestic banks are an important source of funding and credit for emerg-
ing economies and provide a link by which foreign funding can reach domestic
firms.1 Figure 4.1 shows that the average share of total credit to the domestic
(private) non-financial sector that comes from the domestic banking sector is well
above 60% on average for many emerging markets over 2006q1-2013q4.2 The ex-
posure of domestic banks to global financial flows can affect bank funding in for-
eign currencies and thus the currency composition of bank lending, potentially
affecting the degree of currency risk in the economy. Given the central role of
banks for firm funding, such push factors affecting banks can have an important
effect on firm borrowing (and thus firm risk) in foreign currencies.
To address this question, I construct a country-level panel dataset of the
foreign currency share of lending by the domestic banking sector of 43 emerg-
1The international bond market can also be an important source of foreign currency funding
for domestic firms, particularly large ones, and has been examined by Shin (2013); Shin and Zhao
(2013); Turner (2014). Domestic bond markets remain largely underdeveloped.
2The countries in this figure are: Argentina, Brazil, China, Czech Republic, Hungary, Indone-
sia, India, Korea, Mexico, Malaysia, Poland, Russia, Thailand, Turkey, and South Africa. This
data is drawn from the BIS long series on domestic credit. See Dembiermont, Drehmann, and
Muskakunratana (2013) for a discussion of this dataset and its compilation.
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ing markets. Using this dataset, I document 2 new facts: First, I document that
tighter global liquidity conditions, as measured by the VIX, are associated with
a higher share of a country’s external debt attributable to the domestic banking
sector. It is not obvious why this should be the case, as easier credit conditions in
international markets (associated with periods of low VIX) should be associated
with a relative increase in foreign currency lending. Second, I find that tighter
global monetary conditions lead to a larger share of bank loans in FX. This re-
sult goes against the conventional wisdom that foreign currency lending should
be more pervasive when funding markets for foreign currencies are more liquid.
I analyze these relationship through formal regression analysis and explore the
role of country characteristics in that transmission.
In order to identify this relationship, I use a matched firm-bank dataset of
loan relationships from a significant emerging market, Mexico, and explore the
role of bank characteristics in transmission. This dataset consists of all lending
relationships of non-financial firms listed on the Mexican Stock Exchange (BMV).
It includes information on the volume of the lending relationship and currency of
borrowing (foreign vs domestic). I match this data up to bank balance sheet infor-
mation from Bankscope. This allows me to examine which bank characteristics
matter for the transmission of global liquidity conditions into FX bank lending.
While the correlation of FX lending with the VIX may indeed be driven by push
factors associated with global liquidity channeled through banks, it could also
be driven by demand side factors. The matched nature of the dataset allows me
to control for firm demand in each currency by including firm-quarter-currency
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fixed effects. Thus, I focus on the role of bank characteristics interacted with
global liquidity in determining the lending outcomes.
In the country-level panel, I find that global liquidity (as proxied by the VIX)
is highly positively correlated with the share of domestic bank loans in foreign
currency. This relationship is robust across many specifications. Capital inflows
to the banking sector also correlate positively with loans in FX, indicating the
role domestic banks may play in transmitting global financing and financial con-
ditions to domestic borrowers. Country characteristics such as capital account
openness, fixed exchange rates, and institutional quality don’t appear to change
these relationships. Banking sector capital does appear to affect the VIX-FX lend-
ing relationship, but not in a robust way in the macro data.
In the matched firm-bank panel, I confirm the positive relationship of the
VIX with foreign currency lending. Even after adjusting for valuation effects,
an increase in the VIX is associated with faster growth in FX credit relative to
Peso credit. This result holds after controlling for time-varying firm and bank
characteristics. Banks that are better capitalized drive this positive relationship.
Indeed, the positive relationship of FX loan growth (relative to Peso loan growth)
with the VIX for better capitalized banks gets stronger after controlling for firm-
specific demand in foreign and domestic currency. This implies on the other end
that poorly capitalized banks lend more in FX when global funding is loose, but
restrict their FX lending when times are tight (relative to their domestic currency
lending). These results suggest that capitalization of the domestic banking sector
may influence how strongly global financial conditions affect FX lending in a
156
country.
What might expain the suprising relationship between low risk periods
(loose global funding conditions) with lower shares of lending in FX by banks?
A crucial factor at play is the common fact that uncovered interest rate parity
(UIP), an arbitrage condition for foreign and local currency borrowing, is often
violated in emerging markets such that FX borrowing (specifically US dollar) is
attractive (Baskaya, di Giovanni, Kalemli-Özcan, & Ulu, 2017; Salomao & Varela,
2016). Gopinath and Stein (2018) and Gabaix and Maggiori (2015) provide mod-
els rationalizing the failure of UIP in models of financial intermediation. Us-
ing detailed loan data from one emerging market, Turkey, Baskaya, di Giovanni,
Kalemli-Özcan, and Ulu (2017) show that during these low VIX periods, the risk
premium associated with UIP failure is compressed, which then leads to an ex-
pansion of local currency lending. They call this the “interest rate channel”. My
results are consistent with this explanation where compressions in UIP deviations
are correlated with periods of lower global risk, and I show that these patterns
and FX and local currency lending hold in a broad sample of emerging markets.
Coimbra and Rey (2017) build a model where lending by more leveraged
(less capitalized) banks are more sensitive to funding costs, suggesting a channel
by which banks or banking systems may transmit international credit conditions.
In the context of FX lending, this implies that poorly capitalized banks would
lend more in FX when FX funding is cheap. Using the same dataset from Turkey
as Baskaya, di Giovanni, Kalemli-Özcan, and Ulu (2017), Baskaya, di Giovanni,
Peydro, et al. (2017) shows that the increase in lending by banks in response to
157
higher capital inflows is actually driven by well-capitalized banks. I show that
poorly capitalized banks lend less in FX relative to local currency when VIX is
high, while well capitalized banks (which drive the aggregate) do the opposite
and lend relatively more in FX. I find that the gap in the growth rates of FX and
Peso lending for these well capitalized banks is smallest when global credit con-
ditions are easy, suggesting that FX credit to banks via capital inflows does ex-
pand local currency lending. Thus, this paper provides complementary evidence
from loan-level data in a separate emerging market connecting the findings of
Baskaya, di Giovanni, Kalemli-Özcan, and Ulu (2017) and Baskaya, di Giovanni,
Peydro, et al. (2017).
This paper is related more generally to the expanding literature on global
liqudity and the global financial cycle, highlighted by Rey (2013) and Shin (2013).
This literature documents the global comovement in credit and asset prices, as
well as the implications for spillovers into other countries. Miranda-Agrippino
and Rey (2014) shows that looser US monetary policy leads to increased cross
border capital flows and increased credit creation. Bruno and Shin (2014a) high-
light the role of the international banking system in propogating global liquid-
ity shocks. Their model predicts a connection between local currency apprecia-
tion and expansion of banking credit. This paper complements their findings by
showing how global liquidity and banking flows affect the currency composition
of credit.
This work is also an important contribution to the literature on foreign cur-
rency lending. This literature highlights how foreign currency liabilities of banks
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correlate with foreign currency lending (Arteta, 2005; Basso et al., 2011; Luca &
Petrova, 2008; Rosenberg & Tirpák, 2008). Brown, Kirschenmann, and Ongena
(2011) use data from a bank in Bulgaria that has information on the requested
currency of the loan and the actual currency. Their results suggest that FX bor-
rowing is driven both by firms trying to benefit from lower interest rates and by
the bank trying to reduce risk by matching FX liabilities with FX loans. Using
a supervisory bank lending dataset from Hungary, Ongena, Schindele, and Von-
nak (2018) finds that lending by banks in a given currency increases with looser
monetary policy in that currency, thus directly linking monetary policy of global
currencies to currency composition of bank lending. I add to this literature by
connecting the role of global credit conditions to foreign currency lending across
countries, showing that these effects are common across many emerging markets,
and identifying the role of bank equity in this transmission.
Lastly, this work is related to the literature on foreign currency risk and cor-
porate risk more generally (Acharya et al., 2015; Chui et al., 2014). Bruno and
Shin (2014b) show evidence that firms worldwide have more volatile returns
when global financial markets are more liquid, thus synchronizing risk taking
across countries. This paper shows that currency risk may also be synchronized
across countries with global credit conditions. The increase in FX lending with
the VIX potentially increases the currency risk of firms. Thus, this paper also in-
tersects with the extensive literature on firm currency mismatch (Aguiar, 2005;
Caballero et al., 2014; Cowan et al., 2005b; Fuentes, 2009; Hardy, 2017; Kalemli-
Özcan, Kamil, & Villegas-Sanchez, 2016).
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 4.2 presents
the macroeconomic dataset and analysis; Section 4.3 presents the microeconomic
dataset and analysis; and Section 4.4 concludes.
4.2 Macroeconomic Analysis
In this section, I present a new panel database of country level quarterly
time-series data on the share of domestic bank loans made in foreign currencies.
I then explore the aggregate patterns, and present formal regression analysis.
4.2.1 Macro Data
I construct a quarterly dataset of FX loans for banking sectors in emerging
markets from both national and international sources, spanning 1990q1-2014q3.
This is an important contribution to the literature on FX lending, as few such
existing cross country datasets have a frequency shorter than annual. The only
datasets of which I am aware that employ higher frequency data focus on eastern
Europe and former Soviet Bloc countries (Basso et al., 2011; Neanidis & Savva,
2009). My dataset expands the scope to include countries from the Americas,
Asia, and Africa in the full sample. Also, my data is harmonized with the IMF
reported measure for foreign currency loans, providing an extension for analysis
using that data.
My primary variable of interest is FXLoanShare, defined as the share of
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This variable is constructed from stock data collected and reported by the IMF
in their Financial Soundness Indicators (FSI). These are gross loans to both res-
idents and nonresidents issued by the domestic banking sector. These numbers
have been voluntarily reported by many countries, though most only in the last
year or two.3 In order to obtain a larger balanced panel, I collect data from na-
tional authorities and construct measures of the share of loans in FX for countries
at the quarterly level.4 Details of this collection can be found in the Appendix.
This extends the series for some countries, and adds other previously omitted
countries to the sample. For countries that have data both from FSI and national
sources, the correlation between the two measures is > 0.99. When both data
sources are present, I use that constructed from national sources.
Further details on the construction of the dataset can be found in the Ap-
pendix. This dataset ranges from 1990-2014 and covers nearly 70 economies. I
focus on 43 emerging and developing economies in the dataset: Afghanistan, Al-
bania, Argentina, Bhutan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colom-
bia, Costa Rica, Croatia,5 Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, India, In-
3Reporting of foreign currency composition of balance sheets and portfolios are of increas-
ing concern for stadradized international data reporting. See the IMF’s September 2014 report
“Advancing the Work on Foreign Currency Exposures”.
4For many countries, I collect monthly data, which I convert to quarterly by using the end of
quarter values.
5Croatia’s data for FX Loans starts in 2006q2. I fill in the observation for 2006q1 using the
trend from the immediately followig data points (2006 q2 and q3), which appears to be the best
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donesia, Israel, Latvia, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Korea, Lithuania, Mexico, Moldova,
Namibia, Nigeria, Peru, Poland, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Slovak Republic,
South Africa, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine,
and Zambia.6 I also do some analysis with a smaller, balanced sample of 17 coun-
tries over 2006q1-2013q4.7
My measure captures the FX share of lending made to any borrower by the
domestic banking sector. However, loans to residents, and in particular loans to
resident non-financial corporations, are of interest. For a subset of countries, I
am able to get measures of the FX share of loans to domestic residents and to
the domestic non-financial sector. For these countries8, I find these measures are
strongly correlated with my main variable (about 0.97 and 0.95, respectively).
Loans by the domestic banking sector to non-resident counterparties account for
6.5% of the total domestic bank lending for these countries on average, while
loans to the private non-financial sector account for 72.2% on average. Thus,
using the more widely available measure should still capture behaviors related
to domestic lending in foreign currencies.
My primary measure of the global financial cycle is the VIX, a measure of
the implied volatility of S&P 500 index options.9 This measure has been used in
approach given the abrupt change starting in 2006q4.
6 Most of the countries omitted from the sample are developed countries and financial centers,
as well as a few countries with too few observations.
7This sample includes the following countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica,
Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Indonesia, Israel, Latvia, Lithuania, Mexico, Poland, South
Africa, Turkey, and Ukraine.
8Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Mexico, Poland. Of these, all
have data separately for the domestic non-financial sector except Argentina and Latvia.
9The implied volatility is the volatility of the S&P 500 index that would yield the current mar-
ket price for option contracts when put into an options pricing model.
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many other studies, and has been shown in Miranda-Agrippino and Rey (2014)
to comove with a global factor extracted from global capital flows and prices. I
use the logged value of the VIX as my measure, following Rey (2013), Miranda-
Agrippino and Rey (2014), and Nier et al. (2014). Note that the VIX is also used as
a measure of perceived uncertainty and risk for investors. Additional measures of
global financial conditions that I use include the effective federal funds rate (from
FRED), the broad dollar index (a trade wieghted measure of US dollar strength),
and the growth in global credit to banks (from the BIS global liquidity indicators).
To connect global liqudity directly to the banking sector, I construct mea-
sures of external debt of banks for each country. I construct the share of a coun-
try’s external debt owed by the banking sector from the Quarterly External Debt
Statistics (QEDS), published jointly by the IMF and World Bank. That is to say,
this measure s defined as banking sector external debt divided by total external
debt for each country. I also use gross capital inflows to banks, as a share of GDP,
from the dataset of Avdjiev, Hardy, Kalemli-Özcan, and Servèn (2017) to examine
specifically the role of capital inflows to domestic banks. From the World Bank, I
also use a measure of the capital to assets ratio for the banking system as a whole
for each country, as poorly capitalized banks may be more sensitive to external
funding conditions.
I also examine the role of other country characteristics. In line with the clas-
sic macroeconomic trilemma, the exchange rate arrangement may play an impor-
tant role for the tranmission of global liquidity shocks into emerging markets.10
10Rey (2013) suggests that GL may transmit into EM regardless, though it is certainly plausible
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I use the classification for pegged exchange rates from Shambaugh (2004), up-
dated through 2014. The institutional development may impact how connected a
country is to the global financial system as well as how effectively banks are able
to manage risk. As a measure of institutional quality, I construct a variable from
International Country Risk Guide data. I use the publically available dataset,
which has annual data of subindicator averages from the commercially available
dataset.11 I construct my measure from the average of the Government Effective-
ness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption subindicators.
For a time invariant version of this measure, I use the median value over the
sample for each country. I use the Chinn-Ito index (KAOPEN) as a measure of
openness to capital flows (Chinn & Ito, 2006).12,13 Data is annual at the country
level, covering up to 2012. I use the version of the variable that varies between
0 and 1, with 1 indicating free capital mobility. For a time invariant measure of
openness, I use the country’s median value over the sample up to 2012.
4.2.2 Aggregate Patterns
Figure 4.2 shows that the average share (across countries) of credit to the
private sector coming from domestic banks loosely follows the VIX, with a no-
table exception in 2008, though this variation is not very large.
Examining external funding reveals a more striking pattern. Figure 4.3
that the effect will be stronger for those with more rigid exchange rates. See Shambaugh (2004).
11This dataset was downloaded from the World Bank.
12This is a de jure measure of capital account openness.
13Basso, Calvo-Gonzalez, and Jurgilas (2007) find that openness is positively related to loan
dollarization to firms, while Arteta (2005) and Barajas and Morales (2003) find a negative rela-
tionship.
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shows a tight connection between the VIX and the share of external debt out-
standing of the country owed by the domestic banking sector.14 Figure 4.4 shows
a similar pattern when considering just banks’ share of private external debt.
Bank funding seems to be connected to the global financial cycle. Further, a
strong positive relationship between the shares of debt flowing to the banking
sector and loans in FX is documented in Figure 4.5. Thus, domestic banks could
provide an important point of transmission for the global financial cycle to influ-
ence currency risk and exposure. It is important to note that since these figures
measure the of share of external debt allocated to banks, these results could be
influenced from either the banking sector or from other sectors.
Figure 4.6 illustrates this connection directly. We see that with either the full
unbalanced panel or the balanced sample, there is a significant positive connec-
tion between the VIX and the share of loans in FX. This relationship is opposite
from what might first be expected. When global markets are more loose, there is
more foreign currency funding available, so banks funding themselves externally
would want to make a larger share of their loans in FX to match their FX debt po-
sitions. The fact that the share of FX loans moves in the opposite direction is both
significant and puzzling.
Figures C.1-C.17 in the appendix illustrate the intertemporal relationships
between the VIX and share of loans in FX, share of bank external debt in FX,
and banks share of country external debt for individual countries in the balanced
14Bruno and Shin (2014a) document a related trend, that bank to bank cross-border liabilities
increased in the run up to the 2008 crisis, decreasing afterwards.
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sample. Some countries, such as Hungary and Poland, show a very tight link-
age between the VIX and FX Loans in panel (a), while others such as Croatia and
South Africa are not as responsive. Similarly with the share of external debt al-
located to banks in panel (c), Czech Republic and Israel show a tight connection
with the VIX, while this pattern isn’t evident for Turkey. There is clearly im-
portant heterogeneity that causes some countries to follow these patterns more
strongly than others, but the general trends with the VIX seem to be present for
many countries. Panel (b) displays data, when available, for the foreign currency
share of bank external liabilities. Although some interesting variation is present,
there is not enough data available to make any general conclusions.
Figure 4.7 shows the long term relationship between changes in FX Loan
share and other potentially important factors. The figure plots the change in FX
loan share from 2006q1 to 2012q4 (on the y-axis) against the change in exports,
GDP growth, Institutional Quality (IQ), and openness (KAOPEN) from 2006 to
2012. An increase in the share of outstanding loans in foreign currencies over
time is associated with an increase in exports/GDP, a decrease in IQ, and a slight
decrease in openness (there is no apparent relationship with growth, however).
The relationship to exports is in line with previous findings and theory. Panel (c)
suggests that an improvement in institutional quality is associated with a lower
share of loans in FX. The relationship to openness is unexpected, as one would
expect more open economies to be more exposed to foreign currencies. Although
the focus of this paper is on the high-frequency relationship of FX loans to the
global financial cycle, and less on the long term determinants, country character-
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istics may affect the transmission of global liquidity shocks to FX lending. This is
examined in Section 4.2.4.
4.2.3 Empirical Approach
I first seek to establish a relationship between global financial conditions
and either external bank capital and FX loans. I consider regressions of the form:
Yi,q = αi,y + βGLq + εi,q (4.1)
Yi,q is either the percent of country i’s outstanding external debt attributable
to the banking sector, external debt inflows to banks as a percent of GDP, or the
percent of outstanding domestic bank loans denominated in FX in a given quar-
ter.15 GLq is a vector of global liquidity measures in each quarter, primarily the
logged value of the VIX, but also potentially the lagged value of log VIX, the
federal funds rate, and the growth in international bank credit. Since the data is
quarterly, this makes it possible to include country-year fixed effects αi,y to control
for slower moving country specific factors that may determine bank borrowing
and lending patterns.
To examine how country characteristics affect this relationship, I interact my
main measure of global liquidity (the VIX) with a vector of country characteristics
CCi:
15So a value of 1 for each of these variables indicates 1%.
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Yi,q = αi,y + β1GLq + β2GLq × CCi + εi,q (4.2)
Country characteristics that I consider include pegged exchange rate, cap-
ital account openness, and institution quality (with variables and sources de-
scribed in Section 4.2.1). One would expect that global conditions would have
a stronger impact on countries that are more open to capital flows and a fixed
exchange rate. Better institutions could go either way, as it may indicate better
access to foreign funding markets or better development of domestic funding
markets. I also consider a dummy variable for having a well capitalized banking
system, which I define as having aggregate bank capital to assets greater than
8%.16 Banking system capitalization my affect how reactive banks are to changes
in global funding conditions, with more poorly capitalized banks and banking
systems more likely to cut FX lending when the FX funding market tightens.
4.2.4 Results
I first examine the relationship of global liquidity with bank external debt.
Table 4.1 presents regressions with the banking sector’s share of country exter-
nal debt or gross capital inflows to banks as a share of GDP as the dependent
variables. Columns (1)-(7) show regressions for the bank share of external debt
on contemporaneous and lagged VIX and the federal funds rate. The contempo-
raneous value of the VIX is the most consistent predictor of bank external debt,
16 8% is roughly the recommended capital requirement from Basel III for tier 1 and 2 capital
relative to risk weighted assets.
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but all the measures suggest a significant positive relationship with VIX. That is,
as global financial conditions tighten, banks hold a greater share of the country’s
external debt. Using the results from column (6), an increase in the VIX of 1%
results in a 1 percentage point increase in the percent of total external debt made
up by banking sector external debt.17
Columns (8)-(12) use capital inflows to banks relative to GDP as the de-
pendent variable. These regressions reveal that inflows to banks do decrease
as global liquidity tightens, consistent with findings in Avdjiev, Hardy, Kalemli-
Özcan, and Servèn (2017). Note however that a higher federal funds rate is asso-
ciated with an increase in bank inflows. This correlation could be driven by the
fact that the federal funds rate was driven to 0 in late 2008, exactly when global
banking flows retrenched with the financial crisis. The results of Table 4.1, taken
together, imply that while international capital flows to banks fall when global
financial conditions tighten, it doesn’t fall by as much as flows to the rest of the
economy (such that banks end up with a higher share of external debt).
Table 4.2 establishes the second key fact, concerning the relationship of
global liquidity with the share of loans in FX. I find that as the VIX increases,
so does the share of bank lending done in FX. Using the results from column (3),
a 1% increase in the VIX is associated with an increase of almost one percentage
point in the share of loans in FX. This relationship is most robust with contempo-
raneous VIX. The federal funds rate has a negative relationship, whereby loose
17Note that this implies a decrease in the country’s share of external debt outstanding for the
government and/or the non-bank private sector.
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monetary policy (associated with the recession and collapse in capital flows) is
associated with less FX lending. This is the opposite result as that implied by the
VIX, but this is again driven by the fact that loose monetary policy is associated
with the recession and aftermath, when global liquidity was quite low.
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 4.3 capital inflows to the banking sector and the
index of US dollar strength to the standard regression. In the full sample, the VIX
and Federal Funds Rate have the same sign and significance, with slightly smaller
magnitudes as compared to column (6) of Table 4.2. As expected, banking inflows
are positive and significantly related to share of loans in FX, as funding flowing
to banks from abroad is predominantly denominated in foreign currencies. US
dollar strength is also positively associated with share of loans in FX, perhaps
capturing valuation effects of an appreciated dollar as well as indicating the state
of the dollar funding market. Moving to the balanced sample in column (2), only
the VIX and Bank Inflows survive in terms of significance. This again suggests the
importance of the banking sector as a transmission point for global flows, though
perhaps not the only factor in determining lending outcomes by currency.
In columns (3) and (4), I include interactions of the VIX with a capital open-
ness measure (index from 0 to 1, with 1 being more open), fixed exchange rate
dummy, and a measure of institutional quality to see how other country char-
acteristics may affect the transmission of global financial conditions to domestic
bank loans. Generally, there is no significant or robust relationship with these
interactions. The exception is for the balanced sample of countries, more capital
openness reverses the relationship of the VIX with FX loan share. Countries that
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are more open to capital flows see a higher share of loans in foreign currencies
when the VIX is low, as compared to countries with more capital controls in place.
As this result does not hold in the full sample of countries, however, it cannot be
said that the relationship is robust.
Table 4.4 considers the role of bank capitalization. Columns (1) and (2)
present results of the full sample, while columns (3) and (4) consider the bal-
anced sample.18 In columns (1) and (3) including country fixed effects, we see
that the positive relationship of VIX with FX loan share is driven by countries
with high levels of capital in the banking system. For the balanced panel in col-
umn (3), the coefficient on the VIX is negative, though not significant. Though not
a significant result, this aligns with the previous literature that finds that poorly
capitalized banks are more sensitive to global funding conditions, and so when
global funding is loose, poorly capitalized banks increase more their lending in
foreign currencies. After controlling for country-year fixed effects in columns (2)
and (4), the significance disappears for the interaction with bank capital, and the
sign even reverses on the coefficient with the full sample in column (2). Note,
however, that unlike the interactions in Table 4.3, the inclusion of the interaction
of bank capital with the VIX does appear to affect the direct effect of the VIX. To
better examine the role of bank capital in determining sensitivity to global fund-
ing conditions along this measure, I turn to microdata in the next section.
18Hungary is dropped from the balanced sample due to a lack of data on bank capitalization
from the World Bank.
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4.3 Microeconomic Analaysis
This section introduces a mcirodataset of matched firm-bank lending data
from Mexico. I use this data to analyze and extend the results from Section 4.2.
4.3.1 Mexico Data
I use matched firm-bank data from Mexico. This dataset is described in
detail in Hardy (2017). This data consists of all lending relationships of non-
financial firms listed on the Mexican stock exchange (BMV). This includes data
on the loan volume outstanding, the interest rate, the remaining maturity, the cur-
rency of the loan (foreign or domestic). The loan data is matched to firm balance
sheets (from quarterly financial reports filed with the BMV) and bank balance
sheets from Bankscope. Since this data is collected from firms, it includes lending
relationships both from banks resident in Mexico and cross-border banks. For
each firm-bank-currency triplet, I aggregate all loans up in each quarter (as many
firms have multiple loan products open simultaneously with the same bank). To
maintain consistency with the macro data analysis in Section 4.2, I focus on just
the lending done by domestic banks. This leaves a dataset of 116 firms borrowing
from 92 banks over 27 quarters: 8214 bank-firm-quarter-currency observations. I
adjust the FX loans for valuation effects on the assumption that they are all de-
nominated in US dollars.19
19On average, over 90% of all FX liabilities of the firms in this sample are denominated in USD.
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4.3.2 Empirical Approach
I focus on explaining real changes in FX lending (relative to local currency
lending) due to global liquidity conditions. Most of the banking relationships in
the data do not use both foreign and domestic currency loans at the same time.
Hence, defining the dependent variable as the share of loans in FX, as in Sec-
tion 4.2, may not be appropriate. Thus, the regression analysis is formulated as
follows:
∆ log(loancf ,b,q) = α f ,q + αb,q + αb, f + γ0FX
c + γ1FXc × GLq + µcf ,b,q (4.3)
where loancf ,b,q is the loan volume outstanding between firm f and bank b at
time q in currency c. Firm-quarter fixed effects α f ,q control for firm-specific time-
varying factors (observed and unobserved), and similarly bank-quarter fixed ef-
fects αb,q remove variation from individual banks over time, to account for bank-
level shocks to credit supply. αb, f controls for unobserved characteristics of a
given bank-firm pair. I focus on the interaction of the dummy variable for foreign
currency loans FX and the measure of globali liquidity. This means the identify-
ing variation is coming from differences in the growth of FX loans relative to peso
loans with respect to global financial conditions, having controlled for firm and
bank specific factors that may influence such loan growth.
The emphasis in this paper is on bank credit supply of foreign currency
173
loans, and how that supply is influenced by global financial conditions. Control-
ling for firm-quarter fixed effects helps account changes in loan demand, while
bank-quarter fixed effects capture bank specific changes in credit supply. How-
ever, changes in global liquidity may differentially affect the demand for FX vs
local currency loans. For instance, some firms who previously issued bonds in
FV may be unable to do so during periods of global tightening, leading them to
increase their demand for FX loans as a substitute. Also, firms may track the VIX
as an indicator of global business and may thus demand more or less credit de-
pending on their perception of the global business environment. Thus, I need to
control for this differential demand to understand how global liquidity transmits
through domestic banks (i.e. the supply side effects). I account for this in the
following regression:
∆ log(loancf ,b,q) = α
c
f ,q + αb,q + αb, f + γ2FX
c × BCb + γ3FXc × GLq × BCb + µcf ,b,q
(4.4)
where αcf ,q is a firm-quarter-currency fixed effect, capturing changes in firm
loan demand in FX and local currency separately, and BCb is a time invariant
bank characteristic, either average equity/assets, average tier 1 capital ratio, or
average size (measured by log assets). The interaction with bank characteris-
tics is necessary as αcf ,q absorbs the variation from FX
c × GLq. This specification
additionally allows me to explore channels by which global liquidity may influ-
ence FX lending of domestic banks by looking at the characteristics of banks who
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respond more strongly. Bank characteristics are demeaned so that the interpreta-
tion of the direct effect FXc × GLq, when not absorbed by the fixed effects, is the
impact for the average bank.
4.3.3 Results
Table 4.5 presents the main results for the impact of global liquidity on
loan growth in foreign vs. domestic currency. In columns (1)-(4), I consider FX
loans and Peso loans separately. Controlling for bank and firm characteristics,
the growth of lending in both currencies appears to increase with the VIX, with a
larger response for FX loans. While it seems at odds with standard reasoning that
loan growth would increase as financial conditions tighten, the sample of firms
here is listed firms, which tend to be very large. Hence, there may be a time-
varying reallocation effect on the supply side towards large firms during tighter
periods of global liquidity.
To compare these responses and control for time varying bank and firm spe-
cific factors, columns (5)-(8) pool FX and Peso loans together. The main coefficient
of interest is then on the interaction between the FX dummy and the VIX, which
indicates how the growth of FX debt relative to peso debt changes with the VIX.
Consistently, FX loan growth is higher than Peso loan growth when the VIX is
high. Thus, the foreign currency share of loans would increase. Hence, in the
microdata we see a strong response of non-valuation driven changes in the for-
eign currency share of loans to changes in global liquidity (as the FX loans have
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been corrected for valuation effects). These results are robust to controlling for
firm-time, bank-time, and firm-bank fixed effects. Using estimates from column
(8), a 1% increase in the VIX results in a 0.01% increase in credit growth of FX
loans relative to credit growth of peso loans.
While there is a clear correlation between FX lending and the VIX, it is still
not clear if this is driven by external push factors affecting foreign currency cap-
ital flows through the domestic banking system, or if these global movements
change the relative demand for FX vs local currency loans by firms. Table 4.6
address this by controlling for time-varying firm-specific effects in each currency
with the inclusion of firm-time-currency fixed effects. Having the time*currency
interaction in the fixed effects will absorb the variation in the FX × VIX coeffi-
cient. Thus, the main object of interest become the interaction of FX ×VIX with
bank characteristics, to observe more directly the potential role of the banking
sector in this transmission.
In columns (1)-(3), we see that the correlation of the VIX with lending in
FX is driven by banks with low leverage (high equity). This effect gets stronger
once we account for firm specific demand for FX loans in column (3). Columns
(4)-(6) illustrate a similar relationship, looking instead at the Tier 1 capital ra-
tio. Banks that were better capitalized increased their FX loan growth (relative to
their Peso loans) with the VIX, more so than poorly capitalized banks. Since bank
capital to assets is demeaned, the relationship turns negative for banks below
the average capital ratio. Larger and better capitalized banks made more loans
than less capitalized banks, which explains why the total effect is positive in Ta-
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ble 4.5. This finding helps to confirm the less robust relationship at the country
level with bank capital. Poorly capitalized banks lend more in foreign currencies
when global funding conditions are loose, but comparatively less when things
tighten relative to their domestic currency lending. On the opposite side, a well
capitalized banking system may facilitate greater FX lending when global liq-
uidity is tight, especially as a substitute for FX bond debt that firms may not be
able to directly access. Columns (7)-(9) examine the relationship with bank size,
which does not appear to be a significant determinant of the relationship between
FX lending and the VIX.
While the microdata is useful for identifying channels and effects, it does
have drawbacks for external validity. This sample of firms and loans may be
unique along several dimensions which may affect the resutls. First, the bank-
ing system in Mexico is largely dominated by foreign owned banks. Foreign
ownership of banks may be an important dimension to consider, but this partic-
ular dataset may not be as useful to explore that possibility. Second, this dataset
consists of large, publicly traded companies which may not reflect the aggregate
dynamics of FX borrowing. For the case of Mexico, this is likely less important as
most FX borrowing is anecdotally done by the larger firms, but other countries do
have significant FX borrowing by small firms and households which may change
the relationships. Third, Mexico’s banking system is well capitalized. This is
actually largely true of emerging markets generally. From the world bank data,
high income countries as a whole have a capital to assets ratio between 6 and 8%
over 2008-2014, whereas middle income countries are typically closer to 10.5%.
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Mexico’s banking system had a capital ratio closer to 16% over this period, which
is quite high for its income group. Recognizing these caveats, both the macro-
and micro-data suggest a positive relationship of FX lending with the VIX, and
bank capital may be an important factor in determining this response.
4.4 Conclusion
Global liquidity conditions can drive flows of foreign currency funds into
emerging markets. The domestic banking sector is an important source of funds
for firms and a transmission point for global flows. This paper examines the re-
lationship of global liquidity with foreign currency lending by domestic banks. I
construct a country panel dataset of foreign currency loan shares for the domes-
tic banking sector, and document that these shares move positively with the VIX.
I also show that the share of country-level external debt flowing through banks
varies positively with the VIX. Capital inflows to banks are positively associated
with loans in FX, highlighting the role of domestic banks as a transmission point
for global funding conditions to affect foreign currency borrowing by firms.
I use a unique dataset of firm-bank lending relationships in Mexico to fur-
ther identify the channels for this effect. I find the positive relationship of the VIX
with FX lending holds in the microdata. This transmission is driven by well cap-
italized banks. These results hold after controlling for firm-specific demand for
FX and local currency loans and thus focusing on supply side drivers connected
to the VIX. Taken together, these results imply that poorly capitalized banks are
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more likely to lend in FX when times are easy (low VIX) and less likely to lend
in FX when times are tight. Well capitalized banks are able provide more for-
eign currency funding to firms precisely when foreign currency funding begins
to dry up. Emerging market banking systems tend to be better capitalized on
average than developed economies, which may help explain the positive correla-
tion in the aggregate data for emerging markets. These results are consistent with
a compression of deviations from UIP, such that when global financial conditions
are loose, UIP deviations compress resulting in relatively cheaper local currency
interest rates and a relative expansion of local currency lending.
The relationship of global financial conditions, capital inflows, and foreign
currency credit is crucial to understand in order to mitigate potential spillover
effects of global liquidity and manage currency risk. Future research should con-
tinue to examine the role of the domestic banking sector in conjunction with bond
markets and other sources of credit to determine the prudence and effectiveness
of policies mitigating the tranmission of global liqudity (capital controls, macro
prudential policies) and controlling foreign currency exposures.
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Figure 4.1: Average Share of Credit from Domestic Banks, 2006-2013
Source: BIS, author’s calculations. Variable is the country average of credit to the private
non-financial sector from the domestic banking sector relative to total credit received. The
countries are: Argentina, Brazil, China, Czech Republic, Hungary, Indonesia, India, Korea,
Mexico, Malaysia, Poland, Russia, Thailand, Turkey, and South Africa.
180
Figure 4.2: Domestic Bank Credit to Total Credit
Source: BIS, author’s calculations. Solid line is the period average of credit to the private
non-financial sector from the domestic banking sector relative to total credit received. A value of
.77 indicates 77%. Dashed line is the logged value of the VIX. The countries included are:
Argentina, Brazil, China, Czech Republic, Hungary, Indonesia, India, Korea, Mexico, Malaysia,
Poland, Russia, Thailand, Turkey, and South Africa.
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Figure 4.3: Average Bank External Debt and VIX
(a) Full EM Sample (unbalanced) (b) Balanced EM Sample
Source: QEDS, author’s calculations; BIS. Solid line is the period average share of external debt
outstanding from the domestic banking sector relative to the country total. Dashed line is the
logged value of the VIX.
Figure 4.4: Average Bank Debt to Private Debt and VIX
(a) Full EM Sample (unbalanced) (b) Balanced EM Sample
Source: QEDS, author’s calculations; BIS. Solid line is the period average share of external debt
outstanding from the domestic banking sector relative to the total debt of both banking and
other private sectors. Dashed line is the logged value of the VIX.
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Figure 4.5: FX Loans and Bank External Debt
(a) Full EM Sample (unbalanced) (b) Balanced EM Sample
Source: IMF FSI and National Sources, author’s calculations; QEDS. Horizontal axis is the share
of external debt attributable to banks. Vertical axis is the share of loans in FX. The line is an OLS
line of best fit, with a 95% confidence interval.
Figure 4.6: Average FX Loans and VIX
(a) Full EM Sample (unbalanced) (b) Balanced EM Sample
Source: IMF FSI and National Sources, author’s calculations; BIS. Solid line is the period average
share of loans outstanding of the domestic banking sector in FX. Dashed line is the logged value
of the VIX.
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Figure 4.7: Change in FX Loan Share and Other Factors, 2006-2012
(a) FX Loans and Exports (b) FX Loans and GDP Growth
(c) FX Loans and Institutional Quality (d) FX Loans and Openness
Source: IMF FSI and National Sources, author’s calculations; World Bank, ICRG, Chinn and Ito
(2006). FX Loan difference is from 2006q1 to 2012q4. Exports, GDP Growth, Institutional Quality,
and KAOPEN from annual data, difference from 2006 to 2012. Sample is emerging economies
from the balanced sample.
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Table 4.1: External Bank Debt and Global Liquidity
Bank Share of External Debt Inflows to Banks/GDP





VIXq 3.495∗∗∗ 3.362∗∗ 0.481 0.955∗∗ 3.998∗∗ 0.992∗ 1.238∗ -2.048∗ -1.776∗∗ -1.537∗∗ -1.765∗∗ -1.503∗
(1.230) (1.255) (0.382) (0.443) (1.484) (0.524) (0.603) (1.006) (0.786) (0.717) (0.850) (0.814)
VIXq−1 0.190 0.946∗ 1.318∗∗ -1.250∗∗
(0.959) (0.495) (0.506) (0.508)
FFRq 0.391 0.433 -0.0355 0.521∗∗ 0.490
(0.363) (0.262) (0.326) (0.230) (0.332)
Observations 1043 1043 1036 512 1043 1036 512 1287 1280 1280 1287 1280
R2 0.846 0.846 0.992 0.992 0.848 0.992 0.992 0.095 0.592 0.594 0.134 0.593
Countries 30 30 30 16 30 30 16 30 30 30 30 30
Quarters 66 66 66 32 66 66 32 75 75 75 75 75
CountryFE Yes Yes - - Yes - - Yes - - Yes -
CountryYearFE No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes
Dependent variable in columns (1)-(7) is the percent of a country’s external debt owed by the domestic banking sector. Dependent variable in columns
(8)-(12) is capital inflows to the domestic banking sector as a percent of GDP, as constructed in Avdjiev, Hardy, Kalemli-Özcan, and Servèn (2017). VIX is the
logged value of the CBOE S&P 500 implied volatility index. FFR is the effective federal funds rate. Bal. Samp. indicates that a balanced sample, as defined
in the text, is used. Standard errors are double clustered by country and date. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 4.2: Foreign Curreny Loans Share and Global Liquidity





VIXq 3.300∗∗ 1.980∗∗∗ 0.964∗∗∗ 1.683∗∗∗ 3.743∗∗∗ 0.886∗∗∗ 1.417∗∗
(1.257) (0.725) (0.316) (0.448) (1.385) (0.294) (0.491)
VIXq−1 1.864∗∗ 0.394 0.380
(0.732) (0.320) (0.272)
FFRq 0.569 -0.268∗∗∗ -0.421
(0.967) (0.0888) (0.278)
Observations 1769 1769 1752 544 1769 1752 544
R2 0.808 0.809 0.997 0.998 0.810 0.997 0.998
Countries 44 44 44 17 44 44 17
Quarters 100 100 99 32 100 99 32
CountryFE Yes Yes - - Yes - -
CountryYearFE No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Dependent variable is the domestic banking sector’s percent of loans outstanding in foreign currency.
VIX is the logged value of the CBOE S&P 500 implied volatility index. FFR is the effective federal funds
rate. Bal. Samp. indicates that a balanced sample, as defined in the text, is used. Standard errors are
double clustered by country and date. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 4.3: Foreign Curreny Loans Share, Global Liquidity, and Country
Characteristics





VIXq 0.686∗∗ 1.074∗∗ 1.455∗∗∗ 1.268∗∗
(0.330) (0.499) (0.366) (0.539)
FFRq -0.233∗∗∗ -0.284 -0.236∗∗∗ -0.421
(0.0444) (0.302) (0.0534) (0.298)
Banks Inflows/GDPi,q 0.0300∗∗∗ 0.0252∗∗
(0.00946) (0.0109)
USD Indexq 0.0644∗∗ 0.0505
(0.0265) (0.0362)
VIXq × KAOPENi 0.431 -3.177∗∗
(1.212) (1.335)
VIXq × Fixed XRi -0.821 0.457
(0.679) (0.922)
VIXq × IQi 1.122 7.063
(2.205) (4.346)
Observations 1280 528 1499 544
R2 0.997 0.998 0.997 0.998
Countries 30 17 35 17
Quarters 75 32 99 32
CountryYearFE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dependent variable is the domestic banking sector’s percent of loans out-
standing in foreign currency. VIX is the logged value of the CBOE S&P 500
implied volatility index. FFR is the effective federal funds rate. Banks In-
flows/GDP is capital inflows to the domestic banking sector as a percent of
GDP, as constructed in Avdjiev et al. (2017). USD Index is the broad trade
weighted value of the US dollar (from FRED). KAOPEN is the median value
of the Chinn-Ito capital account openness index for each country, demeaned.
Fixed XR is the median value of the exchange rate peg classification as defined
in Shambaugh (2004), dummy variable with 1 indicating fixed. IQ is the me-
dian value of institutional quality index, derived from ICRG as defined in the
text, demeaned. Bal. Samp. indicates that a balanced sample, as defined in
the text, is used. Standard errors are double clustered by country and date. *
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 4.4: Foreign Curreny Loans Share, Global Liquidity, and Bank
Capitalization
Full Sample Balanced Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VIXq 0.0799 0.954∗∗∗ -1.391 0.925
(1.905) (0.335) (1.025) (0.645)
FFRq 1.165 -0.310∗∗∗ -0.0153 -0.361
(0.888) (0.104) (0.358) (0.314)
VIXq × High Bank Capitali 4.358∗ -0.187 3.091∗∗ 0.288
(2.406) (0.530) (1.194) (0.751)
Observations 1622 1607 512 512
R2 0.834 0.997 0.978 0.998
Countries 41 41 16 16
Quarters 99 99 32 32
CountryFE Yes - Yes -
CountryYearFE No Yes No Yes
Dependent variable is the domestic banking sector’s percent of loans outstand-
ing in foreign currency. VIX is the logged value of the CBOE S&P 500 implied
volatility index. FFR is the effective federal funds rate. High Bank Capital is
a dummy equal to 1 when the country-level bank capital ratio is above 8%.
Balanced sample is defined in the text. Standard errors are double clustered by
country and date. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 4.5: Global Liquidity and Loan Growth: Mexico Bank-Firm Level
FX Loans Peso Loans All Loans
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VIXq 0.0742∗∗ 0.0866∗∗∗ 0.0402∗∗∗ 0.0753∗∗∗
(0.0327) (0.0291) (0.00718) (0.00185)
FX -0.0734∗∗∗ -0.0801∗ -0.134∗∗∗ -0.0305
(0.0225) (0.0426) (0.00425) (0.0240)
FX × VIXq 0.0264∗∗∗ 0.0301∗∗∗ 0.0487∗∗∗ 0.0133∗∗∗
(0.00811) (0.00204) (0.00803) (0.00407)
Observations 2145 2114 6059 6006 7825 7821 7197 7112
R2 0.068 0.112 0.030 0.091 0.252 0.261 0.353 0.408
Banks 38 38 79 79 92 88 53 49
Firms 79 78 102 102 102 102 100 99
Quarters 26 26 27 27 27 27 26 26
BankFE Yes - Yes - No Yes - -
FirmFE Yes - Yes - - - - -
BankFirmFE No Yes No Yes No No No Yes
BankQuarterFE No No No No No No Yes Yes
FirmQuarterFE No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample is loans from domestic banks to listed non-financial firms over 2008q1-2014q3. Dependent variable is the log difference of
loans outstanding in FX or Peso at the Bank-Firm level in each period, winsorized by 1%. VIX is the logged value of the CBOE
S&P 500 implied volatility index. FX is a dummy equal to 1 if the loan is denominated in a foreign currency. Regressions are
weighted by the lagged value of the log of loan volume. Standard errors are triple clustered at the bank, firm, and date levels. * p
< 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 4.6: Global Liquidity, Loan Growth, and Bank Characteristics: Mexico Bank-Firm Level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
FX -0.0919 0.00607 -0.0764 -0.0337 -0.115∗∗ -0.0375
(0.115) (0.0584) (0.0600) (0.0661) (0.0420) (0.0735)
FX × VIXq 0.0353 0.00294 0.0298∗ 0.0161 0.0432∗∗∗ 0.0144
(0.0356) (0.0177) (0.0147) (0.0223) (0.00976) (0.0249)
FX × Equity/Assetsb -3.758∗∗∗ -5.818∗∗∗ -7.485∗∗∗
(0.425) (1.472) (2.532)
FX × VIXq × Equity/Assetsb 1.173∗∗∗ 1.742∗∗∗ 2.420∗∗∗
(0.249) (0.472) (0.830)
FX × Capital Ratiob -6.190∗∗ -9.694∗∗∗ -12.90∗∗∗
(2.658) (2.930) (4.342)
FX × VIXq × Capital Ratiob 1.902∗ 2.866∗∗∗ 4.056∗∗
(0.960) (0.998) (1.482)
FX × Bank Sizeb 0.00521 0.0309 0.0672
(0.0190) (0.0333) (0.0873)
FX × VIXq × Bank Sizeb -0.00269 -0.00751 -0.0255
(0.00636) (0.0109) (0.0255)
Observations 6959 6876 6167 6477 6401 5765 6959 6876 6167
R2 0.342 0.397 0.462 0.344 0.395 0.459 0.342 0.396 0.462
Banks 44 40 38 34 33 32 44 40 38
Firms 99 97 91 98 94 89 99 97 91
Quarters 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26
BankFirmFE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
BankQuarterFE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
FirmQuarterFE Yes Yes - Yes Yes - Yes Yes -
FirmQuarterCurrencyFE No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
Sample is loans from domestic banks to listed non-financial firms over 2008q1-2014q3. Dependent variable is the log difference of loans outstanding in FX
or Peso at the Bank-Firm level in each period, winsorized by 1%. VIX is the logged value of the CBOE S&P 500 implied volatility index. FX is a dummy
equal to 1 if the loan is denominated in a foreign currency. Equity/Assets is the average ratio of the bank’s total equity to total assets. Capital Ratio is the
bank’s average Tier 1 capital ratio. Bank Size is the logged value of the bank’s average asset size. Regressions are weighted by the lagged value of the log of
loan volume. Standard errors are triple clustered at the bank, firm, and date levels. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Appendix A: Chapter 2 Appendix
A.1 Appendix Tables












2006 9.34 14.73 55.75
2007 9.19 14.42 56.05
2008 12.67 19.77 62.02
2009 14.52 24.41 61.13
2010 11.90 19.64 63.06
2011 10.85 17.49 61.47
2012 8.34 13.19 61.98
2013 7.05 11.31 60.40
2014 6.24 9.96 60.28
Source: World Bank WDI, INEGI, BIS, author’s cal-
culations. Total credit is loans + bonds. Value added
from my sample calculated as sales - cost of goods
sold. Credit to non-financial sector series from BIS is
to the private non-financial sector, so PEMEX is ex-
cluded from those calculations.
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Assets 1.62 3930.89 45 588.96
Equipment 0.74 1796.25 29 805.38
Sales 4.09 8846.96 9493.23
Employment 5.44 3344.42 15 807.39
Operating Margin 126.58 135.88 139.17
Source: Mexico 2009 Economic Census, author’s calculations.
The 1000 largest firms include some financial firms, so those
firms are excluded from these numbers resulting in the 921
largest non-financial firms. All firms are similarly adjusted to
remove financial firms. All figures are averages. Assets, equip-
ment, and sales are expressed in millions of pesos, employment
is expressed in total persons, and operating margin (defined as
Operating Income/Sales) is expressed in percent.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
FX Peso FX Peso
Exposure f × 2008q3 0.212 0.202
(0.327) (0.560)
Exposure f × 2008q4 -0.0298 0.928
(0.503) (0.882)
2008q3 × Small f -0.130
(0.119)
2008q4 × Small f 0.0149
(0.145)
Exposure f × 2008q3 × Small f -0.583
(0.988)
Exposure f × 2008q4 × Small f 0.461
(2.068)
Exposure f × Shockt -0.521∗∗∗ 1.118∗∗ -0.594∗∗∗ 0.913∗∗∗
(0.108) (0.466) (0.167) (0.313)
Shockt × Small f 0.0661 0.0631
(0.0481) (0.0423)
Exposure f × Shockt × Small f -1.177∗∗ -1.003∗∗∗
(0.485) (0.335)
Observations 764 2377 1636 2819
R2 0.475 0.157 0.815 0.255
Firms 34 47 40 50
FirmFE Yes Yes Yes Yes
BankQuarterFE Yes Yes Yes Yes
FirmControls Yes Yes Yes Yes
FirmTimeTrend No No Yes Yes
JointTest 0.691 0.509
Sample spans 2008q1-2013q1, Firms reports the number of firms in each regression. De-
pendent variable is the log difference of loans outstanding in FX or Peso at the firm-bank
level in each period, winsorized at 1%. Exposure is the firm’s average 2008 net FX po-
sition to assets, with 2 outlier firms winsorized. Small is a dummy equal to one if the
firm’s average size (measured by log assets) is below the sample median. Shock is a
dummy variable taking a value of 1 in 2009 and 2010 and 0 otherwise. Firm Controls
include one quarter lags of firm size (log assets), cash to assets ratio winsorized at 1%,
total liabilities to assets ratio winsorized at 2%, bond credit to assets, share of sales to
foreigners (including exports and sales by foreign subsidiaries), sales to assets ratio, and
net derivatives position to total liabilities winsorized at 3%. Regressions are weighted
by the lagged value of log loan. Errors are clustered at the firm level. JointTest reports
the p-value of the F-test that the sum of the coefficients of Exposure*Shock and Expo-
sure*Shock*Small is equal to 0. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table A.4: Growth in Bank Loans (%), Firm-Bank Level - Exporters
FX Peso
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Shockt -0.0155 -0.0365∗
(0.0240) (0.0207)
Exposure f × Shockt -0.0273 0.00681 0.0217 0.176 0.347∗∗ 0.413∗
(0.0679) (0.0826) (0.0888) (0.144) (0.169) (0.243)
Small f × Shockt -0.0110 -0.0179
(0.0975) (0.104)
Exposure f × Small f × Shockt -0.0970 -0.109
(0.351) (0.384)
Observations 3853 2271 2271 1485 1162 1162
R2 0.013 0.387 0.387 0.041 0.261 0.261
Firms 37 36 36 34 34 34
FirmFE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
BankQuarterFE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
FirmControls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
JointTest 0.828 0.351
Sample spans 2008q1-2013q1, Firms reports the number of firms in each regression. Dependent variable is
the log difference of loans outstanding in FX or Peso at the firm-bank level in each period, winsorized at
1%. Exposure is the firm’s average 2008 net FX position to assets, with 2 outlier firms winsorized. Small is a
dummy equal to one if the firm’s average size (measured by log assets) is below the sample median. Shock is a
dummy variable taking a value of 1 in 2009 and 2010 and 0 otherwise. Firm Controls include one quarter lags
of firm size (log assets), cash to assets ratio winsorized at 1%, total liabilities to assets ratio winsorized at 2%,
bond credit to assets, share of sales to foreigners (including exports and sales by foreign subsidiaries), sales
to assets ratio, and net derivatives position to total liabilities winsorized at 3%. Regressions are weighted by
the lagged value of log loan. Errors are clustered at the firm level. JointTest reports the p-value of the F-test
that the sum of the coefficients of Exposure*Shock and Exposure*Shock*Small is equal to 0. * p < 0.10, ** p <
0.05, *** p < 0.01
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FX Peso FX Peso FX Peso
Short FXL f × Shockt -1.848∗∗∗ 1.796∗∗
(0.640) (0.672)
Shockt × Small f 0.0761 0.102∗∗∗ 0.0696∗
(0.0480) (0.0367) (0.0356)
Short FXL f × Shockt × Small f -1.745∗∗
(0.735)
Exposure f × Shockt -0.539∗∗∗ 0.941∗∗∗ -0.417∗∗∗ 0.832∗∗∗
(0.128) (0.257) (0.116) (0.260)
Exposure f × Small f × Shockt -0.956∗∗∗ -0.948∗∗∗
(0.296) (0.277)
Observations 764 2458 772 2377 911 2681
R2 0.483 0.154 0.471 0.162 0.502 0.172
Firms 34 49 34 47 34 48
FirmFE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
BankQuarterFE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
FirmControls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
JointTest 0.799 0.926 0.303
Sample spans 2008q1-2013q1, Firms reports the number of firms in each regression. Dependent variable in columns
(1) and (2) is the log difference of loans outstanding at the firm-bank level in each period, winsorized at 1%. Depen-




f ,b,t−1, winsorized at 3% for outliers. Dependent variable
in columns (5) and (6) is (Lcf ,b,t − L
c
f ,b,t−1)/(0.5 ∗ (L
c
f ,b,t + L
c
f ,b,t−1)), which admits firm-bank entry and exit, and is
bounded by [-2,2]. Short FXL is the firm’s average 2008 short term fx liabilities to total assets, with 1 outlier firm
winsorized. Exposure is the firm’s average 2008 net FX position to assets, with 2 outlier firms winsorized. Small is
a dummy equal to one if the firm’s average size (measured by log assets) is below the sample median. Risky is a
dummy equal to 1 if the firm is a small firm whose average leverage is above the sample median. Shock is a dummy
variable taking a value of 1 in 2009 and 2010 and 0 otherwise. Firm Controls include one quarter lags of firm size
(log assets), cash to assets ratio winsorized at 1%, total liabilities to assets ratio winsorized at 2%, bond credit to
assets, share of sales to foreigners (including exports and sales by foreign subsidiaries), sales to assets ratio, and net
derivatives position to total liabilities winsorized at 3%. Regressions are weighted by the lagged value of log loan.
Errors are clustered at the firm level. JointTest reports the p-value of the F-test that the sum of the coefficients of
Exposure*Shock and Exposure*Shock*Small is equal to 0. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table A.6: Growth in Bank Loans by Remaining Maturity (%), Firm-Bank Level
FX Peso
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Short Short Long Long Short Short Long Long
Exposure f × Shockt -0.811∗∗∗ -0.768∗ -0.00147 0.599 0.154 0.129 0.864∗∗ 1.326∗∗
(0.259) (0.446) (0.466) (0.356) (0.169) (0.277) (0.389) (0.538)
Shockt × Small f -0.366∗∗∗ 0.189 -0.0411 0.0524
(0.112) (0.153) (0.0568) (0.0712)
Exposure f × Shockt × Small f 0.316 -1.038∗∗∗ 0.0962 -1.157∗
(0.490) (0.362) (0.372) (0.626)
Observations 560 560 397 397 2002 2002 1422 1422
R2 0.448 0.457 0.505 0.513 0.150 0.150 0.206 0.208
Firms 28 28 25 25 47 47 42 42
FirmFE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
BankQuarterFE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
FirmControls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
JointTest 0.0430 0.284 0.333 0.640
Sample spans 2008q1-2013q1, Firms reports the number of firms in each regression. Dependent variable is the log difference of loans
outstanding in FX at the firm-bank level in each period, winsorized at 1%. Exposure is the firm’s average 2008 net FX position to
assets, with 2 outlier firms winsorized. Small is a dummy equal to one if the firm’s average size (measured by log assets) is below the
sample median. Risky is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm is a small firm whose average leverage is above the sample median. Shock is a
dummy variable taking a value of 1 in 2009 and 2010 and 0 otherwise. Firm Controls include one quarter lags of firm size (log assets),
cash to assets ratio winsorized at 1%, total liabilities to assets ratio winsorized at 2%, bond credit to assets, share of sales to foreigners
(including exports and sales by foreign subsidiaries), sales to assets ratio, and net derivatives position to total liabilities winsorized at
3%. Regressions are weighted by the lagged value of log loan. Errors are clustered at the firm level. JointTest reports the p-value of
the F-test that the sum of the coefficients of Exposure*Shock and Exposure*Shock*Small is equal to 0. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p <
0.01
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Table A.7: Growth in Bank Loans (%), Firm-Bank Level, Alternate Samples and Placebos
FX Peso



















Exposure f × Shockt -0.583∗∗∗ -0.407∗∗∗ -0.257 0.896∗∗∗ 1.253∗∗ -0.440
(0.162) (0.134) (0.265) (0.277) (0.522) (0.327)
Shockt × Small f 0.0723∗ 0.0945∗∗ -0.0158
(0.0388) (0.0454) (0.0454)
Exposure f × Shockt × Small f -1.012∗∗∗ -1.340∗∗ 0.0847
(0.297) (0.539) (0.380)
Observations 493 634 764 2371 2075 2377
R2 0.492 0.490 0.469 0.154 0.153 0.150
Firms 30 32 34 47 45 47
FirmFE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
BankQuarterFE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
FirmControls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
JointTest 0.334 0.554 0.169
Sample spans 2008q1-2013q1, Firms reports the number of firms in each regression. Dependent variable is the log
difference of loans outstanding in FX or Peso at the firm-bank level in each period, winsorized at 1%. Exposure is
the firm’s average 2008 net FX position to assets, with 2 outlier firms winsorized. Small is a dummy equal to one if
the firm’s average size (measured by log assets) is below the sample median. Shock is a dummy variable taking a
value of 1 in 2009 and 2010 and 0 otherwise. Firm Controls include one quarter lags of firm size (log assets), cash
to assets ratio winsorized at 1%, total liabilities to assets ratio winsorized at 2%, bond credit to assets, share of sales
to foreigners (including exports and sales by foreign subsidiaries), sales to assets ratio, and net derivatives position
to total liabilities winsorized at 3%. Regressions are weighted by the lagged value of log loan. Errors are clustered
at the firm level. JointTest reports the p-value of the F-test that the sum of the coefficients of Exposure*Shock and
Exposure*Shock*Small is equal to 0. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Emp PPE Emp PPE
Exposure f × 2008q3 0.000349 -0.0539
(0.178) (0.0600)
Exposure f × 2008q4 0.0990 -0.0347
(0.0899) (0.0726)
2008q3 × Small f -0.0488 0.0107
(0.0305) (0.0210)
2008q4 × Small f 0.00145 -0.0173
(0.0291) (0.0282)
Exposure f × 2008q3× Small f -0.00180 -0.0622
(0.227) (0.197)
Exposure f× 2008q4 × Small f -0.308 0.149
(0.254) (0.251)
Exposure f × Shockt 0.190 0.109 0.296 0.375∗
(0.115) (0.0731) (0.220) (0.214)
Shockt × Small f 0.00282 0.0147 0.0168 0.0160
(0.0146) (0.0119) (0.0220) (0.0154)
Exposure f × Shockt × Small f -0.300∗∗ -0.229∗∗ -0.284 -0.593∗∗
(0.129) (0.0890) (0.244) (0.223)
Observations 768 790 545 567
R2 0.173 0.208 0.250 0.312
Firms 51 52 47 48
FirmFE Yes Yes Yes Yes
TimeFE Yes Yes Yes Yes
BankShock Yes Yes Yes Yes
FirmControls Yes Yes Yes Yes
FirmTimeTrend No No Yes Yes
JointTest 0.0829 0.0237 0.927 0.00927
Sample spans 2008q1-2013q1, Firms reports the number of firms in each regression. De-
pendent variable in columns (1) and (3) is the log difference of employment at the firm
level in each period, winsorized at 2%. Dependent variable in columns (2) and (4) is the
log difference of physical capital outstanding, measured as property, plant, and equip-
ment, at the firm level in each period, winsorized at 2%. Exposure is the firm’s average
2008 net FX position to assets, with 2 outlier firms winsorized. Small is a dummy equal
to one if the firm’s average size (measured by log assets) is below the sample median.
Shock is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 in 2009 and 2010 and 0 otherwise. Bank
shock is a control for credit supply shocks to each firm, as constructed in the text. Firm
Controls include one quarter lags of firm size (log assets), cash to assets ratio winsorized
at 1%, total liabilities to assets ratio winsorized at 2%, bond credit to assets, share of sales
to foreigners (including exports and sales by foreign subsidiaries), sales to assets ratio,
and net derivatives position to total liabilities winsorized at 3%. Errors are clustered at
the firm level. JointTest reports the p-value of the F-test that the sum of the coefficients
of Exposure*Shock and Exposure*Shock*Small is equal to 0. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, ***
p < 0.01
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Table A.9: Growth in Firm Level Outcomes (%) - Exporters
Bank Debt Employment PPE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Exposure f × Shockt 0.390∗∗ 0.207 0.0205 0.0253 0.0166 0.0303
(0.156) (0.163) (0.0248) (0.0319) (0.0244) (0.0237)
Shockt × Small f -0.0750 0.00793 0.0136
(0.0940) (0.0160) (0.0173)
Exposure f × Shockt × Small f 0.621∗ -0.0215 -0.0550
(0.352) (0.0527) (0.0597)
Observations 641 641 599 599 601 601
R2 0.159 0.164 0.179 0.179 0.329 0.331
Firms 38 38 38 38 38 38
FirmFE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
TimeFE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
BankShock Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
FirmControls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
JointTest 0.0160 0.929 0.664
Sample spans 2008q1-2013q1, Firms reports the number of firms in each regression. Dependent variable
in columns (1) and (2) is the log difference of bank credit outstanding at the firm level in each period,
winsorized at 1%. Dependent variable in columns (3) and (4) is the log difference of employment at the
firm level in each period, winsorized at 2%. Dependent variable in columns (5) and (6) is the log difference
of physical capital outstanding, measured as property, plant, and equipment, at the firm level in each
period, winsorized at 2%. Exposure is the firm’s average 2008 net FX position to assets, with 2 outlier
firms winsorized. Small is a dummy equal to one if the firm’s average size (measured by log assets) is
below the sample median. Shock is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 in 2009 and 2010 and 0 otherwise.
Bank shock is a control for credit supply shocks to each firm, as constructed in the text. Firm Controls
include one quarter lags of firm size (log assets), cash to assets ratio winsorized at 1%, total liabilities to
assets ratio winsorized at 2%, bond credit to assets, share of sales to foreigners (including exports and sales
by foreign subsidiaries), sales to assets ratio, and net derivatives position to total liabilities winsorized at
3%. Errors are clustered at the firm level. JointTest reports the p-value of the F-test that the sum of the
coefficients of Exposure*Shock and Exposure*Shock*Small is equal to 0. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table A.10: Growth in Firm Level Outcomes (%), Alternate Specifications
∆ log(E) E−E−1E−1 ∆ log(PPE)
PPE−PPE−1
PPE−1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Short FXL f × Shockt -0.0907 0.173 -0.00186 0.351∗∗
(0.0931) (0.258) (0.0634) (0.146)
Shockt × Small f 0.00999 0.00406 0.0169 0.0183
(0.0206) (0.0146) (0.0118) (0.0122)
Short FXL f × Shockt × Small f -0.324 -0.436∗∗∗
(0.279) (0.161)
Exposure f × Shockt 0.0747 0.155∗ 0.0345 0.139∗
(0.0456) (0.0777) (0.0634) (0.0701)
Exposure f × Shockt × Small f -0.203∗ -0.272∗∗∗
(0.105) (0.0893)
Observations 797 797 749 749 819 819 787 787
R2 0.166 0.168 0.151 0.156 0.191 0.195 0.192 0.201
Firms 53 53 51 51 54 54 52 52
FirmFE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
TimeFE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
BankShock Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
FirmControls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
JointTest 0.176 0.525 0.268 0.0232
Sample spans 2008q1-2013q1, Firms reports the number of firms in each regression. Dependent variable in columns (1) and (2) is the
log difference of employment at the firm level in each period, winsorized at 2%; in columns (3) and (4) is employment growth (E −
E−1)/E−1 at the firm level in each period, winsorized at 2%; in columns (5) and (6) is the log difference of physical capital outstanding,
measured as property, plant, and equipment (PPE), at the firm level in each period, winsorized at 2%.; and in columns (7) and (8) is
(PPE− PPE−1)/PPE−1, winsorized at 2%. Exposure is the firm’s average 2008 net FX position to assets, with 2 outlier firms winsorized.
Short FXL is the firm’s average 2008 short term fx liabilities to total assets, with 1 outlier firm winsorized. Small is a dummy equal to one
if the firm’s average size (measured by log assets) is below the sample median. Shock is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 in 2009 and
2010 and 0 otherwise. Bank shock is a control for credit supply shocks to each firm, as constructed in the text, lagged one period. Firm
Controls include one quarter lags of firm size (log assets), cash to assets ratio winsorized at 1%, total liabilities to assets ratio winsorized
at 2%, bond credit to assets, share of sales to foreigners (including exports and sales by foreign subsidiaries), sales to assets ratio, and net
derivatives position to total liabilities winsorized at 3%. Errors are clustered at the firm level. JointTest reports the p-value of the F-test
that the sum of the coefficients of Exposure*Shock and Exposure*Shock*Small is equal to 0. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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A.2 Equivalence of using demeaned estimates of bank shocks
Proof of Proposition 2.6.1. Rewrite the estimated effect as
α̂b,t = α̂
∗
b,t − α̂∗re f ,t (A.1)
Note that the time average of α̂∗re f ,t is α̂
∗
re f ,t. Thus α̂b,t − α̂t = α̂∗b,t − α̂∗t , where α̂t is









time average of α̂ f ,t.
Define L f ,t−1 = ∑b∈B f ,t L f ,b,t−1. Then, by time demeaning B̂S f ,t and substi-
tuting in equation A.1, we obtain
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f ,t − α̂∗re f ,t − (B̂S
∗
t − α̂∗re f ,t)
= B̂S
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Solution for Firm’s Problem
Recall that E[1 + φ] = 1+r1+r∗
1
γ . Let the CDF of the random variable 1 + φ be
given by G(·).
The t=1 decision breaks into 6 cases (denoted by cutoffs W0 to W4), whose
probability depend on w1 and z2:
Case 0: w1 ≤ 0 = W0





k2 = 0, d∗2 = 0, d2 = 0
Π2 = 0















k2 = (1 + κ0)w1, d∗2 = κ1w1, d2 = (κ0 − κ1)w1









































1−α − (1 + κ1)w1
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k2 = (1 + κ1)w1, d∗2 = κ
∗w1, d2 = 0






















































k2 = w1, d∗2 = 0, d2 = 0
Π2 = z2wα1
Using the probabilities of being in these cases and the expected profit from
each, we can express the period 0 decision as maximizing the expected period 2






Pr(Casei|z2) ∗Πi2(w1, z2) (A.2)
s.t.
w1 = z1kα1 − (1 + r)d1 − (1 + r∗)E[1 + φ1]d∗1 (A.3)
k1 = w0 + d1 + d∗1 (A.4)
d1 + d∗1 ≤ κ0w0 (A.5)
d∗1 ≤ κ1w0 (A.6)
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Proofs
Proof of Proposition 2.7.1. If 0 < w1 ≤ W1, the constrained optimal debt and in-





= κ1 > 0,
∂d2
∂w1
= (κ0 − κ1) > 0, and ∂k2∂w1 = 1 + κ0 > 0. Hence, a
negative shock to w1 leads to lower FX debt, peso debt, and investment.
If W1 < w1 ≤W2, the semi-constrained optimal debt and investment choices

















= κ1 > 0,
∂d2
∂w1
= −(1 + κ1) < 0,
∂(d2+d∗2)
∂w1
= −1 < 0, and ∂k2∂w1 = 0. Hence, a negative shock to w1 which leaves
w1 > W1, results in lower FX debt, higher peso debt, higher total debt, and un-
changed investment. 
Proof of Proposition 2.7.2. The proof proceeds in several steps: First, I show that
E1[Pi2] is strictly increasing in w1, ∀ w1 > 0:
Case 1: ∂E1[Π2]∂w1 = αz2((1 + κ0)w1)
α−1(1 + κ0)− (1 + r)(κ0 − κ1 γ−1γ ) > 0 ∀
w1 ∈ (0, W1)
Case 2: ∂E1[Π2]∂w1 = (1 + r)(1 + κ1
γ−1
γ ) > 0
Case 3: ∂E1[Π2]∂w1 = αz2((1 + κ1)w1)
α−1(1 + κ1)− κ1 1+rγ > 0 ∀ w1 ∈ (W2, W3)
Case 4: ∂E1[Π2]∂w1 =
1+r
γ > 0
Case 5: ∂E1[Π2]∂w1 = αz2w
α−1
1 > 0
Thus, maximizing E1[Π2] requires maximizing E0[w1], accounting for the
probability of default.
Next, I show that E0[w1] is increasing in FX debt, holding k1 (and thus d1 +
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d∗1) constant and thresholds Wi constant:
∂E0[w1]
∂d∗1
|Wi=W̄i,(k1=k̄) = (1 + r)
γ−1
γ > 0









2 > 0 for all values of debt d1 + d∗1
such that the firm does not default with probability 1 (prevented by borrowing
constraint).







This implies that with a higher z1, the firm could increase their share of FX
debt while maintaining their original default probability and thus have higher





Proof of Proposition 2.7.3. From Proposition 2.7.2, we know that the probability of
default in period 1 does not depend on z2 and is decreasing in z1. For the re-
maining thresholds, it is sufficient to find conditions for W4 such that Pr(w1 <
W4|z1, z2) < Pr(w1 < W4|z̄) :
z̄kα1 − (1 + r)d1 −W4(z̄)
(1 + r∗)d∗1
<
z1kα1 − (1 + r)d1 −W4(z2)
(1 + r∗)d∗1











































1−α , so X4 <
X3 < X2 < X1.
Assuming this condition holds, then Pr(w1 < Wi|z1, z2) < Pr(w1 < Wi|z̄) ∀
i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}. From the logic in the proof to Proposition 2.7.2, this implies that





Appendix B: Chapter 3 Appendix
B.1 Capital Flow Data
Some of the presentations and definitions of international capital flow data
can be ambiguous or inconsistent across data sources. In order to be clear about
what we are doing, we briefly highlight some basic concepts regarding capital
flow data generally.
B.1.1 Net Flows vs Gross Flows
In the literature and in the data, there is some ambiguity of terms when
referring to net and gross flows. Essentially, there are three distinctions:
Gross Flows: Strictly speaking, gross inflows and outflows refer to one-
way flows without netting out any capital flowing in the opposite direction. This
definition of gross flows is generally what comes to mind when the term is used.
Nevertheless, data that actually matches this definition are quite scarce.
Net Inflows and Outflows: What is commonly called “gross flows” in the
literature is actually more accurately described as “net inflows” and “net out-
flows”. There are no comprehensive datasets on flows that are truly gross. In-
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stead, researchers tend to use net inflows and net outflows, which can be ob-
tained from the IMF’s BOP dataset. Net inflows are gross liability flows, net of
repayments. Net outflows are gross asset flows, net of disinvestment. Thus, al-
though these measures are often called “gross”, they can be positive or negative.
The separation of flows into asset and liability flows allows interpreting liability
flows as net inflows from foreign agents, and asset flows as net outflows by do-
mestic agents. This is the primary working definition of capital flows, which we
use across all data sources for consistency.
Net Flows: This relates to the net movement of capital into and out of a
country. This is the equivalent of the negative of the current account, that is, the
difference between Net Inflows and Net Outflows (or equivalently the difference
between Gross Inflows and Gross Outflows).
Stock/Position Data: In general, there is no standard definition of “net”
stocks, as some countries report outstanding debt net of some financial assets
(Arslanalp & Tsuda, 2014b), while others do not. A more widely-agreed view is
that the net stock of external wealth should be equivalent to the Net International
Investment Position, which is the difference between outstanding external stock
of assets and outstanding external stock of liabilities. Gross positions then refer
to the outstanding stocks of assets and liabilities separately.
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B.1.2 External Borrowing of Sectors
The focus of this paper is on the differentiation of capital flows by sector
in the domestic economy. The term “sector” is used here to refer to institutional
sectors: general government, central banks, depository corporations except the
central bank (“banks”), and other sectors (“corporates”).1 There are other ways
to define the sectors of the economy, but this breakdown is the most common in
the data.2
These broad sectors can sometimes be decomposed into various institu-
tional subsectors (for example, other sectors are sometimes split into other non-
bank financial and other non-financial sectors in the BOP data). Thus, sectors can
also be defined differently depending on the dataset or measure. For instance,
several datasets such as the WB DRS produce statistics on public and publicly
guaranteed (PPG) debt. In this case, public refers to general government, central
banks, and the public sector portions of banks and corporates. Publicly guar-
anteed private sector debt is defined precisely as its name suggests and is the
complement to PPG. Otherwise, most datasets using a sectoral breakdown con-
form to the standard definition of the main institutional sectors and subsectors
given above. We will use the standard 4 sector split for most of our analysis, but
we separately consider PPG vs. PNG debt in Appendix B.6.4.
1It should be noted that the BoP category “other sectors” is broader than what is captured
than the term “corporates”. Nevertheless, in most cases, there is fairly broad overlap between the
two categories. That is why, in the rest of this paper, we use the two terms interchangeably for
presentational convenience.
2See Chapter 4 Section D of the 6th Edition Balance of Payments Manual for an overview of
Systems of National Accounts sectoral breakdowns, and the sectoral breakdowns used in the BOP
(and often other) data sources.
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B.1.3 Sign of Flows
There remains some confusion about the sign of capital inflows and out-
flows in the data. This is primarily due to a change in sign conventions that
occurred when the BOP data switched from the BPM5 to the BPM6 version. In
BPM5, a negative sign indicated that capital was leaving the country on net, re-
gardless of whether it was an asset or liability flow. In the current version of the
BOP data (BPM6), a positive asset flow represents capital leaving the country on
net by domestic residents, while a positive liability flow represents capital en-
tering the country on net by foreigners. We use the updated convention, where
a positive sign indicates an increase in either assets or liabilities, and adjust our
interpretation accordingly.
B.2 Balance of Payments Data
The IMF’s Balance of Payments (BOP) data is the most comprehensive dataset
available on international capital flows. It comprises two main accounts – the
Current Account and the Financial Account.3 The current account records trans-
actions from the real side, capturing imports and exports, factor income, and
transfer payments. The financial account records transaction from the financial
side, capturing the acquisition of financial assets and the incurrence of financial
3A third account, the Capital Account, is generally much smaller than these two. Since the
BOP uses double entry bookkeeping, the sum of the accounts should be zero, so a Balancing
Account called ”Net errors and omissions” is defined to satisfy the identity: current account
+ financial account + capital account + net errors and omissions = 0. Errors and omissions are
usually interpreted as unrecorded private capital flows (see Forbes and Warnock (2012)).
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liabilities. We focus on the Financial Account portion of the BOP data.
There are several presentations of the BOP data.4 The standard presenta-
tion disaggregates the data by flow type and instrument. The analytic presenta-
tion, which is the one available within the IMF’s International Financial Statistics
(IFS), reports exceptional financing (used to meet balance-of-payments financing
needs) separately from the standard presentation.5 The analytic presentation can
be useful to separate some public flows from private flows, because exceptional
financing can be viewed as an alternative instrument to the use of reserve as-
sets or IMF credit to help deal with balance of payments shortfalls.6 We use the
sectoral presentation, which breaks down the standard presentation by domes-
tic institutional sector, but we also use measures of exceptional financing from
the analytic presentation to allocate all exceptional financing flows to the public
sector.
In theory, the structure of the BOP dataset should allow separating the flows
by institutional sector, but the requisite data is sometimes missing. It is difficult
to determine if missing data is truly missing, or if it is zero. Data on outflows are
generally more sparse than data on inflows. Further, the time coverage of the data
varies greatly across countries. Especially for variables with sectoral breakdown,
the coverage is weighted heavily towards recent years.
4See Chapter 14 Section C of the 6th edition BOP manual for a description of the various
presentations.
5Exceptional Financing is usually classified under the other investment category.
6See the 6th edition BOP manual Appendix 1 for a description of Exceptional Financing. See
Alfaro, Şebnem Kalemli-Özcan, and Volosovych (2014) for discussion and use of IFS data to di-
vide net flows into public and private components.
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B.2.1 Types of Flows
Capital flows in the Financial Account of the BOP are disaggregated first
by type of flow. The main types are direct investment, portfolio equity, portfolio
debt, other investment, financial derivatives, and reserves. For each of these flow
types, the BOP reports asset flows and liability flows. We describe each type of
flow and how it can be broken down into the various institutional sectors.7
Direct Investment: Direct investment, commonly called FDI, captures in-
vestment involving at least 10% ownership. It is meant to reflect investment re-
lationships based on control and influence. In addition to equity investment, it
also captures other investments under a controlling relationship, including debt
and reverse investment.
Direct investment is not broken down by sector. Unlike the BPM5 version of
the data, the BPM6 data does have splits according to liability and asset flows for
direct investment (consistent with other BOP flows).8 The debt portion of direct
investment can be allocated with some assumptions. Debt flow between affiliated
parties are only recorded as direct investment debt if at least one party is a non-
financial firm. Thus for inflows, we can attribute all direct investment debt to
the Corporate sector if we assume that such lending from offshore non-financial
firms to onshore banks is negligible.
Portfolio Equity: Portfolio equity captures investment in equity securities
7See Appendix 9 of the Balance of Payments Manual for a list of all the components of the
Financial Account with their structure in the BOP data.
8This is one of the main differences between the BPM5 and BPM6 versions of the data.
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not included in direct investment.9 It is broken down by institutional sector and,
in principle, asset and liability flows are defined for all sectors. Note, however,
that liability flows for central banks and general government should equal zero
regardless of data reporting.10
Portfolio Debt: Portfolio debt consists of all debt securities not captured
under direct investment. It is separated into asset and liability flows, and then
disaggregated by institutional sector.
Financial Derivatives: Financial derivatives tend to be a quantitatively small
category of gross flows, covering derivatives and employee stock options. Finan-
cial derivatives that are associated with reserve asset management are excluded.
Both asset and liability flows offer breakdowns by institutional sector.11 Due to
its small size and sparse data, we ignore this component in our analysis.
Other Investment: Other investment captures all other investments not in-
cluded in the previous categories. It is first broken into other investment equity12
and other investment debt. Other investment debt is then disaggregated as fol-
lows: currency and deposits, loans (including use of IMF credit and loans), insur-
ance and pensions,13trade credit and advances, other accounts payable/receivable,
9Equity not in the form of securities is not captured here.
10Some countries report positive equity liability flows for the government or central bank, but
we believe this is equity from state-owned or quasi-public enterprises (banks or corporates) that
was mis-recorded.
11Some countries may report financial derivatives on a net basis only. See 6th edition BOP
manual paragraphs 6.60 and 8.34.
12This is equity investment that is not direct investment or reserve assets, and is not in the form
of securities. Equity securities are captured under portfolio equity. This category, introduced with
the BPM6 version of the BOP data, is sparsely reported.
13This includes non-life insurance technical reserves, life insurance and annuities entitlements,
pension entitlements, and provisions for calls under standardized guarantees. This component is
likely also small, and very sparsely reported.
213
and SDR allocations.14
Other investment debt as a whole, and each of its component instruments,
is broken down into asset and liability flows, and then further broken down by
institutional sector. However, there is no sectoral breakdown of Other Investment
Equity.
Reserves: Reserve Assets are external assets held by the Central Bank or
Monetary Authority that are readily available for use to meet Balance of Pay-
ments financing needs. These include foreign currency, convertible gold, SDRs,
and other reserve assets. Thus, this component is an asset flow of the public sec-
tor only.
While in principle the structure of the BOP data contains all the ingredients
required to compute each type of flow for each sector, in practice there are some
countries which do not exhaustively provide these breakdowns, especially for
earlier years.15 Table B.1 in the appendix highlights the coverage by flow type
and sector in the quarterly BOP data.16 For each component, the table displays
the number of countries reporting data, the number of quarters with at least one
14SDR holdings (as opposed to SDR allocations) are included in reserve assets. A one time
increase in SDR allocations occurred in the 3rd quarter of 2009 for all IMF member countries, so
those flows are removed.
15Table B.3 lists the BOP variables required to compute each type of capital flow by sector.
Variable names are as they are found in the bulk public download of the BP6 version BOP data, as
of May 2016. The Balance of Payments data also includes International Investment Position (IIP)
data, which is the stock equivalent of the BOP flow measures. Variable names for IIP construction
by sector are also included, for reference.
16Some items in the BOP data are available back to 1948, but this applies to very few of them.
For this table, we consider data only from 1980 onwards. The annual BOP data does have some-
what better coverage. For instance, when shifting from quarterly to annual frequency, the num-
ber of countries with full coverage of portfolio debt liability flows over 1996-2014 goes from
(1,21,13,19) to (4,32,18,27) for central banks, general government, banks, and other sectors, re-
spectively.
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country reporting data, the number of country-quarter observations with non-
missing data, and the number of countries that have data for that component in
every period over the 1996q1-2014q4 period. Next to each of these numbers, in
brackets we report the implied coverage as percentage of the theoretical maxi-
mum, given by 190 countries, 144 quarters, and 27360 total observations. The
direct investment and reserves lines give us an idea of the coverage of the more
standard items that are not disaggregated by sector. Generally, we see that for
most sectors and flow types, most countries and periods show some data. How-
ever, the data is skewed towards recent years, and few countries show coverage
over the full 1996q1-2014q4 period.
Table B.2 shows the coverage breakdown for Other investment Debt by in-
strument, with each instrument listed separately under Asset and Liability by
sector. The table illustrates how more detailed breakdowns tend to result in
poorer coverage, as not all countries provide such detail to the IMF. Generally, if
other investment debt by sector is missing, then all of the underlying instruments
(with the exception of IMF credit) are also missing. When data for instruments
is reported, it can be the case that all of other investment debt is recorded un-
der a single instrument (usually loans), despite the number representing other
instruments as well (such as trade credit, etc.).17
17We thank Gian-Maria Milesi-Ferretti for pointing this out.
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Table B.1: BOP Data Coverage by Sector
Flow Type A/L Sector Country Quarter Country-Quarter Panel
Direct Investment
Assets All 133 (70%) 143 (99%) 8495 (31%) 35 (18%)
Liabilities All 146 (77%) 143 (99%) 10920 (40%) 63 (33%)
Portfolio Equity
Assets
Central Banks 23 (12%) 60 (42%) 309 (1%) 0 (0%)
General Gov 58 (31%) 91 (63%) 1480 (5%) 0 (0%)
Banks 84 (44%) 127 (88%) 3611 (13%) 8 (4%)
Corporates 107 (56%) 143 (99%) 5045 (18%) 13 (7%)
Liabilities
Central Banks 1 (0.5%) 18 (13%) 18 (0.0%) 0 (0%)
General Gov 8 (4%) 73 (51%) 98 (0.0%) 0 (0%)
Banks 71 (37%) 143 (99%) 3283 (12%) 11 (6%)
Corporates 102 (59%) 143 (99%) 5338 (20%) 27 (14%)
Continued on next page
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Table B.1 – Continued from previous page
Flow Type A/L Sector Country Quarter Country-Quarter Panel
Portfolio Debt
Assets
Central Banks 44 (23%) 86 (60%) 1154 (4%) 0 (0%)
General Gov 60 (32%) 104 (72%) 1990 (7%) 3 (2%)
Banks 100 (53%) 134 (93%) 5097 (17%) 18 (9%)
Corporates 101 (53%) 143 (99%) 5090 (19%) 18 (9%)
Liabilities
oo
Central Banks 38 (20%) 143 (99%) 981 (4%) 1 (0.5%)
General Gov 104 (55%) 143 (99%) 6243 (23%) 21 (11%)
Banks 91 (48%) 143 (99%) 4037 (15%) 13 (7%)
Corporates 93 (49%) 143 (99%) 5217 (19%) 19 (10%)
Other Investment Debt
Assets
Central Banks 92 (48%) 143 (99%) 3734 (14%) 2 (1%)
General Gov 104 (55%) 143 (99%) 5653 (21%) 12 (6%)
Banks 138 (73%) 143 (99%) 9793 (36%) 53 (28%)
Corporates 135 (71%) 143 (99%) 9209 (34%) 45 (24%)
Continued on next page
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Table B.1 – Continued from previous page
Flow Type A/L Sector Country Quarter Country-Quarter Panel
Liabilities
Central Banks 130 (68%) 143 (99%) 8768 (32%) 29 (15%)
General Gov 138 (73%) 143 (99%) 10292 (38%) 47 (25%)
Banks 137 (72%) 143 (99%) 10372 (38%) 54 (28%)
Corporates 139 (73%) 143 (99%) 10307 (38%) 56 (29%)
Other Equity
Assets All (%) (%) (%) (%)
Liabilities All (%) (%) (%) (%)
Financial Derivatives
Assets
Central Banks 14 (7%) 95 (66%) 225 (1%) 0 (0%)
General Gov 25 (13%) 86 (60%) 578 (2%) 0 (0%)
Banks 58 (31%) 103 (72%) 1906 (7%) 3 (2%)
Corporates 53 (28%) 111 (77%) 1620 (6%) 4 (2%)
Liabilities
Central Banks 9 (5%) 85 (59%) 136 (0.5%) 0 (0%)
General Gov 17 (9%) 95 (66%) 346 (1%) 0 (0%)
Continued on next page
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Table B.1 – Continued from previous page
Flow Type A/L Sector Country Quarter Country-Quarter Panel
Banks 52 (27%) 103 (72%) 1603 (6%) 2 (1%)
Corporates 49 (26%) 113 (78%) 1400 (5%) 2 (1%)
Reserves Assets Central Bank 146 (77%) 143 (99%) 11387 (42%) 65 (34%)
The dataset covers 190 Countries over 1980q1-2015q4 (144 Quarters), yielding 27360 Country-Quarter observations. The first
number in each cell is the total number of countries, quarters, observations, and countries (respectively) with non-missing data,
while the second number is the percent of total countries, quarters, observations, and countries, respectively. The Panel column
is the number (and percent) of countries with non-missing observations over 1996q1-2014q4. Note that, at the time of donwload,
most 2015q4 variables have not yet been reported.
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Table B.2: Other Investment Debt Instrument Coverage by Sector
Instrument A/L Sector Country Quarter Country-Quarter Panel
Currency and Deposits
Assets
Central Banks 60 (32%) 137 (95%) 2212 (8%) 0 (0%)
General Gov 80 (42%) 143 (99%) 2913 (11%) 4 (2%)
Banks 140 (74%) 143 (99%) 9377 (34%) 49 (22%)
Corporates 130 (68%) 143 (99%) 7531 (28%) 30 (16%)
Liabilities
Central Banks 97 (51%) 143 (99%) 4779 (17%) 9 (5%)
General Gov 21 (11%) 143 (99%) 627 (2%) 1 (0.5%)
Banks 137 (72%) 143 (99%) 9413 (34%) 41 (22%)
Corporates 51 (27%) 143 (99%) 1496 (5%) 2 (1%)
Loans
Assets
Central Banks 37 (19%) 134 (93%) 840 (3%) 0 (0%)
General Gov 62 (33%) 143 (99%) 2910 (11%) 7 (4%)
Banks 110 (58%) 143 (99%) 6287 (23%) 24 (13%)
Continued on next page
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Table B.2 – Continued from previous page
Instrument A/L Sector Country Quarter Country-Quarter Panel
Corporates 98 (52%) 143 (99%) 5377 (20%) 19 (10%)
Liabilities
Central Banks 107 (56%) 143 (99%) 5521 (20%) 5 (3%)
General Gov 140 (74%) 143 (99%) 9918 (36%) 44 (23%)
Banks 117 (62%) 143 (99%) 6477 (24%) 23 (12%)
Corporates 136 (72%) 143 (99%) 9835 (36%) 48 (25%)
Trade Credit and Advances
Assets
Central Banks 3 (2%) 55 (38%) 113 (0.4%) 0 (0%)
General Gov 38 (20%) 143 (99%) 1376 (5%) 2 (1%)
Banks 16 (8%) 107 (74%) 438 (2%) 2 (1%)
Corporates 108 (57%) 143 (99%) 6423 (23%) 26 (14%)
Liabilities
Central Banks 5 (3%) 83 (58%) 127 (0.4%) 0 (0%)
General Gov 39 (21%) 143 (99%) 1177 (4%) 0 (0%)
Banks 20 (11%) 105 (73%) 456 (2%) 0 (0%)
Continued on next page
221
Table B.2 – Continued from previous page
Instrument A/L Sector Country Quarter Country-Quarter Panel
Corporates 121 (64%) 143 (99%) 7431 (27%) 34 (18%)
Other Accounts Payable/Receivable
Assets
Central Banks 61 (3%) 143 (99%) 1722 (6%) 1 (0.5%)
General Gov 82 (43%) 143 (99%) 3235 (12%) 5 (3%)
Banks 92 (48%) 143 (99%) 4280 (16%) 12 (6%)
Corporates 105 (55%) 143 (99%) 5256 (19%) 9 (5%)
Liabilities
Central Banks 81 (43%) 143 (99%) 3305 (12%) 2 (1%)
General Gov 90 (47%) 143 (99%) 3348 (12%) 7 (4%)
Banks 95 (50%) 143 (99%) 4257 (16%) 8 (4%)
Corporates 110 (58%) 143 (99%) 6067 (22%) 13 (7%)
Continued on next page
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Table B.2 – Continued from previous page
Instrument A/L Sector Country Quarter Country-Quarter Panel
Insurance and Pensions
Assets
Central Banks n/a n/a n/a n/a
General Gov n/a n/a n/a n/a
Banks 1 (0.5%) 4 (3%) 4 (0.0%) 0 (0%)
Corporates 29 (15%) 107 (74%) 891 (3%) 3 (2%)
Liabilities
Central Banks n/a n/a n/a n/a
General Gov n/a n/a n/a n/a
Banks n/a n/a n/a n/a
Corporates 34 (18%) 107 (74%) 1030 (4%) 2 (1%)
The dataset covers 190 countries over 1980q1-2015q4 (144 quarters), yielding 27360 country-quarter observations. The first number in each cell
is the total number of countries, quarters, observations, and countries (respectively) with non-missing data, while the second number is the
percent of total countries, quarters, observations, and countries, respectively. The Panel column is the number (and percent) of countries with
non-missing observations over 1996q1-2014q4. Note that, at the time of download, most 2015q4 variables have not yet been reported.
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Table B.3: BOP Variables by Sector
Flow Type A/L Sector New BP6 New IIP
Direct Investment
Assets All BFDA BP6 USD IAD BP6 USD





(BFPAECB BP6 USD + BF-
PAEMA BP6 USD)




BFPAEG BP6 USD IAPEG BP6 USD
Banks BFPAEDC BP6 USD IAPEDC BP6 USD




BFPLECB BP6 USD ILPECB BP6 USD
Continued on next page
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Table B.3 – Continued from previous page
Flow Type A/L Sector New BP6 New IIP
General Gov-
ernment
BFPLEG BP6 USD ILPEG BP6 USD
Banks BFPLEDC BP6 USD ILPEDC BP6 USD
Corporates BFPLEO BP6 USD ILPEO BP6 USD
Continued on next page
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Table B.3 – Continued from previous page





(BFPADCB BP6 USD + BF-
PADMA BP6 USD)




BFPADG BP6 USD IAPDG BP6 USD
Banks BFPADC BP6 USD IAPDDC BP6 USD









BFPLDG BP6 USD ILPDG BP6 USD
Banks BFPLDDC BP6 USD ILPDDC BP6 USD
Continued on next page
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Table B.3 – Continued from previous page
Flow Type A/L Sector New BP6 New IIP





BFOADCB BP6 USD IAODCB BP6 USD
General Gov-
ernment
BFOADG BP6 USD IAODG BP6 USD
Banks BFOADDC BP6 USD IAODDC BP6 USD




BFOLOCBFR BP6 USD ILOOCBFR BP6 USD
General Gov-
ernment
BFOLOGFR BP6 USD ILOOGFR BP6 USD
Banks BFOLODC BP6 USD ILOODC BP6 USD
Continued on next page
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Table B.3 – Continued from previous page
Flow Type A/L Sector New BP6 New IIP





BFFACB BP6 USD +
BFFAMA BP6 USD




BFFAG BP6 USD IADFG BP6 USD
Banks BFFADC BP6 USD IADFDC BP6 USD




BFFLCB BP6 USD ILFCB BP6 USD
General Gov-
ernment
BFFLG BP6 USD ILFG BP6 USD
Banks BFFLDC BP6 USD ILFDC BP6 USD
Continued on next page
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Table B.3 – Continued from previous page
Flow Type A/L Sector New BP6 New IIP
Corporates BFFLO BP6 USD ILFO BP6 USD
Reserves Assets Central Bank BFRA BP6 USD IAR BP6 USD
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B.3 BIS Data
B.3.1 International Debt Securities
The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) produces datasets on interna-
tional bond issuance and bonds outstanding, by sector and by residence or na-
tionality of the issuer. International debt securities (IDS) are defined as those is-
sued in a market other than that of the country where the borrower resides (Gruić
& Wooldridge, 2012). This does not necessarily imply that the securities are held
by foreigners, but can be taken as an approximation for external holdings of debt
securities.18 Since the IDS data are compiled on a security-by-security basis, gran-
ular sectoral splits are easy to obtain, unlike the data on debt from international
bank creditors which requires some construction to obtain the split.
The IDS data are important for our exercise. While the BOP data relies on
reporting by national statistical offices (which can result in incomplete coverage
of portfolio debt securities by sector), the IDS data are compiled directly on a
security-by-security basis, which can result in much better coverage. The IDS
data can also be presented on a residency basis or by the nationality of the issuing
institution. See Avdjiev, Chui, and Shin (2014) and Shin (2013) for a more detailed
discussion of this issue.
18While this is a reasonable assumption for most borrowing sectors and countries in the world,
there are some exceptions. Most notably, the gap between the set of IDS and the set of externally-
held debt securities tends to considerable in the case of government bonds issued by reserve
currency countries, since these countries often issue large amounts of government debt in domes-
tic markets, which are then traded abroad. Lately, this has also been the case for the government
bonds of several large EMEs (e.g. Brazil, Mexico, and Poland), albeit to a lesser degree than for
government bonds issued by reserve currency countries. For most of these cases, BOP data is
available and used. Otherwise, we rely on other data sources first to avoid this issue.
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There are several options for how we allocate international debt securities
to each sector. As noted earlier, bonds can be classified based on the residence of
the issuer or the nationality of the issuer. Further, the BIS classifies IDS according
to sector with several subsectors which can be aggregated up to our public, bank,
and corporate sectors: Public banks, private banks, central banks, public other
financial corporations, private other financial corporations, public non-financial
corporations, private non-financial corporations, and general government sec-
tors.
We keep general government and central bank sectors as they are found.
Public and private banks are allocated to the bank sector. Public and private other
financial and public and private non-financial corporations are allocated to the
corporate sector. This aligns the bonds up with the standard institutional sector
definitions in the BOP data. However, the role of public banks and corporations
can be quite important in some countries.
B.3.2 BIS External Bank Credit Data
The BIS compiles two sets of statistics on international banking activity. The
Locational Banking Statistics (LBS) capture outstanding claims and liabilities of
internationally active banks located in 44 reporting countries against counter-
parties residing in more than 200 countries. Banks record their positions on an
unconsolidated basis, including intragroup positions between offices of the same
banking group. The data are compiled based on the residency principle (as done
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for BOP or QEDS). The LBS capture the overwhelming majority of cross-border
banking activity.19 The historical LBS data breaks down counterparties in each
country into banks (banks and central bank sectors) and non-banks (corporate
and government sectors).20 The LBS reports outstanding stocks, and based on
them BIS calculates exchange rate- and break-adjusted flows.21
The second set of banking data is the Consolidated Banking Statistics (CBS).
This differs from the LBS in that the positions of banks reporting to the BIS are ag-
gregated by the nationality (rather than by the residence) of the reporting bank.22
Currently, banking groups from 31 countries report to the CBS. We use the CBS on
an immediate counterparty basis (CBS/IC).23 The CBS data does provide a bor-
rower breakdown of the Non-Bank Sector into Public and Private. Since there is
no currency breakdown available for the CBS, the BIS does not calculate adjusted
19Due to the fact that not all counties in the world report data to the LBS, these statistics do not
capture the entire global stock of outstanding external bank credit. Most countries which host
large internationally active banks have reported to the LBS for several decades (the full list of LBS
reporting countries is available at: http://www.bis.org/statistics/rep countries.htm). Neverthe-
less, there are a small number of notable exceptions, such as China and Russia (the LBS series for
both of which starts only as recently as Q4/2015). That said, the LBS capture around 95% of all
global cross-border interbank business (BIS, 2015). While there is no similar estimate for the share
of cross-border bank lending to non-banks captured by the LBS, it is reasonable to assume that it
is also above 90%.
20Data on total cross border claims by BIS reporting banks separated by bank and non-bank
counterparties are available going back to 1978. The recent enhancements to the BIS LBS data
have provided more granular counterparty sector splits. Most importantly in the context of our
study, in the enhanced LBS data the non-bank sector has been divided into the non-bank private
sector and the public sector (Avdjiev, McGuire, & Wooldridge, 2015).
21Breaks may arise from changes in reporting practices, methodology, population of reporting
institutions, etc. Other valuation adjustments besides exchange rates are less concerning, as loans
are generally not traded in secondary markets.
22For example, the positions of a French bank’s subsidiary located in New York - which in the
LBS are included in the positions of banks in the United States - are consolidated in the CBS with
those of its parent and included in the positions of French banks.
23The CBS are compiled in two different ways: by immediate counterparty and by ultimate
risk. The immediate counterparty is the entity with whom the bank contracts to lend or borrow.
Ultimate risk takes account of credit risk mitigants, such as collateral, guarantees and credit pro-




B.3.3 Obtaining Borrowing Sector Splits for Bank Creditor Data
In this section, we describe our methodology for constructing gross capital
inflows and debt outstanding from BIS sources. Our goal is to obtain the stocks
and flows measured based on residency (consistent with the LBS data), but we
also employ the CBS to obtain certain (non-bank) borrowing sector splits. We
deviate from residency in some cases to gain a more complete picture of flows.
The bank loan data is from the LBSR. For observations prior to 2013, the
LBS only provide the breakdown between bank and non-bank debtors (where
non-bank captures both the non-bank private and the public sector).24 We focus
on cross-border bank lending in the LBS in the form of loans, for which we have
data starting in 1996. However, our methodology described below can also be
applied to total cross-border bank claims (in all instruments).25
Next, we describe how we use the sectoral split information contained in
the CBS/IC data in order to divide the Non-Bank sector in the LBS data into Non-
Bank Public sector and Non-Bank Private sector. This is described next. First, we
go over our methodology for constructing the split for the outstanding stocks
of LBS cross-border bank loans. Then, we describe our methodology for con-
24The enhanced BIS data, available from 2013 on, splits the non-bank sector into public and
private sub-sectors. Note that the LBS include central banks with banks instead of public, but
central banks tend to compose a very small portion of cross-border bank claims in the BIS data.
25Starting in 1984, we have data for total bank cross-border credit (in all instruments). We don’t
use this in our initial analysis in order to avoid double counting external bond flows. In practice,
the difference between total bank credit and bank credit in just the loan and deposit instruments
tends to be small.
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structing the split for exchange rate adjusted changes, which relies on currency
composition information available in the LBS.
B.3.3.1 Borrowing Sector Splits for Outstanding Stocks
For outstanding stocks, we use the share of international bank debt for each
sector from the CBS to estimate the split of the Non-Bank LBS data into Public









where npb indicates Non-Bank Private, nb indicates Non-Bank, pub indi-
cates Public, j denotes the borrowing country, and t denotes the time period. X̂BS
is our estimated cross border bank debt, XBC denotes the cross border claims
(from the LBS) of BIS reporting banks, and INTC is international claims (from the
CBS on immediate counterparty basis). The CBS international claims are defined
as the sum of XBC and the local claims by foreign affiliates that are denominated
in foreign currencies (LCFC).
This construction of the split of bank debt makes the following assumptions:
First, the sectoral shares for INTC are the same as the sectoral shares for XBC.
This is reasonable since for most countries, LCFC tends to be small relative to
26This estimation is also used in Arslanalp and Tsuda (2014a) and Arslanalp and Tsuda (2014b).
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XBC.27 Second, the sectoral shares for the set of banks that report LBS data (44
countries) are the same as the sectoral shares for the set of banks that report CBS
data (31 countries). The 31 CBS reporting countries account for about 90% of the
XBC in the LBS, and the CBS captures the activities of the subsidiaries of banks
from these 31 countries worldwide. As a result, the CBS data are sufficiently
representative to make the above assumption a reasonable one. Third, data for
the CBS that allows us to estimate the split of Non-Bank into Public and Private
is not available for advanced economies before 2000, and is only available on
a semiannual basis for EM for the period before 2000. We linearly extrapolate
the semiannual shares to Public and Private into a quarterly series for EM. For
advanced economies, we assume constant shares from 2000 backwards.28
Having made these assumptions and constructed the external debt to bank
creditors, we can then estimate total external debt by sector by adding X̂BS to
IDS for each sector. This will produce a longer series of external debt estimates
by sector than the Quarterly External Debt Statistics (QEDS)29, and cover more
countries.
Recently, the BIS has released its enhanced banking data, starting in 2013.
This data contain more granular borrowing sector splits - Bank, Public, and Non-
Bank Private. We use this short, recent series to judge the quality of our decompo-
27While for most countries, LCFC tends to be small relative to XBC, there are a small number
of exceptions. For example, this is not the case in dollarized economies (e.g. Ecuador) and some
emerging European economies (e.g. Hungary and Poland), where lending denominated in euro
and in Swiss francs has been non-negligible.
28The assumption of constant shares for advanced economies before 2000 is not too concerning
when we are only extending back 4 years.
29The QEDS data starts in 2004, and provides data on stocks of external debt by institutional
sector for a wide range of countries.
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sition. Our methodology for estimating borrowing sector splits for the non-bank
borrowing sector and the public sector generates estimates that are very close to
the actual (reported) underlying figures.30
B.3.3.2 Borrowing Sector Splits for Outstanding Flows
Obtaining exchange rate-adjusted flows to all sectors and to banks is straight-
forward since they are reported in the LBS data. However, as discussed above,
the historical LBS data do not have a split of the non-banks sector into its pub-
lic and private components. Thus, in order to get estimates for exchange rate-
adjusted flows to the non-bank private sector and to the public sector, we rely
on the estimated stocks for those sectors obtained in the previous section.31 We
assume that the currency compositions of claims on these sectors are the same as
the currency composition of claims on the non-bank sector as a whole.
Using the above assumption, we can obtain estimates of the stock of bank











i,t is the estimated stock of claims denominated in currency j on the
non-bank private Sector in country i at the end of period t; X̂BS
all,nbp
i,t is the es-
30Since not all LBS reporting countries have started providing the enhanced borrowing sec-
tor splits, these comparisons are based on the set of LBS reporting countries which had started
reporting enhanced LBS data as of March 2016.
31Note that since most bank credit is not traded in secondary markets (e.g. loans), fluctuations
in market valuations should be negligible.
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timated stock of claims denominated in all currencies on the Non-Bank Private
Sector in country i at the end of period t; XBSj,nbi,t is the reported stock of claims
denominated in currency j on the Non-Bank Private Sector in country i at the
end of period t; and XBSall,nbi,t is the reported stock of claims denominated in all
currencies on the Non-Bank Private Sector in country i at the end of period t.
We then estimate the flow of bank lending to the Non-Bank Private Sector
in each currency by converting the USD values of the estimated stocks into their
corresponding values in the currency in which they are denominated using the
same period USD exchange rate, differencing them, and then converting back



















i,t is the estimated flow of claims denominated in currency j on the
Non-Bank Private Sector in country i during period t; FX j,usdt is the end-of-period
t exchange rate between currency j and USD; and F̃X
j,usd
t is the average exchange
rate during period t between currency j and USD.
Now that we have the estimated flow for each currency, we sum these indi-








where nbp denotes the Non-Bank Private Sector.
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where pub denotes the Public Sector.
B.4 Filling Missing Data
We draw on 3 separate sources for data to construct measures of capital
flows that can be used when the BOP data is missing. The first is BIS data, which
is described in detail in Appendix B.3. We also draw on the International In-
vestment Position (IIP) data that accompanies the BOP data, and the Quarterly
External Debt Statistics (QEDS) data which is produced jointly by the World Bank
and IMF. Both of these are stock measures, and have the same sector and capital
flow type classifications as the BOP data. The QEDS data is quarterly, the IIP data
comes either quarterly or annually.
The dataset with the most broad coverage by sector and capital flow type is
derived from BIS data. While this data in many cases captures much of the inter-
national financial flows we are trying to measure, it is not always an appropriate
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fill. Specifically, bond inflows are measured in the BIS data as net issuance of debt
securities in international markets. While this measure is appropriate for many
countries, countries that have many foreigners buying domestically issued bonds
or domestics buying international issued bonds will introduce error. An impor-
tant example of this is government debt issued by advanced economies. The US
has a substantial amount of sovereign debt that is traded abroad, but nearly all
of the debt is issued domestically, making the BIS measure an inappropriate way
to fill the missing series.32 Thus to increase the accuracy of our filling process,
we turn to the IIP and QEDS data. To approximate flows, we first difference the
stocks with a simple correction for exchange rate valuation effects.33 When both
IIP and QEDS data are available, we use the IIP measures for consistency with
the BOP data. We use these stock measures to fill both portfolio debt and other
investment debt for the government and central bank sectors. We also use these
measures to fill Corporate portfolio debt in AE.
For the remaining missing data, we use our BIS constructed measures. Ta-
ble B.1 summarizes the process of constructing matching series using the BIS
data.
32The only national data that we include is for the United States, which has subtantial capital
flows that won’t be captured by the BIS data, but also a gap between the availability of QEDS
and IIP data and the coverage of the BOP data. Specifically, we fill in the stock IIP measure of
government portfolio debt for the US using the TIC data from the US Treasury, Securities data (B)
Tables A.2.d and A.2.a, for the period 1999q1-2003q2, and then take the first difference.
33Data on currency composition of external debt, split by capital flow type and sector, is scarce.
We assume the external debt is denominated in domestic currency. While this is not always the
case, changing the assumption to denominated in USD does not appreciably change our filling
accuracy.
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Table B.1: BIS Data Alignment with BOP
Sector
Capital
Flow Type Banks Corporates Government Central Bank












Loans to Government +
IMF Credit to GG (BOP)
Loans to CB +




BOP OID to DC OID to OS OID to GG OID to CB
BIS BIS Filled Loans plus any other non-missing other investment
debt instruments from BOP, by sector
DC = Depository Corproations, except the Central Bank; OS = Other Sectors; GG = General Government; CB =
Central Bank; CD = Currency & Deposits; LN = Loans; PD = portfolio debt; OID = other investment debt; NI = Net
Issues in International Markets by Residency
For the BIS data, we construct our measure of portfolio debt flows from the
BIS IDS data. It captures net issuance of debt securities (bonds) in a market other
than that of the country where the borrower resides (Gruić & Wooldridge, 2012).
This does not necessarily imply that the securities are held by foreigners, but can
be taken as an approximation for external financing flows through debt securi-
ties.34 Since the IDS data are compiled on a security-by-security basis, granular
sectoral splits are easy to obtain; we thus construct these net issuances by sector
using the same sector definitions as the BOP data.
For other investment debt, we construct our series from our BIS estimates
as follows: First, we examine the underlying components of other investment
debt. The primary instruments are loans (for corporates and governments) and
currency and deposits (for banks and central banks). If loans are missing for cor-
porates or government, or currency and deposits is missing for banks or central
34As discussed above, the assumption does not hold well for sovereign debt, particularly in
advanced economies, but is otherwise appropriate for many economies.
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banks, we rely on the BIS Locational Banking Statistics (LBS) to fill in the data.35
The BIS data captures cross-border lending from banks in BIS reporting coun-
tries.36,37 This lending can be broken by instrument into loans, debt securities
holdings, and other instruments. We use just the loan instrument in our mea-
sure, and so avoid capturing any bond holdings or equity investment made by
banks. Since the BIS data will not capture official lending, we add IMF Credit
to these series to capture that component of loans.38 The Locational Banking
Statistics by Residence (LBSR) historically only break the counterparty sector for
Bank lending into banks and non-banks, though recent data includes additional
sector splits. We employ the BIS Consolidated Banking Statistics (CBS) and the
Locational Banking Statistics by Nationality (LBSN), both of which have further
counterparty breakdowns, in order to construct estimates for Bank lending flows
for all 4 sectors for the entire period, as described in Appendix B.3.
After augmenting the Loans (or Currency and Deposits) with the BIS data,
we sum them with any remaining non-missing instruments within other invest-
ment debt. This sum becomes our estimate for other investment debt from BIS
data.39
35Interbank loan flows are automatically classified as deposits in the BOP data. Thus, all loans
from BIS reporting banks to bank counterparties, including the central bank, would be captured
in the currency and deposits instrument in the BOP.
36This captures about 95% of all cross-border interbank business (BIS, 2015).
37There have been some discrepancies noted in the past between the BOP ad BIS data due for
a few specific cases, such as trustee accounts in Japan and custodial accounts in Switzerland. We
give priority to the BOP data, which is well reported for these series.
38IMF Credit is a subcomponent of the Loans instrument in other investment debt for general
government and central banks. This figure is known by the IMF even if the actual loans by sector
are not reported by the country. For central banks, since we fill the currency and deposits instru-
ment with BIS loans, we add IMF Credit to the central bank back in only if the Loans instrument
is missing.
39In general, when other investment debt is missing, most data on the underlying instruments
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Our corresponding stock measures are similarly constructed. We rely first
on IIP data, with an internal fill. We next fill any missing data with QEDS mea-
sures. And finally any remaining missing observations are filled with our BIS
stock estimates derived above.40
B.4.1 Comparison with BOP data
Having thus constructed our filling series, we compare the result with the
available BOP data. Figures B.1 and B.2 illustrates this match by plotting the ag-
gregate flows for each series by sector, capital flow type, and country group. For
each sector and capital flow type, we keep only countries that had non-missing
BOP data over 2006q1-2013q4.
are also missing. A few countries are exceptions to this, and only for a very few periods: Eritrea
and Equatorial Guinea in the annual data, and Eritrea and Kosovo in the quarterly data. None of
these countries are included in our analysis with this data.
40Even though the sector data may be missing in the BOP, the total for portfolio debt or other
investment debt inflows often is not. We do not constrain our filled series by sector to match the
total of the flow type as reported in the BOP. However, the two series correlate highly (.98) and
exhibit similar patterns.
243
Figure B.1: Aggregate Portfolio Debt, Billions USD
(a) Advanced





(e) Advanced Banks (f) Emerging Banks
(g) Advanced Corporates (h) Emerging Corporates
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Figure B.2: Aggregate Other Investment Debt , Billions USD
(a) Advanced









(g) Advanced Banks (h) Emerging Banks (i) Developing Banks




There are 89 countries in our annual data sample of capital inflows:41
Advanced (25): Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United
Kingdom, United States
Emerging (34): Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Colombia, Croa-
tia, Czech Republic, Egypt, Estonia, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Kaza-
khstan, Latvia, Lebanon, Lithuania, Macedonia, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, Philip-
pines, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South
Africa, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, Uruguay, Venezuela
Developing (30): Albania, Angola, Bangladesh, Belarus, Bolivia, Costa Rica,
Cote d’Ivoire, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Gabon, Ghana, Guatemala,
Jamaica, Kenya, Liberia, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Namibia, Nigeria,
Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Serbia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Trinidad and
Tobago, Tunisia, Vietnam
Countries dropped for the Direct Investment figures (22): Angola, Aus-
tria, Belgium, Cote d’Ivoire, El Salvador, Gabon, Greece, India, Ireland, Jamaica,
Jordan, Lebanon, Liberia, Malaysia, Montenegro, Morocco, New Zealand, Serbia,
41If we use quarterly data for these figures our sample drops to 85, leaving off El Salvador,
Mongolia, Montenegro, and Serbia.
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Trinidad and Tobago, Ukraine, Venezuela, Vietnam
B.5.2 Inflow Regressions
Sample was selected from countries that had data for debt flows for all 4
sectors and for GDP over 2001q3-2014q4.
Advanced (23): Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United
States
Emerging (28): Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Colombia, Croa-
tia, Czech Republic, Egypt, Estonia, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Latvia,
Lithuania, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russian Fed-
eration, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey
Developing (4): Bolivia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala
Note that we drop Cyprus and Iceland due to their large debt flows relative
to individual GDP.42
42Samples by region (for appendix correlation tables): NorthAmerica (2): Canada, United
States; Latin America (10): Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador,
Guatemala, Mexico, Peru; Central and Eastern Europe (13): Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Repub-
lic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovak Republic,
Slovenia, Turkey; Western Europe (16): Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United King-
dom; Emerging Asia (7): China, India, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand;




Our outflow sample consists of 31 countries:43
Advanced (15): Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Netherlands, Norway, United King-
dom
Emerging (16): Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, Colombia, Croatia, Czech Republic,
Estonia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Mexico, Philippines, Russian Federa-
tion, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey
B.5.4 DRS Debt Data
The DRS data is annual and does not cover advanced economies. It does,
however, extend much further back for many of the countries. Our sample con-
sists of 74 countries over 1981-2014 is as follows:
Emerging (14): Brazil, Bulgaria, China, Colombia, Egypt, India, Indonesia,
Jordan, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, Philippines, Thailand, Turkey
Developing (60): Algeria, Bangladesh, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana,
Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad,
Comoros, Republic of Congo, Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, Dominica, Dominican
Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethipia, Fiji, Gabon, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala,
Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Honduras, Jamaica, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagas-
43For the outflow figures using the annual data, we extend the sample back to 2002 by dropping
Korea and Netherlands from the advanced group, though we are able to add Poland and Uruguay
to the EM group. The trends in the figures are the same if we use our main sample and start in
2004.
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car, Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nige-
ria, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone,
Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Vanuatu,
Zambia, Zimbabwe
B.6 Additional Results
B.6.1 Flow Shares by Sector
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Figure B.1: Composition of External Debt Inflows: Share by Sector
(a) Share of Debt in Total
Stocks
(b) Share of Other
Investment in Total Debt
Stocks
(c) Share of Portfolio Debt
in Total Debt Stocks
(d) Share of Sectors in
Total Debt - Advanced
(e) Share of Sectors in
Other Investment Debt -
Advanced
(f) Share of Sectors in
Portfolio Debt - Advanced
(g) Share of Sectors in
Total Debt - Emerging
(h) Share of Sectors in
Other Investment Debt -
Emerging
(i) Share of Sectors in
Portfolio Debt - Emerging
Source: BOP, IIP, QEDS, and BIS, authors’ calculations. Panel (a) uses annual data after 2001 in
order to get a balanced sample.
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B.6.2 Average Debt Flows to GDP
Figure B.2: Average External Debt Inflows, Percent of GDP











(i) Other Investment Debt,
Developing
Source: BOP, IIP, QEDS, and BIS, authors’ calculations. Total debt is portfolio debt + other
investment debt.
Since aggregate figures can be driven by some of the large players in each
group, we normalize flows by GDP and examine the evolution of the average.
Figure B.2 (a)-(c) plots this for each country group by sector. For both advanced
and emerging economies, we see a collective sudden stop in banking inflows
at the time of the 2008 crisis. Unlike the aggregate figures, we do not see the
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dramatic increase in debt inflows to emerging market banks and corporates fol-
lowing the GFC for the average country. Emerging market corporate borrowing
similarly dropped at the time of the crisis, but the drop was not as large as for
banks. The pattern of government debt inflows surging at the crisis survives for
the average emerging market country.
Splitting debt again into portfolio and other investment debt in panels (d)-
(f) and (g)-(i), we can see the magnitude of the collapse and the ensuing sustained
decrease in other investment debt flows to banks relative to GDP for the average
advanced economy. For emerging market corporates, the factor that mitigates the
collapse in other investment debt flows is the sustained increase in bond inflows
relative to GDP. Bond inflows to governments still tend to be quite large relative
to other sectors, particularly after the GFC and generally for EM.
B.6.3 Direct Investment Debt
The direct investment debt (DID) component of the data is not as exten-
sively reported as our augmented data for portfolio debt and other investment
inflows, so we limit our sample for this analysis.44 The balanced DID sample is
a subsample of 67 countries, of which there are 20 advanced, 28 emerging, and
19 developing. Details of the 22 countries that are dropped can be found in Ap-
pendix B.5.
Direct investment debt is an important part of direct investment flows, as
44When DID is missing, we fill it by subtracting direct investment equity (DIE) from total direct
investment, as with our other data series.
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shown in Figure B.3 where we plot it against direct investment equity, in aggre-
gate terms. The figure shows that they share the same pattern over time. How-
ever, with the rise in offshore issuance much of direct investment debt may really
be more like portfolio debt flows and hence less stable than its equity counterpart
(Avdjiev et al., 2014). Direct investment debt makes up a larger share of direct in-
vestment for AE, but less so for EM and especially developing countries. It is
interesting to note that, for both debt and equity, direct investment has decreased
substantially in advanced economies following the global financial crisis, but has
leveled off somewhat in emerging and developing economies. Thus, while direct
investment debt plays a larger role in the advanced world prior to the crisis, its
influence will be felt relatively more in other economies.
Figure B.3: Aggregate Direct Investment Inflows, Billions 1996 USD
(a) Advanced (b) Emerging (c) Developing
Source: BOP data and authors’ calculations.
Direct investment debt is only recorded in the BOP if one of the (related)
counterparties involved is a non-financial entity. Debt flows between related fi-
nancial enterprises (including banks) are captured in either portfolio debt or other
investment debt. We make the assumption that direct investment debt flows from
offshore non-financial firms to onshore financial firms (or banks) are negligible.
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With this assumption, we can allocate direct investment debt to the corporate
sector. We compare direct investment debt, portfolio debt, and other investment
debt for the corporate sector in Figure B.4.45
Figure B.4: Aggregate Corporate Debt Inflows, Billions 1996 USD
(a) Advanced (b) Emerging (c) Developing
Source: BOP data and authors’ calculations.
We see that direct investment debt can be significant in size, relative to other
capital flow types. It tends to follow the same trends as other forms of debt in the
aggregate, but can have some influence on the evolution of total debt. In fact, it
is larger than the other debt components in some periods.
B.6.4 PPG vs PNG Debt Inflows
We have focused on the sectoral split of inflows by government, central
bank, banks, and corporates, and found important differences between public
and private flows. Another way to examine the roles of the public and private
sector is to split the data by Public and Publicly-Guaranteed Debt (PPG) vs Pri-
vate Non-Guaranteed Debt (PNG). This allows us to capture flows nominally al-
45When comparing direct investment with our other series that have been filled using BIS data,
we need to assume that direct investment debt flows from banks to non-financial firms are negligi-
ble (else they would be double counted). This assumption applies to less than 3% of observations
in our direct investment debt sample, as most observations with non-zero direct investment debt
are not mising the other investment debt for coprorates series in the BOP.
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located to the private sector which should actually be considered liabilities of the
public sector, such as borrowing by public and quasi-public corporations com-
mon in many EM.46 We can do this for EM and developing economies using the
World Bank’s Debtor Reporting System (DRS) data found within the World Bank
International Debt Statistics (WB-IDS). This data is annual going back to 1970
for many countries, but we use a balanced sample of 14 EM and 60 developing
countries over 1981-2014.47
Figure B.5 (a)-(b) plots aggregate debt inflows from the DRS data, with
flows split by PPG and PNG debt. Panels (c)-(d) plot the average of PPG and
PNG debt to GDP ratio for each group of countries. According to these mea-
sures, PNG debt in EM soared leading up to the GFC, as most measures of debt
inflows did. Following a brief collapse, PNG debt rebounded significantly in the
aggregate, but this rebound is muted if we examine flows relative to GDP for the
average country. This is consistent with what we see in Figures 3.6 and B.2, where
much of the post-2008 increase in aggregate flows is driven by large and quickly
growing EM such as China.48
46The usual definitions allocate flows to the sector of the immediate borrower, not the sector
who is ultimately owes the debt, which may result in effectively misattributing the debt to the
wrong sector. Also, note that all of our measures are based on the residency principle, however
the recent increase in offshore bond issuance can also be a source of mismeasurement of capital
flows. Offshore bond issuance has received significant recent attention in Shin (2013), Avdjiev et
al. (2014), Avdjiev, McCauley, and Shin (2016), and others, so we refer the interested reader to
those sources for a more complete discussion of the issue.
47See Section B.5 in the appendix for details on the sample. The DRS data is first split into
short term, long term, and IMF credits. The long term data can be further subdivided by PNG
debt and PPG debt. The PPG debt can further be split by creditor. We assume that the portion
of PPG debt that is short term is negligible, and so attribute all Short Term Debt to PNG. We
further combine IMF credit into PPG debt to get our split of total external debt into public and
private components. This is analgous to the decomposition done in Alfaro, Kalemli-Özcan, and
Volosovych (2014), who do their analysis in the context of net flows.
48These figures will not be exactly comparable in terms of magnitude with our previous dataset
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Figure B.5: PPG vs. PNG Debt Inflows
(a) Aggregate, Billions 1996
USD, Emerging
(b) Aggregate, Billions 1996
USD, Developing
(c) Average, Percent GDP,
Emerging
(d) Average, Percent GDP,
Developing
Source: World Bank DRS data and authors’ calculations.
In both emerging and developing economies, and in both the aggregate and
average GDP figures, we see a steady decline in PPG debt until the GFC, after
which it rebounds, and significantly so in the case of developing economies. This
is similar to what we observe in Figures 3.6 and B.2, but in those figures the
decrease leading up to 2008 is not as pronounced as when you take the longer
time horizon.
These figures also highlight how private and public capital flows can move
opposite each other, consistent with our previous results. This is particularly no-
ticeable for EM around the 2008 crisis, where we see PNG flows fall dramatically
while PPG flows rise, thus smoothing out the total debt inflows.
in Figure 3.6, as the underlying sample of countries is somewhat different.
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B.6.5 Correlations with the VIX
Recent work by Rey (2013), Bruno and Shin (2015), and others highlights
how capital flows tend to move together and correlate strongly with the VIX, a
common proxy for global liquidity or global risk aversion. We use our dataset
to perform this analysis while distinguishing flows by sector. We use the quar-
terly version of our dataset and restrict our sample to countries where we have
quarterly GDP data for the period, 2001q3-2014q4.49 This reduces our sample to
23 advanced, 28 emerging, and 4 developing countries, 55 in total. The sample
is detailed in Appendix B.5. We split our countries into groups, aggregate their
flows, and normalize those flows by their aggregate GDP.
Table B.1: Correlation of Aggregate Inflows with VIX, by Capital Flow Type
Regions DI PE PD OID DID DIE
World -0.17 -0.52 -0.46 -0.47 -0.16 -0.12
N. America -0.19 -0.12 -0.38 -0.43 -0.47 0.06
Lat. America 0.01 -0.34 -0.43 -0.20 -0.15 0.11
Cent./East. Europe 0.01 -0.39 -0.51 -0.32 -0.01 0.02
West. Europe -0.12 -0.44 -0.27 -0.42 -0.02 -0.44
Em. Asia -0.24 -0.50 -0.51 -0.52 -0.24 -0.22
Adv. Asia 0.07 -0.40 -0.41 -0.07 0.04 0.05
ME/Africa -0.25 -0.37 -0.46 -0.35 -0.27 -0.09
Sample consists of 55 countries over 2001q3-2014q4, and is described in Ap-
pendix B.5. DI = direct investment; PE = portfolio equity; PD = portfolio debt;
OID = other investment debt; DID = direct investment debt; DIE = direct in-
vestment equity. We allow portfolio equity and direct investment to be zero if
missing when computing the aggregate figures, but correlations are comparable
if we restrict to a balanced sample where equity flows are non-missing. Inflows
are aggregated by group and normalized by group aggregate GDP.
Table B.1 is akin to correlations in Rey (2013), with flows split by capital flow
type and borrower region. In addition to the 4 main components of flows, we dis-
49Availability of quarterly GDP data constrains the size and length of our sample.
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play correlations for the debt and equity portions of direct investment separately.
Like her results, we see the familiar pattern of capital flows that are negatively
correlated with the VIX across all capital flow types. The exception to this is di-
rect investment flows, which Rey finds to be always positively correlated with the
VIX. Our results show negative correlations instead, including at the world level,
although strictly speaking they are not statistically significant.50 This is driven by
the sample window: Rey’s window is 1990q1-2012q4, but direct investment be-
gins to move more opposite of the VIX in more recent years (our sample window
is 2001q3-2014q4).
Table B.2: Correlation of Aggregate Debt Inflows with VIX, by Geography and
Sector
Regions Gov CB Bank Corp All
World 0.24 0.31 -0.52 -0.59 -0.52
N. America 0.34 0.04 -0.11 -0.62 -0.48
Lat. America -0.27 0.42 -0.47 -0.38 -0.38
Cent./East. Europe -0.10 0.27 -0.56 -0.37 -0.47
West. Europe 0.11 0.30 -0.49 -0.36 -0.44
Em. Asia -0.25 -0.13 -0.46 -0.52 -0.57
Adv. Asia -0.15 0.15 -0.06 -0.37 -0.30
ME/Africa -0.19 -0.20 -0.25 -0.45 -0.52
Sample consists of 55 countries over 2001q3-2014q4, and is described in
Appendix B.5. Debt inflows are inflows of portfolio and other investment
debt. Inflows are aggregated by group and normalized by group aggregate
GDP.
Analysis by capital flow type may obscure important trends and relation-
ships in flows by sector (see Alfaro, Kalemli-Özcan, and Volosovych (2014) for
an emphasis on this point for the case of net flows). In Table B.2, we take the
debt inflows (portfolio debt + other investment debt) and split them by sector
50The approximate standard error of each correlation in the table is 0.13.
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Table B.3: Correlation of Aggregate Portfolio Debt Inflows with VIX, by
Geography and Sector
Region Gov CB Bank Corp All
World 0.23 -0.25 -0.54 -0.50 -0.46
N. America 0.32 -0.02 -0.59 -0.52 -0.38
Lat. America -0.36 -0.38 -0.45 -0.30 -0.43
Cent./East. Europe -0.4 -0.02 -0.63 -0.43 -0.51
West. Europe 0.16 -0.09 -0.46 -0.21 -0.27
Em. Asia -0.34 -0.24 -0.42 -0.38 -0.51
Adv. Asia -0.22 -0.11 -0.47 -0.41 -0.41
ME/Africa -0.33 -0.14 -0.13 -0.29 -0.46
Sample consists of 55 countries over 2001q3-2014q4, and is described
in Appendix B.5. Inflows are aggregated by group and normalized
by group aggregate GDP.
Table B.4: Correlation of Aggregate Other Investment Debt Inflows with VIX, by
Geography and Sector
Region Gov CB Bank Corp All
World 0.11 0.31 -0.49 -0.52 -0.46
N. America 0.28 0.04 0.00 -0.58 -0.43
Lat. America 0.17 0.44 -0.42 -0.29 -0.20
Cent./East. Europe 0.26 0.28 -0.52 -0.33 -0.32
West. Europe -0.11 0.30 -0.47 -0.30 -0.42
Em. Asia -0.04 -0.03 -0.42 -0.51 -0.52
Adv. Asia 0.16 0.15 0.10 -0.31 -0.07
ME/Africa 0.23 -0.14 -0.24 -0.39 -0.35
Sample consists of 55 countries over 2001q3-2014q4, and is described
in Appendix B.5. Inflows are aggregated by group and normalized
by group aggregate GDP.
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and then examine the correlation with the VIX. The last column is the total flow
of all 4 sectors combined. The most striking feature of Table B.2 is that inflows to
the banks and corporates (the private sectors) are all negatively correlated with
the VIX as usual, but inflows to governments and central banks (the public sec-
tors) are often positively correlated, particularly for more developed regions like
North America and Western Europe. The positive correlation of government debt
with the VIX at the World level is driven by these large, AE. Tables B.3 and B.4 in
Appendix B.6 present these correlations by region with debt split into portfolio
debt and other investment debt.
Table B.5: Correlation of Aggregate Debt Inflows with VIX, by Development,
Sector, and Capital Flow Type
Portfolio Debt Other Investment Debt
Group Gov CB Bank Corp Gov CB Bank Corp
Advanced 0.28 -0.16 -0.53 -0.49 0.02 0.29 -0.44 -0.48
Emerging -0.49 -0.26 -0.65 -0.48 0.30 0.33 -0.61 -0.51
Developing -0.19 -0.07 -0.11 -0.14 0.10 0.24 -0.29 -0.15
Sample consists of 55 countries over 2001q3-2014q4, and is described in Appendix B.5.
Inflows are aggregated by group and normalized by group aggregate GDP.
Table B.5 shows the correlations, but with debt split into portfolio debt
and other investment debt and countries grouped by development. Here we
see clearly the delineation between public and private sectors. Advanced econ-
omy government portfolio debt correlates positively with the VIX. This is con-
sistent with a flight to safe assets during crisis times, or may reflect advanced
economy governments borrowing more in response to a crisis. Emerging mar-
ket sovereigns face the same fate as their private sector, with portfolio debt in-
flows falling as the VIX rises. Other investment debt to the public sectors is pos-
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itively correlated across each group, though the correlation is strongest for EM
and for advanced central banks. Thus, while emerging market sovereigns may
not be able to obtain bond financing from international financial markets during
a global crisis, they are able to obtain other forms of credit, perhaps from pub-
lic sector lenders such as the IMF. Other developing nations have quantitatively
the weakest connection of their flows to the VIX, but follow the same qualitative
patterns as emerging market countries.
B.6.6 Correlations Between Flows
We also examine the correlation of capital flows across sectors and flow
types. Rey (2013) shows that capital flows tend to move together across asset
classes and regions. We explore this relationship by sectors in stages. Table B.6
presents these correlations over the whole sample. Consistent with our previous
results, public and private flows tend to move in opposite directions.
Table B.6: Correlation of Aggregate Inflows by Sector
GG DB CB DB DC DB OS DB
GG DB 1.00
CB DB 0.21 1.00
DC DB -0.12 -0.20 1.00
OS DB -0.20 -0.30 0.80 1.00
Sample consists of 55 countries over 2001q3-2014q4, and is
described in Appendix B.5. Aggregate inflows are normal-
ized by aggregate GDP. GG = Government; CB = Central
Bank; DC = Banks; OS = Corporates; DB = Debt, which is
the sum of portfolio debt and other investment debt.
We disaggregate the flows by type in Table B.7. Here, we see a bit more
contrast. Some public flows do not move together, such as central bank portfolio
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debt, which moves opposite that of central bank and government other invest-
ment debt, but co-moves with bank and corporate portfolio debt. Also, govern-
ment portfolio debt has a weakly positive correlation with corporate other invest-
ment debt. Corporate and bank other investment debt tend to move together, and
equally strong is the correlation between corporate and bank portfolio debt. The
cross correlations of these also tend to be large, with the correlation between other
and portfolio debt for corporates being the lowest.
Table B.7: Correlation of Aggregate Inflows by Sector and Capital Flow Type
GG PD CB PD DC PD OS PD GG OID CB OID DC OID OS OID
GG PD 1.00
CB PD -0.05 1.00
DC PD -0.13 0.54 1.00
OS PD -0.28 0.43 0.77 1.00
GG OID 0.05 -0.33 -0.48 -0.34 1.00
CB OID 0.08 -0.32 -0.45 -0.33 0.46 1.00
DC OID -0.01 0.36 0.70 0.55 -0.20 -0.14 1.00
OS OID 0.01 0.38 0.62 0.46 -0.18 -0.23 0.71 1.00
Sample consists of 55 countries over 2001q3-2014q4, and is described in Appendix B.5. Aggregate in-
flows are normalized by aggregate GDP. GG = Government; CB = Central Bank; DC = Banks; OS =
Corporates; PD = portfolio debt; OID = other investment debt
Table B.8 in shows the correlation of flows by sector, capital flow type, and
country group for advanced and emerging countries. Similar patterns remain,
but additional detail on these relationships is uncovered. For instance, while
advanced economy government debt tends to move opposite that of their banks,
emerging market government portfolio debt inflows tend to move with either
advanced or emerging bank inflows.
When flows are split by sector, the common finding that most flows tend to
move together no longer holds. Rather, there is an interesting interplay between
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flows to the public and private sectors of the economy, and the relationship seems
to be different for advanced than for emerging economies.
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Table B.8: Correlation of Aggregate Inflows by Country Group, Sector, and Capital Flow Type
Advanced Emerging
Gov. Cent. Bank Bank Corp. Gov. Cent. Bank Bank Corp.
Variables PD OID PD OID PD OID PD OID PD OID PD OID PD OID PD OID
AE GG PD 1.00
AE GG OID 0.02 1.00
AE CB PD -0.08 -0.23 1.00
AE CB OID 0.11 0.45 -0.23 1.00
AE DC PD -0.21 -0.39 0.43 -0.46 1.00
AE DC OID -0.08 -0.11 0.24 -0.11 0.67 1.00
AE OS PD -0.32 -0.25 0.29 -0.32 0.76 0.53 1.00
AE OS OID -0.06 -0.10 0.09 -0.24 0.58 0.67 0.43 1.00
EM GG PD 0.10 0.01 -0.02 -0.17 0.23 0.29 0.09 0.55 1.00
EM GG OID 0.18 -0.09 -0.13 0.03 -0.42 -0.42 -0.43 -0.32 0.08 1.00
EM CB PD -0.07 -0.21 0.15 -0.30 0.42 0.33 0.43 0.61 0.37 -0.10 1.00
EM CB OID -0.04 0.03 0.08 -0.00 -0.15 -0.12 -0.19 -0.06 -0.25 -0.05 -0.01 1.00
EM DC PD -0.01 0.06 0.06 -0.16 0.37 0.38 0.33 0.53 0.53 -0.10 0.35 -0.12 1.00
EM DC OID 0.02 0.16 0.05 -0.15 0.49 0.49 0.35 0.56 0.37 -0.25 0.27 -0.24 0.47 1.00
EM OS PD 0.05 -0.02 -0.09 -0.13 0.15 0.15 0.12 0.33 0.61 0.18 0.35 -0.22 0.62 0.39 1.00
EM OS OID 0.00 0.09 0.17 0.09 0.44 0.38 0.38 0.28 0.11 -0.25 0.19 -0.24 0.46 0.71 0.35 1.00
Sample consists of 55 countries over 2001q3-2014q4, and is described in Appendix B.5. Inflows are aggregated by group and normalized by group
aggregate GDP. AE = Advanced Economies; EM = EM; GG = Government; CB = Central Bank; DC = Banks; OS = Corporates; PD = portfolio debt;
OID = other investment debt
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Table B.9 presents unconditional correlations of aggregate debt inflows and
outflows. There are high correlations between all private inflows and outflows,
but the largest correlation is for bank inflows with bank outflows (which is the
largest sector in terms of outflow and inflow volume). This result is driven by
advanced economy banks.















s Public 0.22 0.37 0.28 1.00
Bank 0.06 0.97 0.67 0.28 1.00















s Public 0.28 0.12 0.09 1.00
Bank 0.06 0.96 0.62 0.03 1.00















s Public 0.03 0.77 0.70 1.00
Bank -0.29 0.31 0.20 -0.05 1.00
Corp 0.16 0.38 0.57 0.52 -0.06 1.00
Sample consists of 31 countries (15 advanced, 16 emerging) over
2004q1-2014q4, and is described in Appendix B.5. Debt is the sum of
portfolio debt and other investment debt (and reserves in the case of
public outflows). Flows are aggregated to the country group level and
normalized by group aggregate GDP.
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B.6.7 Inflow Regressions
Table B.10 presents regressions by capital flow type rather than by sector,
using the BOP data as is and filling missing data with zero, as typically done in
the literature. As expected, we see that capital inflows are negatively associated
with the VIX across all capital flow types, with high significance on total flows
and other investment debt flows. GDP growth is likewise positively associated
with capital inflows, with high significance for total and other investment flows.
Portfolio equity is negatively correlated with GDP growth, though this relation-
ship is not significant.
Panel B restricts the sample to just advanced economies. The same results
hold generally, but with larger coefficients. Portfolio debt inflows are not signif-
icantly related to the VIX, however, and the (insignificant) coefficient on direct
investment flows is negative.
Examining the results for EM reveals important differences. Panel C shows
these regressions. We similarly see that total flows and other investment debt are
negatively related to the VIX and positively related to GDP growth. However, we
see that both portfolio debt as well as direct investment are significantly related
to the VIX. Direct investment also has a significant positive coefficient on GDP
growth.
The fact that the VIX has a negative and statistically significant impact also
on FDI in EMs is important because it is a flow category that is generally thought
of as less volatile. The negative response is consistent with what has been found
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Table B.10: Drivers of Capital Inflows, by Instrument (Quarterly BOP data,
missing filled with Zero)
Panel A: All Countries











log(VIXt−1) -7.986∗∗∗ -1.166 -1.087 -1.252 -4.481∗∗∗
(2.654) (0.626) (0.809) (0.670) (1.347)
GDP Growthit−1 0.218∗∗∗ 0.0366 -0.0245 0.0104 0.196∗∗∗
(0.0472) (0.0199) (0.0178) (0.0190) (0.0473)
Observations 2695 2695 2695 2695 2695
R2 0.041 0.008 0.006 0.005 0.037
CountryFE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: Advanced Economies











log(VIXt−1) -14.87∗∗ -1.801 -2.286 -1.961 -8.823∗∗∗
(5.998) (1.444) (1.874) (1.575) (2.897)
GDP Growthit−1 0.370∗∗∗ -0.00381 -0.0651 0.0883 0.350∗∗
(0.100) (0.0342) (0.0500) (0.0501) (0.128)
Observations 1127 1127 1127 1127 1127
R2 0.055 0.005 0.012 0.015 0.049
CountryFE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel C: EM











log(VIXt−1) -3.344∗∗∗ -0.788∗∗∗ -0.204 -0.734∗∗∗ -1.618∗∗
(0.831) (0.251) (0.115) (0.238) (0.787)
GDP Growthit−1 0.165∗∗∗ 0.0552∗∗ -0.00324 -0.0246 0.138∗∗∗
(0.0518) (0.0239) (0.00233) (0.0120) (0.0365)
Observations 1372 1372 1372 1372 1372
R2 0.074 0.020 0.003 0.010 0.094
CountryFE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample is from 2002q4-2014q4, samples as listed in Appendix B.5. Capital inflow data is from
Balance of Payments, with any missing data replaced with zeros. Dependent variables are
expressed as a percentage of GDP. VIX is the implied volatility of S&P 500 index options.
GDP growth is calculated as a year-on-year percentage growth. Errors are clustered at the
country level. ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2016), who argue that FDI flows capture a lot of in-
vestment flows by financial entities and booking at financial and offshore cen-
ters, and Blanchard and Acalin (2016), who find that FDI inflows and outflows
at the quarterly frequency are highly correlated, and emerging market FDI flows
respond to the US monetary policy rate. These papers suggest that a lot of mea-
sured FDI is in fact transitional flows between financial centers.51
Interestingly, portfolio debt has a negative coefficient on GDP growth (sig-
nificant at the 10% level), which is at odds with the majority of flows.
51See Kalemli-Özcan, Sorensen, Volosovych, and Villegas-Sanchez (2016) who decomposes FDI
between European countries into industrial and financial FDI separating direct and ultimate in-
vestors using micro data on foreign ownership. They find that FDI based on ultimate investment
is much lower, less volatile and in fact mostly done by US ultimate investors, but transitions
through European financial centers as captured by direct foreign ownership.
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Table B.11: Drivers of Total Debt Inflows Before and After the Global Financial Crisis, by Sector - Advanced Economies
(Quarterly AHKS data, missing filled from Public Sources)
Pre-GFC: 2002q4-2007q4 Post-GFC: 2008q1-2014q4
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)









log(VIXt−1) -10.47∗∗∗ -0.405 -7.224∗∗∗ -2.843∗∗ -10.49∗∗∗ -3.170∗∗∗ 1.879 2.081 -0.255 0.0529 1.258 -0.568
(2.308) (0.817) (1.805) (1.143) (2.189) (1.087) (3.714) (2.351) (1.938) (0.647) (3.339) (1.374)
GDP Growthit−1 0.00662 0.0293 0.00464 -0.0273 0.0568 0.00888 0.441∗∗∗ 0.153∗∗∗ 0.196∗∗ 0.0919 0.456∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗
(0.0741) (0.0309) (0.0576) (0.0429) (0.0952) (0.0495) (0.145) (0.0462) (0.0830) (0.0478) (0.134) (0.0383)
Observations 483 483 483 483 465 465 644 644 644 644 644 644
R2 0.042 0.001 0.025 0.039 0.035 0.028 0.030 0.008 0.011 0.013 0.031 0.011
CountryFE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample is from 2002q4-2014q4, countries as listed in Appendix B.5. Total Debt is the sum of Portfolio Debt and Other Investment Debt inflow data, constructed by AHKS as
described in Section 3.2. Public inflows are defined as the sum of General Government and Central Bank inflows. Dependent variables are expressed as a percentage of GDP.
VIX is the implied volatility of S&P 500 index options. GDP growth is calculated as a year-on-year percentage growth. Errors are clustered at the country level. ** p < 0.05, ***
p < 0.01
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Table B.12: Drivers of Total Debt Inflows Before and After the Global Financial Crisis, by Sector - Emerging Markets
(Quarterly AHKS data, missing filled from Public Sources)
Pre-GFC: 2002q4-2007q4 Post-GFC: 2008q1-2014q4
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)









log(VIXt−1) -3.269∗∗∗ 0.271 -1.595∗∗ -1.945∗∗∗ -4.248∗∗∗ -2.832∗∗∗ -0.927 1.465 -2.047∗∗ -0.345 -0.249 0.165
(0.813) (0.430) (0.586) (0.380) (0.898) (0.517) (1.022) (1.132) (0.780) (0.282) (1.315) (0.611)
GDP Growthit−1 0.00421 -0.00331 0.0152 -0.00764 0.00699 -0.00503 0.0717∗∗∗ -0.0377∗∗∗ 0.0747∗∗∗ 0.0348∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗ 0.0718∗∗∗
(0.0171) (0.00843) (0.0148) (0.00885) (0.0192) (0.0114) (0.0197) (0.0135) (0.0173) (0.00876) (0.0374) (0.0235)
Observations 588 588 588 588 558 558 784 784 784 784 752 752
R2 0.037 0.001 0.018 0.073 0.051 0.084 0.025 0.018 0.072 0.045 0.031 0.038
CountryFE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample is from 2002q4-2014q4, countries as listed in Appendix B.5. Total Debt is the sum of Portfolio Debt and Other Investment Debt inflow data, constructed by AHKS as
described in Section 3.2. Dependent variables are expressed as a percentage of GDP. VIX is the implied volatility of S&P 500 index options. GDP growth is calculated as a
year-on-year percentage growth. Errors are clustered at the country level. ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table B.13: Robustness on Controls: Drivers of Total Debt Inflows, All Sectors -
Advanced Economies (Quarterly AHKS data, missing filled from Public
Sources)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
log(VIXt−1) -9.101∗∗∗ -4.154 -3.733 -11.27∗∗∗ -11.45∗∗∗ -2.690 -5.111
(2.676) (2.294) (2.260) (3.134) (3.138) (1.592) (2.618)
GDP Growthit−1 0.506∗∗∗ 0.402∗∗ 0.539∗∗∗ 0.526∗∗ 0.275∗∗ 0.285 0.276∗∗
(0.179) (0.150) (0.185) (0.189) (0.122) (0.138) (0.133)
FFRt−1 3.199∗∗∗ 5.404∗∗∗ 3.397∗∗∗
(0.871) (1.266) (0.977)
Yield Curvet−1 -3.892∗∗∗ 3.016∗∗ 1.101
(1.109) (1.087) (1.337)
TED Spreadt−1 4.422 -4.517 -2.554
(2.988) (2.428) (2.639)
Observations 1127 1127 1127 1127 1127 1127 1127
R2 0.065 0.105 0.086 0.069 0.100 0.112 0.114
CountryFE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
TimeTrend Yes Yes
Sample is from 2002q4-2014q4, countries as listed in Appendix B.5. Total Debt is the sum of Portfolio Debt and
Other Investment Debt inflow data, constructed by AHKS as described in Section 3.2. Dependent variables
are expressed as a percentage of GDP. VIX is the implied volatility of S&P 500 index options. GDP growth
is calculated as a year-on-year percentage growth. FFR is the effective US Federal Funds Rate, lagged one
quarter. Yield Curve is the difference between 10 year US Treasury constant maturity rate and 3 month US
Treasury constant maturity rate, lagged one quarter. TED Spread is the difference between the 3 month US
dollar LIBOR rate and the 3 month US Treasury rate, lagged one quarter. FFR is the effective US Federal Funds
Rate, lagged one quarter. Yield Curve is the difference between 10 year US Treasury constant maturity rate
and 3 month US Treasury constant maturity rate, lagged one quarter. TED Spread is the difference between
the 3 month US dollar LIBOR rate and the 3 month US Treasury rate, lagged one quarter. Errors are clustered
at the country level. ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table B.14: Robustness on Controls: Drivers of Total Debt Inflows, All Sectors -
Emerging Markets (Quarterly AHKS data, missing filled from Public Sources)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
log(VIXt−1) -2.261∗∗ -1.197 -0.824 -2.539∗∗∗ -2.637∗∗∗ 0.0743 0.554
(0.829) (0.745) (0.681) (0.858) (0.948) (0.622) (0.840)
GDP Growthit−1 0.116∗∗∗ 0.0828∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗ 0.0946∗∗∗ 0.0826∗∗∗ 0.0836∗∗∗
(0.0347) (0.0252) (0.0317) (0.0342) (0.0254) (0.0234) (0.0234)
FFRt−1 0.796∗∗∗ 0.900 1.297∗∗∗
(0.282) (0.485) (0.449)
Yield Curvet−1 -1.107∗∗∗ -0.209 0.173
(0.313) (0.463) (0.407)
TED Spreadt−1 0.524 -1.624 -2.018
(0.727) (0.892) (1.000)
Observations 1372 1372 1372 1372 1372 1372 1372
R2 0.071 0.100 0.093 0.071 0.079 0.105 0.106
CountryFE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
TimeTrend Yes Yes
Sample is from 2002q4-2014q4, countries as listed in Appendix B.5. Total Debt is the sum of Portfolio Debt and
Other Investment Debt inflow data, constructed by AHKS as described in Section 3.2. Dependent variables
are expressed as a percentage of GDP. VIX is the implied volatility of S&P 500 index options. GDP growth
is calculated as a year-on-year percentage growth. FFR is the effective US Federal Funds Rate, lagged one
quarter. Yield Curve is the difference between 10 year US Treasury constant maturity rate and 3 month US
Treasury constant maturity rate, lagged one quarter. TED Spread is the difference between the 3 month US
dollar LIBOR rate and the 3 month US Treasury rate, lagged one quarter. FFR is the effective US Federal Funds
Rate, lagged one quarter. Yield Curve is the difference between 10 year US Treasury constant maturity rate
and 3 month US Treasury constant maturity rate, lagged one quarter. TED Spread is the difference between
the 3 month US dollar LIBOR rate and the 3 month US Treasury rate, lagged one quarter. Errors are clustered
at the country level. ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table B.15: Robustness on GDP Growth: Drivers of Total Debt Inflows, by Sector
- Advanced Economies (Quarterly AHKS data, missing filled from Public
Sources)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total Public Banks Corp.
log(VIXt−1) -10.48∗∗∗ 0.614 -8.600∗∗∗ -2.495∗∗
(2.986) (1.418) (2.301) (1.064)
GDP Growthit−1 0.566∗∗ 0.00402 0.446∗∗ 0.116
(0.241) (0.0688) (0.211) (0.0737)
Observations 1127 1127 1127 1127
R2 0.047 0.000 0.046 0.025
CountryFE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample is from 2002q4-2014q4, countries as listed in Appendix B.5. Total Debt
is the sum of Portfolio Debt and Other Investment Debt inflow data, con-
structed by AHKS as described in Section 3.2. Dependent variables are ex-
pressed as a percentage of GDP. VIX is the implied volatility of S&P 500 index
options. GDP growth is calculated as country year-on-year percentage GDP
growth minus aggregate advanced economy year-on-year GDP growth. Er-
rors are clustered at the country level. ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table B.16: Robustness on GDP Growth: Drivers of Total Debt Inflows, by Sector
- Emerging Markets (Quarterly AHKS data, missing filled from Public Sources)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total Public Banks Corp.
log(VIXt−1) -2.505∗∗∗ 1.188 -2.562∗∗∗ -1.132∗∗∗
(0.862) (0.677) (0.747) (0.253)
GDP Growthit−1 0.133∗∗∗ -0.0390∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗ 0.0478∗∗∗
(0.0440) (0.0136) (0.0430) (0.0112)
Observations 1372 1372 1372 1372
R2 0.066 0.017 0.099 0.078
CountryFE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample is from 2002q4-2014q4, countries as listed in Appendix B.5. Total Debt
is the sum of Portfolio Debt and Other Investment Debt inflow data, con-
structed by AHKS as described in Section 3.2. Dependent variables are ex-
pressed as a percentage of GDP. VIX is the implied volatility of S&P 500 index
options. GDP growth is calculated as country year-on-year percentage GDP
growth minus aggregate advanced economy year-on-year GDP growth. Er-




Table B.17: Drivers of Capital Outflows, by Instrument (Quarterly BOP data,
missing filled with Zero)
Panel A: All Countries











log(VIXt−1) -7.173∗∗∗ -0.0898 -0.409 -1.469∗∗∗ -5.321∗∗∗ 0.115
(2.166) (0.884) (0.522) (0.503) (1.909) (0.485)
GDP Growthit−1 0.196∗∗∗ 0.0515 -0.0142 0.00391 0.126∗∗∗ 0.0280∗∗∗
(0.0604) (0.0338) (0.00930) (0.0159) (0.0411) (0.0100)
Observations 1408 1408 1408 1408 1408 1408
R2 0.048 0.006 0.005 0.011 0.041 0.007
CountryFE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: Advanced Economies











log(VIXt−1) -11.89∗∗∗ -0.492 -0.743 -2.232∗∗ -9.375∗∗ 0.951
(3.869) (1.862) (1.102) (0.958) (3.614) (0.583)
GDP Growthit−1 0.392∗∗ 0.0824 -0.0271 0.0329 0.306∗∗ -0.00203
(0.146) (0.0424) (0.0224) (0.0467) (0.111) (0.00951)
Observations 660 660 660 660 660 660
R2 0.075 0.009 0.009 0.018 0.071 0.021
CountryFE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel C: EM











log(VIXt−1) -2.678∗∗ 0.370 -0.142 -0.775∗∗ -1.447∗∗∗ -0.683
(1.226) (0.407) (0.296) (0.351) (0.461) (0.774)
GDP Growthit−1 0.105 0.0384 -0.00761 -0.00891 0.0477∗∗ 0.0358∗∗
(0.0523) (0.0470) (0.00721) (0.00879) (0.0187) (0.0129)
Observations 704 704 704 704 704 704
R2 0.037 0.004 0.005 0.014 0.040 0.017
CountryFE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample is from 2004q1-2014q4, countries as listed in Appendix B.5. Capital outflow data is from Balance of
Payments, with any missing data replaced with zeros. Dependent variables are expressed as a percentage
of GDP. VIX is the implied volatility of S&P 500 index options. GDP growth is calculated as a year-on-year
percentage growth. Errors are clustered at the country level. ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Appendix C: Chapter 4 Appendix
C.1 Appendix
C.1.1 Macro Data
This section details the sources, definitions, and construction of the data
and variables used in the macro analysis.
VIX is taken from global liquidity indicators produce by the BIS. The VIX
is the Chicago Board Options Exchange Market Volatility Index, which is a mea-
sure of the implied volatility of the S&P 500 index options. FFR is the Effective
Federal Funds Rate obtained from FRED (the database of the St. Louis Federal
Reserve). Spread is defined as the difference between the domestic monetary
policy rate and FFR. The domestic monetary policy rate is obtained from the IMF
International Financial Statistics. When the monetary policy rate is not available,
the rate on Treasury Bills is used. When neither of those are avaiable, the Money
Market rate is used.
GDP Growth is annual nominal GDP growth from the World Bank WDI
data, publically available online. Real GDP per capita is missing recent data
for Argentina, but using real GDP per capita growth yields similar results, so
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I use the nominal figure to reatin more observations in the dataset. Exports as a
percentage of GDP is likewise taken from the public World Bank data, except
for the most recent data for Latvia and Lithuania, which was missing. This
data is filled in from Eurostat. KAOPEN is a de jure measure of capital ac-
count openness Chinn and Ito (2006). I use the version of this variable that
is normalized between 0 and 1, downloaded from http://web.pdx.edu/~ito/
Chinn-Ito website.htm, which has this measure updated through 2012. An in-
crease in the value of KAOPEN indicates domestic policies more open to capital
flows (less restrictive). For a time invariant measure of openness, I use the me-
dian value over the sample. Measures of financial development are taken from
the World Bank database produced by Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2000).
I use the ratio of bank assets to GDP as a measure of banking sector develop-
ment, using the median value over the sample to get a time invariant version (so
as to not capture fluctuations in the banking sector due to the expansion and con-
traction in global credit). My measure of institutional quality comes from pub-
lically available annual data derived from the International Country Risk Guide
(ICRG) commercial dataset. This consists of year end values of subindicators,
made available by the World Bank. I construct my measure of institutional qual-
ity from the average of the Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Cor-
ruption Control, and Rule of Law indicators for each year. For a time invariant
measure of institutional quality, I use the median value over the sample. For
exchange rate classification, I draw on Ilzetski, Reinhart, and Rogoff (2009). I
use the monthly coarse classification, and convert to quarterly data using end of
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quarter values. I classify the exchange rate as rigid if it takes a value of 1 or 2,
which encompasses explicit and de facto pegs and crawling pegs, and de facto
crawling bands narrower than +/- 2%. I construct a dummy variable equal to 1
if the exchange rate is rigid, and 0 otherwise. I use the median value over the
sample for a time invariant measure of exchange rate regime.
For measures of external debt, I draw on the Quarterly External Debt Statis-
tics database published jointly by the IMF and World Bank. I construct the share
of external debt held by the banking sector from the Quarterly External Debt
Statistics (QEDS), published jointly by the IMF and World Bank. Share of bank
debt relative to private debt is constructed by dividing banking sector external
debt by the sum of bank external debt and the “Other” sector external debt.1
Share of credit to the domestic non-financial sector extended by domestic banks
is calucalted from the BIS long series on credit to the private sector.2 I use the se-
ries adjusted for breaks in the data. The sample used from this data is Argentina,
Brazil, China, Czech Republic, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Mex-
ico, Poland, Russia, South Africa, Thailand, and Turkey. For the fraction of exter-
nal bank liabilities in foreign currencies (plotted in panel (b) of Tables C.1-C.17)
is obtained from BIS Locational Banking Statistics, Tables 2A and 2C.
The balanced sample is data from 2006q2-2013q4 for the following coun-
tries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic,
1Data is available for all of my balanced sample, except for Croatia. The banking sector is
“Deposit taking corporations, except the central bank”, while the “other” sector is composed of
other financial corporations, non-financial corporations, households, and non-profit institutions
serving households.
2see Dembiermont et al. (2013) for a discussion of this data.
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Hungary, Indonesia, Israel, Latvia, Lithuania, Mexico, Poland, South Africa, Turkey,and
Ukraine.
The sample of all emerging and developing markets has data from 1990q1-
2014q2 and consists of: Afghanistan, Albania, Argentina, Bhutan, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Repub-
lic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Israel, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Ko-
rea, Latvia, Lithuania, Mexico, Moldova, Namibia, Nigeria, Peru, Poland, Ro-
mania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Slovak Republic, South Africa, Sri Lanka,
Swaziland, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Turkey, Ukraine, Uganda, West Bank and Gaza,
and Zambia.3
C.1.2 FX Loans
The FX Loans variable is defined as fraction of gross loans made by the
domestic banking sector denominated in a non-domestic currency.4 A primary
source for this data is the Financial Soundness Indicators (FSI) produced by the
IMF. However, this data has been voluntarily reported, and so data is only avail-
able for select countries, and usually only for very recent years. I extend this
dataset with data from National sources. A description of the source of the na-
tional data and variable construction is described below. All data not from the
3Other countries with FX Loan data available from FSI: Austria, Canada, Cyprus, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong SAR China, Italy, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Macao
SAR China, Malta, Maritius, Netherlands, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, and United Kingdom
4With some exceptions, based on data availability with data drawn from national sources.
For instance, data for currency composition of external loans of the Albania banking sector are
unavailable, but it is assumed that external loans are small enough that the domestic ratio will
match the total.
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national sources described below are from the FSI database. In the below descrip-
tions, MFI stands for Monetary Financial Institutions, usually those institutions
which report to the central bank, comprising deposit taking corporations.
• Albania: The Bank of Albania reports loans of banks by district, with break-
downs by foreign and national currency. The largest districts have a full
breakdown, while a residual group of districts only had breakdown for
short term loans. I use only the districts with a full breakdown, comprising
93-94% of all loans. The correlation between this measure and the measure
including the Other districts short term loans is > .99. Data is quarterly
from 2007q4-2014q3. This is domestic loans.
• Argentina: The Central Bank of the Argentine Republic (BCRA) publishes
balance sheet data for financial institutions (excludes the central bank, data
is the exact same as that of the banking sector). The data details assets,
including loans, are broken down by external and domestic sector, and by
foreign and domestic currency. Data is consolidated. The series is monthly
starting from 1940, but most of the detail in the breakdowns begins in 1994.
• Chile: The Central Bank of Chile reports figures for loan balances by do-
mestic and foreign currency for the banking sector. Data is from 1990q1-
2014q2.
• China: The People’s Bank of China publishes figures on the sources and
uses of funds of financial institutions, which includes the People’s Bank of
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China,5 the banking industry deposit-taking financial institutions, trust and
investment companies, financial leasing companies and auto finance com-
panies. The data contains a breakdown of deposits and loans in total and
foreign currency. Data is monthly from 2007m1-2010m12, with quarterly
data for 2006.
• Colombia: The Central Bank of the Republic of Colombia (BCRP) publishes
data on the currency composition of loans granted by the financial sec-
tor. This data is weekly from 2002m5-2014m12, and “includes loans given
by depository corporations.” I use the series “Total Gross Loans without
Mortgage Loans Securitization”. The figures including securitization yield
a slightly smaller ratio.
• Costa Rica: Harmonized balance sheets of other depository corporations
(with breakdown by currency) is published by the Central Bank of Costa
Rica. Loans by sector are listed, and the sum of loans to all sectors is used
to compute the variable. Data is monthly from 2001m12-2014m12.
• Czech Republic: The Czech National Bank reports loans made by commer-
cial banks in foreign and domestic currency monthly from 1997m1-2014m12.
• Estonia: The Bank of Estonia publishes statistics on the financial sector.
Data on loans from credit institutions (Banking sector, excluding savings
and loan associations and central bank) is broken down by sector and cur-
rency from 1997m1-2014m12. Estonia joined the Euro in 2011, so domestic
5The People’s Bank has very few claims on the non-financial sector.
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currency changes from the Estonian Kroon to the Euro at that point.
• Hungary: The Central bank of Hungary publishes financial accounts by
institutional sector. They include a currency breakdown for loans. Hun-
gary posts this data for both consolidated and non-consolidated positions,
including and excluding Special Investment Vehicles (SPE), and by stocks,
flows, and revaluations. I use non-consolidated stocks (not including SPEs)
from the Monetary Institutions secgion (S.122), which includes deposit tak-
ing banks, but excludes the central bank. This data is quarterly from 1989q4-
2014q2.
• Indonesia: The Central Bank of Indonesia reports loans in total and in do-
mestic currency by commercial and rural banks. Data is 2002m1-2014m11.
• Latvia: Data for Latvia was drawn from the central bank of Latvia. Table
20 of the MFI Balance Sheet and Monetary Statistics produced by the Bank
of Latvia reports the percentage of loans in foreign currency granted by
MFI’s (except the central bank), covering 2002m1-2013m12. These figures
do not report loans made to resident MFIs, and are reported separately for
the other sectors. To get an estimate for currency composition of gross loans,
I average the ratios to the resident non-MFI sector, non-resident MFI’s, and
non-resident non-MFI’s, weighting by total loans to each. Latvia adopted
the Euro in 2014m1.
• Lithuania: The Central Bank of the Republic of Lithuania publishes balance
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sheet data for MFIs. Currency breakdown of loans to residents is in section
2.8. Currency breakdown is not available for the external sector, so I use the
domestic sector for my calculation of the composition. Comparing this to
the available numbers reported by FSI, we see that they match. Hence, I use
this series to give a larger range for the data. (Lithuania does not use the
Euro until 2015). Data is monthly, spanning 1993m12-2014m12.
• Mexico: The Central Bank of Mexico reports credit extended by commercial
banks in domestic and foreign currencies. FX Loans is calculated as the sum
of domestic and external credit, and interbank credit (to be as consistent as
possible with the definition of the variable from other sources, the interbank
market is included). Data is 1994m12-2014m11.
• Poland: The National Bank of Poland reports currency breakdown loans
and claims of the banking system. Data for loans separate from other claims
is listed for residents that are not general government or other MFIs. (“Other
claims” do not include debt securities). I estimate the currency composition
of gross loans by using “loans and other claims” for loans vis-a-vis resi-
dent MFIs and the external sector. “Loans” and “Other Claims” are listed
separately for the general government, but currency composition is only
available for their sum. I estimate the loans in foreign currency by using the
composition of the sum and multiplying by the loan total. Total gross loans
is then computed from all of these estimates. Data is from monthly from
1996m12-2014m9.
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• Romania: The Central Bank of Romania reports data on loans outstanding
from MFIs with breakdown by currency for the Private Non-Financial sec-
tor. I assume that the loans there are representative of the total gross loans
composition. Checking this data with that reported for FSI shows that they
match, and so I use this series to give a larger range. Data is monthly from
2000m1-2014m12.
• South Africa: The Reserve Bank of South Africa reports data on assets




In panel (a), the solid line is the share of loans outstanding from the domes-
tic banking sector in FX. Source: IMF Financial Soundness Indicators and Na-
tional Sources. In panel (b), the solid line is the share of banking sector external
liabilities in FX. Source: BIS Locational Banking Statistics. In panel (c), the solid
line is the share of a country’s external debt attributable to the banking sector.
Source: QEDS. In all panels, the dashed line is the logged value of the VIX.
Figure C.1: Argentina
(a) FX Loans (b) Bank FX Liabilities (c) Bank Share Ext. Debt
Figure C.2: Brazil
(a) FX Loans (b) Bank FX Liabilities (c) Bank Share Ext. Debt
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Figure C.3: Chile
(a) FX Loans (b) Bank FX Liabilities (c) Bank Share Ext. Debt
Figure C.4: Colombia
(a) FX Loans (b) Bank FX Liabilities (c) Bank Share Ext. Debt
Figure C.5: Costa Rica
(a) FX Loans (b) Bank FX Liabilities (c) Bank Share Ext. Debt
Figure C.6: Croatia
(a) FX Loans (b) Bank FX Liabilities (c) Bank Share Ext. Debt
286
Figure C.7: Czech Republic
(a) FX Loans (b) Bank FX Liabilities (c) Bank Share Ext. Debt
Figure C.8: Hungary
(a) FX Loans (b) Bank FX Liabilities (c) Bank Share Ext. Debt
Figure C.9: Indonesia
(a) FX Loans (b) Bank FX Liabilities (c) Bank Share Ext. Debt
Figure C.10: Israel
(a) FX Loans (b) Bank FX Liabilities (c) Bank Share Ext. Debt
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Figure C.11: Latvia
(a) FX Loans (b) Bank FX Liabilities (c) Bank Share Ext. Debt
Figure C.12: Lithuania
(a) FX Loans (b) Bank FX Liabilities (c) Bank Share Ext. Debt
Figure C.13: Mexico
(a) FX Loans (b) Bank FX Liabilities (c) Bank Share Ext. Debt
Figure C.14: Poland
(a) FX Loans (b) Bank FX Liabilities (c) Bank Share Ext. Debt
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Figure C.15: South Africa
(a) FX Loans (b) Bank FX Liabilities (c) Bank Share Ext. Debt
Figure C.16: Turkey
(a) FX Loans (b) Bank FX Liabilities (c) Bank Share Ext. Debt
Figure C.17: Ukraine
(a) FX Loans (b) Bank FX Liabilities (c) Bank Share Ext. Debt
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C.1.4 Macro Tables
Table C.1: Descriptive Statistics
Panel A: Full Sample (Unbalanced), 1990-2014
N mean median std. dev. min max
FX Loans 1769 35.779 28.984 25.94634 0 100
Monetary Policy Spread 1529 6.589 5.11 8.694 -3.288 178.17
Depreciation Rate 1674 0.897 0.020 7.794 -19.062 195.148
Exports/GDP 1683 36.622 32.940 17.356 5.517 92.953
GDP Growth 1683 4.026 4.491 4.274 -17.955 20.941
Openness 1769 0.621 1 0.485 0 1
Good Institutions 1769 0.831 1 0.375 0 1
Pegged Exchange Rate 1745 0.307 0 0.461 0 1
NonBank Private External Debt Growth 1013 2.662 2.273 10.150 -100.000 194.304
Bank External Debt Growth 1015 3.650 1.876 20.736 -100.000 523.670
Bank Share of External Debt 1043 22.890 21.676 14.312 0 68.716
Countries 42
Quarters 98
Panel B: Balanced Sample, 2006-2013
N mean median std. dev. min max
FX Loans 544 32.795 23.406 24.862 2.921 92.831
Monetary Policy Spread 544 4.335 4.02 4.137 -3.288 30.628
Depreciation Rate 544 0.500 -0.032 6.933 -19.063 58.404
Exports/GDP 544 39.518 37.389 19.177 10.872 88.761
GDP Growth 544 3.142 3.937 4.396 -17.955 12.233
Openness 544 0.647 1 0.478 0 1
Institutional Quaity 544 0.824 1 0.382 0 1
Pegged Exchange Rate 544 0.221 0 0.415 0 1
NonBank Private External Debt Growth 512 2.161 2.151 7.970 -1.000 35.606
Bank External Debt Growth 512 3.298 2.249 0.132 -100.000 130.617
Bank Share of External Debt 512 22.469 21.817 13.665 1.780 68.716
Countries 17
Quarters 32
FX Loans is the proportion outstanding of loans from the domestic banking sector denominated in foreign currencies.
Monetary Policy Spread is defined as the difference between the domestic monetary policy rate and the US Effective
Federal Funds Rate. Depreciation Rate is the rate of local currency depreciation vis-a-vis the US Dollar, expressed in
percent. Exports/GDP is total exports of the country normalized by GDP (annual data). GDP Growth is Nominal
GDP Growth (annual data). Openness is a dummy variable equal to 1 if KAOPEN, the Chinn-Ito index of capital
account openness, is greater than 0.5. Good Institutions is a dummy variable equal to 1 if an index constructed from
ICRG subindicators is greater than 0.5. Pegged Exchange Rate is a dummy equal to one if the exchange rate is pegged,
and 0 if it is flexible. All percentages are expressed as whole numbers, i.e. 35 represents 35%.
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Table C.2: FX Loans and VIX, Country Specific Regressions
Country 2006-2013 Full Sample Country Full Sample
Argentina 1.317∗ -1.501 Afghanistan -0.598
Brazil 1.705∗∗∗ 1.786∗∗∗ Albania 0.520
Chile 0.727 0.439 Bhutan -0.0791
Colombia 0.796 0.954∗ Bosnia and Herzegovina 1.005
Costa Rica 1.118 0.949 China -0.964∗∗
Croatia -0.844 -0.770 Estonia 2.391∗∗∗
Czech Republic 0.859∗ 1.243∗∗∗ India -1.273
Hungary 7.008∗∗∗ 3.398∗∗∗ Kazakhstan 0.897
Indonesia 1.139 0.632 Kenya 2.313∗∗∗
Israel 2.428∗∗ 1.779∗∗ Korea 2.483∗∗∗
Latvia 0.285 -0.958 Macedonia, FYR -0.271
Lithuania 0.551 -1.027 Moldova -2.421
Mexico 1.467∗∗∗ 1.956∗∗∗ Namibia -0.0317
Poland 4.961∗∗∗ 3.718∗∗∗ Peru 0.340
South Africa 0.907 0.750 Romania 2.761∗∗
Turkey 2.324∗∗∗ 2.313∗∗∗ Russia 2.480∗∗








Dependent variable is the share of domestic bank loans outstanding in foreign currencies, inde-
pendent variable is the logged value of the VIX. Data is quarterly. Each coefficient is its own
regression. Year fixed effects are included. Standard errors are max of two way cluster at country
and date levels, robust, and OLS. P-values were calculated using a wild bootstrap on the country-
cluster. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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C.1.5 Micro Tables
Table C.3: Global Liquidity and Loan Growth: Mexico Bank-Firm Level - Lag
Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FX -0.0832 0.0291 0.0250 0.0330∗∗∗ 0.0160 0.0112
(0.0775) (0.132) (0.0173) (0.00742) (0.0163) (0.0179)
FX × VIXq−1 0.0318∗ -0.00611
(0.0180) (0.0391)
FX × FFRq−1 -0.0307 -0.0593∗
(0.0304) (0.0300)
FX × Bank Inflows/GDPq−1 -0.00329∗∗∗ -0.00192
(0.000746) (0.00218)
Observations 7197 7112 7197 7112 7197 7112
R2 0.353 0.408 0.353 0.409 0.353 0.408
Banks 53 49 53 49 53 49
Firms 100 99 100 99 100 99
Quarters 26 26 26 26 26 26
BankFirmFE No Yes No Yes No Yes
BankQuarterFE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
FirmQuarterFE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample is loans from domestic banks to listed non-financial firms over 2008q1-2014q3. Dependent variable is the
log difference of loans outstanding in FX or Peso at the Bank-Firm level in each period, winsorized by 1%. VIX
is the logged value of the CBOE S&P 500 implied volatility index. FFR is the effective federal funds rate. Banks
Inflows/GDP is capital inflows to the domestic banking sector as a share of GDP, as constructed in Avdjiev, Hardy,
Kalemli-Özcan, and Servèn (2017). FX is a dummy equal to 1 if the loan is denominated in a foreign currency.
Regressions are weighted by the lagged value of the log of loan volume. Standard errors are triple clustered at the
bank, firm, and date levels. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table C.4: US Dollar and Loan Growth: Mexico Bank-Firm Level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FX × Equity/Assetsb -0.334 2.017
(0.492) (10.65)
FX × FFRq × Equity/Assetsb 1.049
(0.749)
FX × Capital Ratiob -1.293∗∗ 8.888
(0.560) (16.55)
FX × FFRq × Capital Ratiob 2.043
(1.249)
FX × Bank Sizeb 0.00230 -0.389
(0.0132) (0.246)
FX × FFRq × Bank Sizeb -0.0420∗∗
(0.0153)
FX × USD Indexq × Equity/Assetsb -0.0213
(0.108)
FX × USD Indexq × Capital Ratiob -0.0968
(0.167)
FX × USD Indexq × Bank Sizeb 0.00374
(0.00245)
Observations 6167 5765 6167 6167 5765 6167
R2 0.462 0.459 0.462 0.461 0.459 0.462
Banks 38 32 38 38 32 38
Firms 91 89 91 91 89 91
Quarters 26 26 26 26 26 26
BankFirmFE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
BankQuarterFE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
FirmQuarterCurrencyFE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample is loans from domestic banks to listed non-financial firms over 2008q1-2014q3. Dependent variable is the
log difference of loans outstanding in FX or Peso at the Bank-Firm level in each period, winsorized by 1%. FFR is
the effective federal funds rate. USD Index is the broad trade weighted value of the US dollar (from FRED). FX is a
dummy equal to 1 if the loan is denominated in a foreign currency. Equity/Assets is the average ratio of the bank’s
total equity to total assets. Capital Ratio is the bank’s average Tier 1 capital ratio. Bank Size is the logged value of the
bank’s average asset size. Regressions are weighted by the lagged value of the log of loan volume. Standard errors
are triple clustered at the bank, firm, and date levels. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Morais, B., Peydró, J., & Ruiz, C. (2015). The international bank lending channel
of monetary policy rates and quantitative easing: credit supply, reach-for-
yield, and real effects. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, 7216.
Neanidis, K., & Savva, C. (2009). Financial dollarization: short-run determinants
in transition economies. Journal of Banking and Finance, 33(10), 1860–1873.
Niepmann, F., & Schmidt-Eisenlohr, T. (2017a). Foreign currency loans and credit
risk: evidence from U.S. banks. working paper.
Niepmann, F., & Schmidt-Eisenlohr, T. (2017b). No guarantees, no trade: How
banks affect export patterns. Journal of International Economics, 108, 338–350.
Nier, E., Sedik, T., & Mondino, T. (2014). Gross private capital flows to emerging
markets: can the global financial cycle be tamed? IMF Working Paper, No.
14/196.
Obstfeld, M. (2012). Does the current account still matter? American Economic
Review, 102(3), 1–23.
OECD. (2008). The role of institutional investors in promoting good corporate
governance practices in Latin America: the case of Mexico. mimeo, OECD.
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